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(i) 
A B S T R A C T 
Non-wage labour costs comprise between 30 and 40 per cent c-f total 
labour costs in the average f i rm within the OECD bloc of countries. In many 
countries, their percentage share of total labour costs in both manufacturing 
and service industries has grown systematically over several decades. 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, labour market analysts concentrated their 
attention on the employment effects of hiring and training costs which 
comprise a relatively small proportion of all non-wages. In more recent 
times, and particularly in the 1980s, interest has expanded to embrace the 
employment and other labour market effects of changes in statutory and/or 
voluntary pension, health and unemployment contributions as well as in 
holiday payments and other special cost items. 
The early, human capital oriented, studies were principally concerned 
with explaining the cyclical adjustment of employment and hours of work to 
unanticipated changes in product demand. In later theoretical and empirical 
work, i t was established that integrating the rôle of non-wages into labour 
market analyses helped to cast considerable light on such diverse topics as 
the employment effects of working time reductions, the comparative 
international variability of workers and hours (especially in relation to the 
incidence of unemployment), the employment implications of job security 
policies, the job creation potential of payroll tax reductions and the 
implications of special tax treatment of employee fringe benefits. 
This report is designed to cover these and other policy topics, with a 
marked emphasis on the most recent international research activity. 
Attention is concentrated on the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America. The breadth of 
(ii) 
experience and policy direction encompassed by these countries allows us to 
provide a comprehensive review of the areas in which non-wage labour costs 
have an important bearing on employment as well as the wider labour 
market. In a European Community context, it is probable that a better set 
of policy perspectives is achieved from a discussion based on a wider 
comparative international setting. Our emphasis is decidedly on policy 
questions although we provide reasonable levels of theoretical and empirical 
background - in acccessible form - where these are deemed to be important 
to a full understanding of the economic issues involved. 
In the course of this work, we present detailed statistical material 
for each of the four highlighted countries. These include non-wage 
estimates of fixed and variable components of costs, relative trends in 
individual cost items and the industrial decomposition of costs together with 
information on hours of work, labour turnover, employee skill and other 
labour market variables that relate closely to non-wages. Where possible, 
the statistics are constructed in such a way as to facilitate cross-country 
comparison. 
(iii) 
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Chapter 1 Objectives, 5cope and Definitions 
A firm's total labour costs can be separated into remuneration that is 
directly related to the work performance of its employees and all other 
costs. The latter embrace a very wide spectrum of possibilities including 
social security contributions, private fringe benefits, hiring/firing and 
training costs, payments for days not worked, special types of bonus 
payments as well as a myriad of smaller cost items. Their collective name is 
non-wage labour costs (NWLCs). Recent years have witnessed a surge of 
interest in the labour market effects of changes in NWLCs, especially in 
relation to employment. Three outstanding factors help to account for this. 
In the first place, the share of NWLCs within total labour costs has 
grown systematically in most OECD countries over the past two decades and 
now accounts for between 34 and 40 per cent of the total in the average 
firm. Precise international comparisons are rather difficult to make, 
depending on definitional choice and somewhat painstaking matching of cost 
items (e.g. Hart, 1984a). The Swedish Employers' Federation regularly 
presents a wide international set of comparative data and while the statistics 
are crude - involving little attempt at standardisation and entailing some 
interpolation - they at least provide the broadest available picture of 
international trends and growth rates. A sample of these data, depicting 
NWLCs as a percentage of total labour costs, are shown in Table 1.1 for the 
years, 1965, 1975 and 1983 along with an estimate of annual growth rates in 
the percentage. In all countries, the growth of non-wages has outstripped 
that of direct wages over this period. In the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG), the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA) -
three of the four countries on which this report focuses - the annual growth 
rates of the ratios are between 2.25 (FRG) and 3.74 (UK) per cent. Although 
Table 1.1 
Non-Wage Labour Costs as a Percentage of Total Labour Costs 
1965 1975 1983 
Annual rate of 
growth a 
1965-83 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
United Statesb 
Average (unweighted) 
Coefficient of variation (%) 
41.0 
43.5 
-
14.1 
21.6 
40.2 
29.7 
44.9 
-
31.7 
22.2 
19.0 
13.7 
17.1 
26.9 
39.1 
45.1 
41.7 
19.0 
17.0 
32.7 
43.8 
39.2 
51.4 
13.9 
42.9 
29.9 
32.2 
19.6 
24.0 
31.1 
37.7 
47.7 
44.9 
21.7 
22.0 
36.7 
44.4d 
44.4 
46.3 
15.5 
44.0 
33.0 
40.6 
26.5 
26.7 
34.7 
31.1 
0.84 
1.82 
2.20( 
2.53 
2.98 
0.56 
2.25 
0.17 
0.44' 
1.85 
2.22 
4.32 
3.74 
2.51 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
Growth rate is for the proportion of NWLCs to total labour costs. 
Excluding the costs of vocational training and of welfare services. 
1967 to 1983. 
Data do not include the extra week of vacation. 
Data refer to all employees. Irregular bonuses and payments for days not 
worked are included in wages for time worked. NWLCs for Japan are 
thus significantly underestimated in comparison to other countries (see 
discussion in the text). 
Data refer to all employees. 
1970 to 1983 
Average and coefficient of variation are calculated for all countries, 
excluding Canada and Japan. 
Source: Swedish Employers' Confederation, Wages and Total Labour Costs 
for Workers. International Survey. 
our fourth country, Japan, displays far more modest growth (0.44 per cent) 
we will see elsewhere that certain categories of NWLCs - omitted from 
Table 1.1 - are increasingly believed to play a vital part in explaining key 
differences in the performance of the Japanese labour market and those of 
its main OECD competitors. 
In the second place, over the same period covered by Table 1.1, 
economists have developed a number of labour market theories in which some 
types of NWLCs are seen to perform in distinctly different ways from the 
rôles traditionally accredited to direct wages. It has become increasingly 
recognised that certain earlier theoretical and empirical labour market 
studies that had included only direct wages as a reflection of labour costs 
may not only have misrepresented the full part played by total labour costs 
but also produced seriously misleading policy prescriptions. One central 
reason for this, as we shall see at several stages throughout the report, is 
that the structure of NWLCs necessitates the division of the firm's labour 
input into the number of workers and their rate of utilisation. The latter 
may include hours of work, shiftworking, work organisation and part-time 
working. In turn, when this distinction is incorporated into labour market 
analyses - together with the appropriate allocation of total labour costs - any 
resulting policy prescription may constitute a major departure from that 
obtained from equivalent earlier work. 
Thirdly, several of the important labour market policy questions that 
arose in the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s happened to feature 
NWLCs quite prominently. Attempted answers helped to accelerated the 
development of relevant theory and empirical testing. Such problems 
included the topics of the effects of workweek reductions on employment and 
unemployment, the labour market implications of increased job security 
legislation, the employment generating potential of cuts in payroll taxes and 
the benefits/costs of a long-term growth of specific human capital 
investments. A particularly stimulating development in some of these areas 
has been the fact that certain analysts chose to go along the relatively 
difficult route of carrying out their research in a comparative international 
perspective and thereby achieved much more general insights. 
1.1 Objectives and Scope 
The central aim of the report is to convey the importance of NWLCs 
to current labour market policy questions, particularly those relating to 
employment. In order to capture as wide a range of policy topics as possible, 
the work focuses on international aspects of costs in four contrasting major 
OECD economies - viz. FRG, Japan, UK and USA. While the report is 
designed to be completely self-contained in that it discusses essential 
economic arguments wherever necessary, excessive formality and detail in 
this direction are avoided. For interested readers, a great deal of 
complementary technical economic analysis is provided in Hart (1984a) while 
the present study provides a wealth of references that give in depth economic 
analyses of each specific subject area covered. 
The European/North American/Japanese orientation enables us to 
deal with NWLCs and employment in a number of different dimensions. 
First, as we shall see particularly in chapters 2 and 6, there is a 
sharply contrasting structure of NWLCs among the four countries. The 
following examples are among those of concern to later discussion, 
a The FRG places far greater emphasis on legislatively imposed social 
security costs than do the other countries, 
b The Japanese bonus structure has an importance and rôle not found 
elsewhere. 
c Job security legislation - typically imposing a special type of NWLC 
on the employer - is far more prevalent in Europe than in the USA. 
d Per-employee unemployment insurance contributions in the USA 
constitute a tax on jobs that applies differently from elsewhere. 
Secondly, policy discussion involving NWLCs, while displaying general 
overlap in one or two areas, has tended to vary among the three geographical 
regions. A number of examples stand out. In Europe, economic models 
incorporating NWLCs have proved to be especially helpful in clarifying 
several of the thorny questions relating to the employment effects of 
workweek reductions. In contrast, United States economists have devoted 
considerably more attention to studying the economic reasons for and the 
implications of the growth of private fringe benefits. One particular 
f ixation in Japan has been the employment implications of the growth of 
private and statutory pension contributions in the wake of a significant actual 
and forecasted growth in the retirement cohort as a proportion of the 
economically active population. 
Thirdly, the choice of the four highlighted countries permits a 
discussion of the most important international comparative work that has 
focused on NWLCs. An important aspect of the work has involved an 
evaluation of the relative variability of employment, hours of work and wages 
in Japan and the USA. In a similar context, differences in job tenure and 
earnings profiles in these two countries have also been examined. Another 
area of comparative research has concentrated on the implications for 
employment adjustment and workers/hours variability of an unequal incidence 
of job security rules in Europe and the USA. Closely related to this area, 
economists are beginning to attempt to explain why, during downturns in 
economic activity, worksharing is more prevalent in Europe while the USA 
appears to resort more readily to the use of temporary layoffs. 
(2) 
While the main focus of the report is on the analysis of current 
employment policy as i t relates to very recent research findings involving 
NWLCs, the preparation of parts of the relevant background evidence has 
enabled us to present new information that extends earlier work. In 
particular, we provide the most accurate and detailed estimates of fixed and 
variable NWLCs (for definitions, see next section) so far attempted. Other 
statistical breakdowns together with some empirical investigation contain 
much new material. 
1.2 Two Key Definitions 
1.2.1 NWLC coverage 
In very broad terms, NWLCs are defined to include the following cost 
categories: 
statutory social welfare costs 
voluntary social welfare costs 
payments for days not worked 
benefits in kind 
other expenses of a social nature 
vocational training costs 
taxes and subsidies 
[bonuses]. 
These are the general headings adopted in the EC classification of 
labour costs (see Labour Costs in Industry. EUROSTAT, various volumes). 
Each heading is subdivided into more narrowly defined cost items, the number 
of which vary from country to country. Hart (1984a) provides detailed 
breakdowns under the EC classification for the four countries of main 
concern here. The report not only deals with the employment issues related 
to these costs taken as a whole but also focuses on most of the individual cost 
headings and attempts to convey their distinctive rôles. 
The last cost item, 'bonuses', is bracketed in order to denote its 
somewhat special position with respect to non-wages. In many countries, 
bonuses can be regarded more or less in the same way as wage costs since 
they relate directly to work performance and effort. As we shall see in the 
next chapter and elsewhere, however, this interpretation may be totally 
unsatisfactory for certain countries. In our sample of countries in 
particular, it has been argued that Japanese bonuses may well be comprised 
largely of fixed NWLCs (as defined in the following sub-section) and should 
not be treated as direct compensation. 
1.2.2 Fixed and variable NWLCs 
The distinction between fixed and variable costs is, of course, well 
known in economics. Typically it applies to short-run production and cost 
theory where fixed costs are associated with a constant stock of capital and 
variable costs are wages paid to the variable factor input, labour. In the 
present context, the distinction - widely adopted in the labour market 
literature - has a somewhat different connotation. In the NWLC context, 
fixed and variable labour costs apply to two components of one input factor; 
these aré, respectively, the number (or stock) of workers and their average 
rate of utilisation, the combination of which defines the labour input. 
Labour utilisation usually (although not invariably) refers to average working 
hours per period. Fixed (or more strictly 'quasi-fixed') NWLCs are, 
therefore, those costs that attach only to the number of workers and that do 
not vary with the rate of labour utilisation. 
The fixed NWLCs that feature most prominently in the literature are 
specific training costs, especially those non-recurrent, or once-over, costs 
that are incurred in the first period of a worker's lifetime in a given firm. 
If, for example, the worker has to learn to operate a highly specialised 
machine, then some minimum level of training would be required irrespective 
of the subsequent per-period length of working time. In the traditional 
quasi-fixed cost theory (Oi, 1962; Becker, 1964), it would be expected that 
the firm would pay the full cost of training that pertains exclusively to its 
own activities. While the training would be expected to enhance marginal 
product within the firm itself, workers who are laid-off cannot 'sell' this 
increment to marginal product to other firms because, by definition, the 
investment in their human capital is firm-specific. They are unlikely to be 
willing to pay for an investment that resulted in a wage reduction in the 
event of layoff. (By symmetric argument, workers would be expected to pay 
the full cost of general training.) It should be added, however, that more 
modem theory (especially Hashimoto, 1981) has established why it would be 
in the joint interest of employers and workers to share both the costs and 
returns of specific investments. Arising from these ideas, firms employing 
labour with relatively high specific human capital endowments are more 
likely to encourage long tenure thereby maximising the discount period over 
which the once-over investments are amortised. 
Other types of NWLCs are also fixed, especially certain types of 
voluntary social welfare payments. Indeed, these are often quantitatively 
more important than training costs and recent studies have concentrated on 
their labour market policy implications. The main point to establish here, 
however, is that several of the important ideas in the subsequent policy 
discussion hinge on the division of labour costs into fixed and variable 
components and on the associated division of the labour input into stock and 
utilisation components. Much related effort has also been devoted to 
providing detailed estimates of fixed/variable cost ratios for our four 
countries. 
Chapter 2 International Trends in Non-Wage Labour Costs 
In the following sections in this chapter, we feature what we believe 
are the main trends in NWLCs in each of the four featured countries. As far 
as possible the discussion is designed to concentrate on common cost features 
in our four countries of interest as well as to provide a useful background on 
which to focus later policy discussion. On occasion, however, the discussion 
deals with country-specific information where this is thought to be essential 
information for later references to that country. 
2.1 Federal Republic of Germany 
As in all other OECD countries, hourly NWLCs in FRG have grown 
considerably in recent years. Table 2.1 shows indices of hourly real total 
NWLCs (including all cost items except for bonuses listed in section 1.2.1) for 
manual and non-manual (more str ict ly, blue collar and white collar) workers 
in FRG for the years 1978, 1981 and 1984 together w i th an index of hourly 
productivity. The costs have grown by just under 20 per cent for the period 
and they are almost exactly in line with productivity growth. 
A better appreciation of the importance of NWLCs is gained, 
however, by expressing them as a proportion of total labour costs. This is 
carried out in Table 2.2. Not only are non-wages then seen to be significant 
in absolute terms - comprising 44.4 per cent of total labour costs in 
manufacturing in 1984 - but i t is clear that they have been growing faster 
than direct compensation. Between 1978 and 1984 they have accounted for 
over 8 per cent more of total labour costs. This depressed economic period 
witnessed, on the average, great wage restraint by German unions with real 
labour costs per employed person (measured as total compensation divided by 
the GDP price deflator) growing at a modest rate of about 1 per cent per 
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Table 
a 
b 
2.1 
Indices of real NWLCs and productivity: 
FRG manual and non­manual workers : 
manual 
1978 100 
1981 114 
1984 117 
1978, 1981 and 1984 
NWLCs3 
non­manual 
100 
108 
119 
Average hourly cost deflated by 
Output per person hour in 1978 ρ 
total 
100 
112 
119 
consumer 
rices. 
in manufacturing, 
(1978=100) 
b 
Productivity 
100 
108 
119 
price index. 
Sources: EUROSTAT, Labour Costs in Industry (various issues); 
Produktionsvolumen und­potential, 'Produktionsfaktoren des 
Bergbaus und der verarbeitenden Gewerbes in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland' (Berlin: Deutches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung). 
Table 2.2 
1978 
1981 
1984 
Non­wage labour costs as a percentage of 
total labour costs by type of costs: 
FRG manufacturing industry. 
1978. 1981 and 1984 
Al l 
non 
wages 
36.1 
43.5 
44.4 
As percentage of total labour cost 
Payments Statutory Voluntary 
for days Social Social 
not worked Welfare Welfare 
13.1 14.2 0.3 
15.2 13.9 2.3 
14.4 14.3 3.1 
Vocational 
training 
1.7 
1.0 
1.1 
Source: Statisches Bundesamt: Fachserie 16'Arbeitskostenerhebung' 
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annum. Clearly, labour cost growth would have been even more modest -
and on a par with countries like USA, Denmark and Sweden that experienced 
negative rates of real labour costs at this time (see OECD, 1985) - i f NWLCs 
have grown at the same rate as wage compensation. 
Table 2.2 also gives a breakdown of the NWLC percentages by four of 
the main cost items (see section 1.2.1). A very noticeable feature of FRG 
NWLCs in general is that statutory social welfare costs (i.e. employer 
compulsory contributions to pensions, health care, unemployment and 
short-time insurance) are considerably greater than voluntary social welfare 
costs (such as private industrial retirement pensions and net payments to 
private pension funds). Since the Second World War, there has been great 
cooperation between unions and governments in FRG over the mandatory 
provision of benefits and the emphasis given to statutory relative to 
voluntary social welfare is stronger than any other OECD country. (A 
general discussion of the relative economic merits of these two types of 
NWLC can be found in Hart, 1985; see also Chapter 5.) Noticeably, 
however, voluntary social welfare costs have grown appreciably faster than 
statutory costs in manufacturing, accounting for one-third of the total 
growth of non-wages as a percentage of total costs between 1978 and 1984. 
As indicated in section 1.2.2, the ratio of f ixed-to-variable NWLCs 
are often a vital consideration in economic analyses involving non-wages. 
Recall that fixed NWLCs are those cost items that are independent of hours 
worked per period. NWLCs that can be regarded as fixed costs include 
supplementary retirement and provident schemes, payments to savings 
schemes, severance pay, etc. (for a complete list, see below). A rigorous 
measurement of f ix i ty would also divide statutory social security into fixed 
and variable components but we leave discussion of this point until a l i t t le 
later. Albeit to state that in the estimated fixed/variable cost ratios for 
12 
manufacturing industries (1978, 1981 and 1984) shown in Table 2.3. statutory 
social welfare payments are treated as purely variable costs. Payments for 
days not worked are also regarded as variable costs despite the fact that 
there is some ambiguity over the precise allocation of such costs (see the 
discussion in Hart, 1984a, Ch.2). 
On this narrow definition of f ix i ty - referred to as Ratio I in Hart 
(1984a) and in later sections of this report - i t can be seen that the 
fixed/variable cost ratio has grown from 0.06 to 0.10 over the period. The 
estimated ratios are somewhat smaller than in the other three countries of 
interest but their positive growth rate is common to all (see Hart, 1984a and 
OECD, 1986). As expected, the aggregate figures disguise a wide dispersion 
of individual industry ratios. For example, a ratio of 0.23 in mineral oil 
refining contrasts with a ratio of 0.05 in the leather and leather goods 
industry in 1984. As emphasised in Chapter 6, large capital intensive 
industries are likely to incur higher degrees of labour f ix i ty than smaller 
industries with relatively high labour intensity. This does not hold 
invariably, however, as a closer comparative examination of Table 2.3 wil l 
reveal. As far as growth rates are concerned, the rat io grew by 136 per cent 
in iron and steel in contrast to -33 per cent in the manufacture of tools and 
finished metal goods. 
While the figures in Table 2.3 give a reasonably accurate impression 
of the relative sizes and growth rates of the fixed/variable cost ratios among 
the industries, they are not precise estimates. In particular, they almost 
certainly understate the sizes of the ratios in high wage industries like 
chemicals and metal manufacture. The principal reason concerns the system 
governing statutory social welfare contributions. In common with the other 
three countries featured in this report - and most other countries in the 
OECD bloc - employers in FRG contribute to each i tem of social welfare in 
13 
Table 2.3 
Fixed/variable Cost Ratios (Ratio D: 
German Manufacturing Industries 
1978. 1981 and 1984 
Mineral oil refining 
Iron and steel 
Non-ferrous metals 
Non-metallic mineral goods 
Glass and glassware 
Ceramic goods 
Chemicals 
Foundries 
Structural metal products 
Tools and finished metal goods 
Mechanical engineering 
Office and data processing machinery 
Electrical engineering 
Motor vehicle manufacturing 
Shipbuilding 
Aerospace 
Instrument engineering 
Tobacco products 
Textiles 
Leather and leather goods 
Timber and furniture 
Pulp, paper and board manufacture 
Paper and board processing 
Printing 
Rubber and plastics processing 
Rubber products 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 0.06 0.09 0.10 
Sources: Statisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 16 'Arbeitskostenerhebung' 
1978 
Ratio I 
0.26 
0.11 
0.08 
0.08 
0.06 
0.08 
0.11 
0.08 
0.12 
0.06 
0.09 
0.11 
0.09 
0.09 
0.09 
0.11 
0.08 
0.15 
0.05 
0.04 
0.06 
0.09 
0.06 
0.06 
0.06 
0.05 
1981 
Ratio I 
0.20 
0.13 
0.10 
0.08 
0.08 
0.08 
0.12 
0.08 
0.12 
0.06 
0.09 
0.28 
0.10 
0.10 
0.10 
0.11 
0.08 
0.26 
0.05 
0.05 
0.07 
0.10 
0.06 
0.06 
0.07 
0.06 
1984 
Ratio I 
0.23 
0.23 
0.11 
0.09 
0.10 
0.10 
0.16 
0.08 
0.14 
0.04 
0.10 
0.15 
0.13 
0.11 
0.13 
0.15 
0.09 
0.24 
0.06 
0.05 
0.07 
0.10 
0.07 
0.06 
0.07 
0.06 
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the form of a payroll tax which, for a given period of t ime, varies directly 
with wages up to a ceiling cut-off l imi t . For employees with wages above 
the ceiling, the contribution per period is calculated simply as the tax rate 
multiplied by the ceiling wage. Therefore, in these cases, the contributions 
constitute fixed costs since a change in the wage - due, for example, to 
longer per-period hours - involves no change in contribution. Currently in 
FRG, again like many other countries, the wage ceilings are situated towards 
the upper tails of wage distributions. Firm with predominantly male and 
highly skilled labour may nonetheless experience high fixed costs given a 
significant proportion ; of their workforce may well receive wages above 
ceiling levels. For most other f irms, however, statutory social welfare 
contributions comprise essentially variable labour costs. 
In research into the effects of payroll tax changes on employment 
and hours of work in FRG - reported on in some detail in section 3.2.2 - Hart 
and Kawasaki (1987) have produced detailed estimates of aggregate 
manufacturing fixed and variable NWLCs that include adjustments to take 
account of social welfare wage ceilings as well as some special features that 
are FRG specific. Estimates from this study are presented in Figure 2.1 
which shows the trend in fixed and variable labour costs between 1951 and 
1981. Four categories of non-wages are shown in the figure that, together, 
account for all FRG NWLCs. These are: 
FT: average fixed statutory social welfare contributions (primarily 
concerning pension, health and unemployment insurance); 
VT: average variable statutory social welfare contributions (with the 
same coverage as FT); 
FR: average remaining fixed NWLCs (supplementary retirement and 
provident schemes, payments to workers' saving schemes, severance 
pay, vocational training, canteen/recreational and other social 
Figure 2 . 1 : Estimates of Average Per-Capita Fixed and Variable Non-Wage Labour Costs 
as Percentages of Total Labour Costs: FRG Manufacturing Industry, 1951-1981 
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Source: Constructed from data in Hart and Kawasaki (1987). 
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expenditures, benefits in kind, housing and housing allowances, family 
allowances, maternity and disability allowances, other expenditures); 
VR: average remaining variable NWLCs (paid holidays and compensation 
for holidays not taken, sickness pay, holiday bonuses, public holidays, 
industrial accident insurance). 
Estimates of FT and VT involved fitting and interpolating separate 
wage distributions for female and male workers as well as adjusting wage 
ceilings in order to compensate for the double monthly Christmas payment 
(Weihnachtsgeld) received by a high proportion of the total workforce. 
The graphs in Figure 2.1 express, the above cost categories as 
percentages of total labour costs. Up until the late 1960s variable 
'remaining' non-wages (VR) grew steadily in relation to total costs and then 
increased from 12.8 per cent to 19.5 per cent of the total between 1970 and 
1981. Variable payroll taxes (VT) declined significantly in the late 
1950s/early 1960s with fixed taxes (FT) growing somewhat. The principal 
reason for this was that, during this period, wage ceilings were changed at 
infrequent intervals and wage growth pushed higher and higher proportions of 
workers over the ceiling limits. For example, both health insurance and 
unemployment insurance ceilings were unchanged between 1957 and 1964, at 
DM.660 and DM.750, respectively. After this time, and particularly in the 
most recent years, governments have increased the ceilings on an annual 
basis and, on average, ceiling growth has exceeded wage growth. 
Accordingly, VT has displayed trend growth and FT trend decline since 1964. 
By contrast, 'remaining' fixed non-wages have shown more or less steady 
growth over the entire period, starting at 7.1 per cent of total costs and 
finishing at 11.2 per cent. It should be emphasised that the statistics 
represented in Figure 2.1 should not be compared with the industrial data in 
Table 2.3 given the ability to input much more accurate detail into the 
former, but at the cost of greater aggregation compared to the latter. 
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2.2 Japan 
This section and section 6.1.1 present extensive estimates of Japanese 
labour costs. A detailed discussion of sources and background technical work 
can be found in Appendix 2.1. 
In line with virtually every OECD country, Japan's NWLCs have grown 
relative to total labour costs since the middle of the 1970s (see ÖECD, 1986 
for a comprehensive international comparison). Tables 2.4 and 2.5 provide 
more detailed cost breakdowns of the trends. They show, respectively, the 
manufacturing and service industry time-series movements of the main 
components of wage and non-wage costs - expressed as proportions of total 
costs - since the mid-1960s. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 give a pictorial display of 
the same information. The outstanding features of these data are as follows: 
(a) The two largest cost items - contract wages and the bonus - have 
exhibited remarkable stability within the total share over the past 
decade, 
(b) There is a pro-cyclical fluctuation in overtime payments - particularly 
in manufacturing industry - which is in line with the well known 
cyclical variation in average hours of work in Japan relative to most 
other OECD countries (see section 4.2). 
(c) Statutory welfare costs have shown the largest and the most persistent 
growth in the total share over the entire period. 
(d) While the growth is not as marked as for statutory costs, voluntary 
welfare costs have also experienced an increased share over the period. 
(e) Training costs have exhibited some cyclical fluctuation around a 
declining trend. 
The constancy of the contract wage and bonus shares may reflect the 
fact that such compensation represents, primarily, returns to investment in 
specific human capital rather than outcomes of competitive market forces 
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Table 2.4 
Wage and Non-Wage Labour Costs as a Proportion of Total Labour Costs: 
Japanese Manufacturing Industry. 1965-85. 
Year 
1965 
1968 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Total 
Monthly 
Labour 
Costs 
(Yen) 
41517 
62104 
99865 
115379 
147005 
179978 
194915 
219109 
240802 
255866 
273855 
293689 
311649 
325262 
334014 
348921 
372903 
Con-
tract 
Wages 
59 
56 
55 
55 
53 
54 
56 
55 
54 
54 
53 
53 
53 
53 
53 
53 
52 
Over-
time 
Pay-
ments 
7.9 
9.0 
7.1 
6.9 
8.8 
6.1 
4.6 
5.9 · 
6.2 
6.4 
6.9 
7.4 
7.0 
6.8 
7.0 
7.7 
7.7 
As 
Paid 
Holi 
days 
2.4 
2.3 
2.4 
2.2 
2.2 
2.4 
2.4 
2.3 
2.4 
2.3 
2.1 
2.5 
2.3 
2.3 
2.4 
2.2 
2.1 
Percentage of Total Labour Costs 
Bonus 
15 
17 
19 
20 
20 
21 
20 
19 
19 
18 
19 
19 
19 
19 
18 
16 
20 
Statutory 
Welfare 
Costs 
4.6 
5.0 
4.9 
4.9 
5.0 
5.2 
5.9 
6.0 
6.5 
6.6 
6.7 
6.7 
7.2 
7.4 
7.4 
7.3 
7.3 
Voluntary 
Welfare 
Costs 
5.6 
5.4 
5.6 
6.0 
5.6 
5.6 
6.1 
6.7 
6.9 
7.7 
7.4 
6.6 
6.7 
6.8 
6.8 
7.0 
7.0 
Train-
ing 
Costs 
0.65 
0.81 
0.68 
0.65 
0.74 
0.64 
0.47 
0.40 
0.38 
0.39 
0.40 
0.48 
0.47 
0.47 
0.43 
0.45 
0.45 
Bene 
fits 
in 
kind 
3.6 
3.4 
3.3 
3.3 
3.1 
3.0 
3.2 
3.2 
3.2 
3.3 
3.1 
3.0 
3.4 
3.2 
2.9 
2.3 
2.3 
Other NWLCs 
1.3 
1.6 
1.5 
1.4 
1.4 
Ì.4 
1.3 
1.3 
1.5 
1.5 
1.7 
1.8 
1.7 
1.8 
1.8 
1.2 
1.0 
Sources: 'Basic Survey on Wage Structure', Ministry of Labour; 
'General Survey on the System of Wages and Working Hours', Ministry of Labour; 
'Survey on the System of Welfare Facilities for Employees', Ministry of Labour; 
'Wage Composition Survey', Ministry of Labour; 
'Survey on Labour Costs', Ministry of Labour; 
'Monthly Labour Survey', Ministry of Labour; 
Other unpublished statistics. 
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Table 2.5 
Wage and Non-Wage Labour Costs as a Proportion of Total Labour Costs: 
Japanese Service Industry. 1967-85. 
Year 
1967 
1970 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Total 
Monthly 
Labour 
Costs 
(Yen) 
54977 
85767 
142322 
186214 
204302 
208118 
229603 
243599 
258284 
276029 
294565 
304364 
314229 
324870 
529785 
Con-
tract 
Wages 
67 
63 
56 
55 
61 
57 
56 
57 
56 
56 
56 
56 
56 
56 
59 
Over-
time 
Pay-
ments 
3.6 
3.0 
3.2 
8.8 
6.1 
4.6 
5.9 
6.2 
6.4 
6.9 
7.4 
7.0 
6.8 
7.0 
7.7 
As 
Paid 
Holi 
days 
2.8 
2.7 
2.0 
2.0 
2.1 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.2 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
1.9 
2.1 
Percentage of Total Labour Costs 
Bonus 
15 
19 
25 
24 
19 
21 
21 
20 
20 
20 
19 
19 
19 
20 
18 
Statutory 
Welfare 
Costs 
3.6 
3.4 
4.5 
4.9 
5.5 
5.6 
6.0 
6.1 
6.2 
6.4 
6.9 
7.0 
7.0 
7.1 
7.1 
Voluntary 
Welfare 
Costs 
3.4 
3.8 
4.3 
4.6 
4.3 
4.9 
4.9 
4.8 
4.8 
4.7 
4.9 
4.9 
5.0 
5.1 
5.1 
Train-
ing 
Costs 
0.65 
0.67 
0.51 
0.78 
0.45 
0.55 
0.49 
0.54 
0.58 
0.58 
0.58 
0.59 
0.57 
0.53 
0.53 
Bene-
f i ts 
in 
kind 
3.5 
3.1 
3.8 
3.5 
5.4 
5.5 
5.5 
5.4 
5.1 
5.1 
5.7 
5.5 
5.0 
2.3 
2.4 
Other 
NWLCs 
0.6 
0.7 
1.1 
1.5 
1.4 
1.7 
1.9 
2.4 
2.5 
2.4 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.8 
1.1 
Sources: 'Basic Survey on Wage Structure', Ministry of Labour; 
'General Survey on the System of Wages and Working Hours', Ministry of Laboi 
'Survey on the System of Welfare Facilities for Employees', Ministry of Labour 
'Wage Compdsition Survey', Ministry of Labour; 
'Survey on Labour Costs', Ministry of Labour; 
'Monthly Labour Survey', Ministry of Labour; 
Other unpublished statistics. 
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(Hashimoto and Raisian, 1987; FitzRoy and Hart, 1987; Section 4.2). 
Fluctuations in excess labour demand on the external market - as represented 
by the rate of unemployment - is relatively unimportant in Japan. Also, 
Japanese workers change jobs significantly less frequently than, for example, 
their United States counterparts (Hashimoto and Raisian, 1985a). It is less 
likely under these circumstances that contract wage and bonus payments 
respond to unanticipated fluctuations in economic activity. High degrees of 
labour fixity (see below) are likely to induce firms to minimise costly 
turnover and meet demand fluctuations through variations in the utilisation 
rates of existing employees and nominal wage payments rather than through 
changing their stocks of workers. 
This latter inference is supported by the above observation of 
relatively large cyclical variability in overtime payments. It is clearly this 
component of total compensation that accounts for the wide observation of 
relatively high variability in Japanese hourly wage compensation (e.g. 
Gordon, 1982; Hashimoto and Raisian, 1987). 
Statutory welfare costs largely represent employers' contributions to 
social security schemes. In descending order of importance, the three main 
cost items relate to pension, health and unemployment benefit (see Hart, 
1984a for FRG, Japan UK and USA breakdowns and Hart and Kawasaki 1987, 
for a very detailed FRG analysis). With the exception of a few countries 
(see, especially, section 2.5), this cost item has risen throughout OECD during 
this period. Its growth, and projected growth, is particularly marked in 
Japan, however, and it derives in the main part from the extraordinary 
growth in statutory pension contributions. The reason for this is that the 
growth rate of the retirement cohort in Japan relative to the economically 
active population is higher than for any other OECD country and, moreover, 
will accelerate towards the end of the century and into the next century (see 
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Hart, 1984a and 1987a). Contrary to the trend in most other countries, the 
Japanese are gradually increasing the average age of mandatory retirement 
in order to offset the inexorable rise of pension costs. 
The above comments about the constancy of the contract wage and 
bonus payments should perhaps be tempered slightly by the observation of a 
growing share of voluntary welfare costs, essentially comprising private 
fringe benefits. As argued by Smith and Ehrenberg (1985) and others, 
employers and workers bargain over total compensation and not just direct 
remuneration and so wages, bonuses and fringes may be traded-off against 
one another. Given relatively long tenure among Japanese workers, it may 
be that, as real wage growth has progressed, they have placed greater 
emphasis on deferred compensation in the form of private health, pension and 
other benefits. 
Two observations are worth making concerning training costs. First, 
in line with other countries (see Hart 1984a), they comprise a relatively small 
proportion of total NWLCs. (Despite enjoying a position in the labour 
market literature that would suggest the opposite1.) Secondly, their fall in 
the total share during the second half of the 1970s, may well indicate some 
greater degree of economic uncertainty - in the wake of OPEC supply shocks 
- with respect to this aspect of specific human capital investments. 
As we will see in the discussion of international comparisons in 
employment and hours variability in section 4.2, the relative size of Japanese 
fixed-to-variable labour cost ratios is an important consideration. Tables 
2.6 and 2.7 provide the most detailed measures ever compiled on the sizes of 
these ratios in Japan, for manufacturing and service industries respectively. 
The tables show estimates of the ratios of fixed-to-variable labour costs 
based on three assumptions concerning which items should be included under 
fixed costs. 
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Table 2.6 
Estimates of Fixed/Variable Labour Cost Ratios: 
Japanese Manufacturing Industry, 1965-85 
Year Ratio I Rat ion Ra t i o in 
T965 0.1£ 0.17 0.59 
1968 0.14 0.16 0.41 
1971 0.14 0.17 0.47 
1972 0.14 0.17 0.49 
1975 0.14 0.16 0.49 
1974 0.15 0.16 0.50 
1975 0.14 0.17 0.49 
1976 0.15 0.17 0.48 
1977 0.14 0.17 0.47 
1978 0.16 0.19 0.47 
1979 0.15 0.18 0.48 
1980 0.15 0.17 0.48 
1981 0.15 0.18 0.47 
1982 0.15 0.18 0.47 
1985 0.15 0.17 0.46 
1984 0.15 0.16 0.44 
1985 0.15 0.15 0.48 
Sources: As for Table 2.4. 
Table 2.7 
Estimates of Fixed/Variable Labour Cost Ratios: 
Japanese Service Industry. 1967-85 
Year Ratio I Rat ion Ratio m 
1967 0.07 0.10 0.29 
1970 0.08 0.10 0.57 
1975 0.09 0.11 0.50 
1974 0.08 0.11 0.48 
1975 0.08 0.10 0.56 
1976 0.15 0.16 0.50 
1977 0.15 0.15 0.48 
1978 0.15 0.16 0.47 
1979 0.15 0.15 0.48 
1980 0.13 0.16 0.48 
1981 0.14 0.16 0.47 
1982 0.14 0.16 0.47 
1985 0.14 0.16 0.46 
1984 0.15 0.15 0.46 
1985 0.11 0.15 0.40 
Sources: 
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Ratios I and Π are based on Hart, 1984a (see also OECD, 1986). The 
f irst is the narrowest definition, wi th fixed costs comprising all NWLCs other 
than paid holidays and bonuses that do not vary with hours worked. I t should 
be noted that statutory welfare fixed costs are derived from detailed 
calculations that involve evaluating the relative importance of contributions 
that lie outside upper and lower tax ceilings on f i t ted wage distributions. A 
description of the methodology is given in Appendix 2.1 while further detailed 
analytical background can be found in Hart (1984a) and Hart and Kawasaki 
(1987). Ratio Π further includes paid holidays as a fixed cost; i t is argued in 
Hart (1984a) that such payments typically contain both fixed and variable 
elements which are usually impossible to separate in practice. Ratio ΠΙ is 
significantly larger than the other ratios since i t also includes bonus 
payments in the (fixed cost) numerator. Hashimoto (1979) and Hashimoto 
and Raisian (1987) argue that Japanese bonus payments largely reflect 
investments in specific human capital. As argued above, this view would 
seem to tie in with the constant share of the bonus observed in Tables 2.4 and 
2.5. I t would be diff icult to imagine, however, that the bonus consists purely 
of such investments and so, as with Ratio Π, the third rat io almost certainly 
contains some variable elements. 
Graphs of the ratios in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 are shown in Figures 2.4 
and 2.5, respectively. Since the early 1970s the ratios in manufacturing 
industry have remained quite stable with perhaps a slight tendency to decline 
in recent years. At least with respect to Ratio Π, this contrasts with several 
other major OECD countries where larger growth is apparent. Undoubtedly 
the main reason for this latter observation is the fact that Japanese holiday 
payments, in contrast to almost every other OECD country, are small and 
constant over the entire period. The main difference in the service industry 
has been a much more marked dip in the bonus - thereby affecting Ratio m -
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during the first OPEC supply shock together with a relatively pronounced rise 
in Ratios I and Π between 1975 and 1977 after which time a fair degree of 
stability has been maintained. 
In section 2.5 we will return to an international comparative 
evaluation of Japanese fixity ratios. 
Table 2.8 shows indices of real non-wages and productivity between 
the base year 1965 and 1985 for Japanese manufacturing industry while Figure 
2.6 illustrates these trends. Apart from a short period in the early 1970s 
when non-wages grew more than productivity relative to the base year, the 
latter variable has outgrown the former to a very considerable extent over the 
remainder of the period. These comparative observations are of great 
interest in the debate on employment/unemployment with respect to 
international comparative trends in labour costs and underline Japan's strong 
cost advantage over the period. As we have seen (see 2.1) real non-wage and 
productivity growth have been very similar in FRG in recent years while UK 
evidence (see Hart 1984a) suggests that growth in non-wages has outstripped 
that in productivity. 
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Table 2.8 Indices of Real Non-Wage Labour Costs and Productivity: 
Japanese Manufacturing Industry, 1965-85 
Year 
1965 
1968 
1971 
1972 
1975 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1985 
Real NWLCs* 
100 
150 
186 
215 
254 
215 
209 
215 
218 
225 
251 
229 
252 
256 
258 
Productivity** 
100 
148 
185 
201 
177 
224 
225 
244 
258 
276 
291 
508 
512 
508 
511 
Notes: * Average Monthly Costs Deflated by Consumer Price Index. 
K * Output per person hour. 
Sources: As for table 2.4 and, additionally, Τ Liesner, 'Economic statistics 
1900-1985'. The Economist, 1985. 
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2.5 United Kingdom 
The recent behaviour of the major components of UK labour costs is 
summarised in Table 2.9 from which i t is clear that NWLCs fel l as a proportion 
of total labour costs between 1981 and 1984 having risen in each Labour Costs 
Survey conducted since 1964. The breakdown of costs for 1981 and 1984 is 
portrayed in Figure 2.7. In this section, the behaviour of NWLCs in the recent 
past is considered and in particular some attempt is made to see how far, if at 
al l , movements in NWLCs have been influenced by the dramatic changes which 
have taken place in the UK labour market during the 1980s. 
One of the most striking characteristics of the recent behaviour of the 
UK economy has been the volati l i ty of quantities relative to nominal prices. 
Between 1980 and 1986 manufacturing employment fel l by 24.4 per cent and 
now accounts for only 21.4 per cent of the workforce. The number of 
self-employed people, having risen by only 5.5 per cent between 1971 and 
1981, rose by 25.6 per cent to 2.7 million between 1981 and 1986. Between 
March 1980 and September 1986, the total number of hours worked in UK 
manufacturing fel l by 24.5 per cent, mirroring almost precisely the fall in 
employment. Figure 2.8 shows how total hours and average weekly hours 
worked in the manufacturing sector varied between 1976 and 1986. These 
statistics on hours of work wil l be of value when the impact of NWLCs on 
labour uti l isation is discussed (see Chapter 5). 
Between 1980 and 1986, total unemployment grew by 85 per cent, 
from 1.8 mill ion to 5.5 million and the number of long-term unemployed 
(unemployed for more than one year) grew by 270 per cent to 1.5 mill ion. 
This was the main characteristic of the change in unemployment: the position 
was not that more were becoming unemployed but rather that those who did 
become unemployed experienced longer durations out of work. This finding is 
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Table 2.9 
Breakdown of Wage Costs in UK Production Industries, 1964-1984 
Wages and Salaries 
National Insurance 
Voluntary Social Welfare 
Benefits in Kind 
Subsidised Services 
Training 
All Other Costs 
Total Labour Costs 
Production and Construction Industries 
1964 1968 1975 1975 1978 1981 
91.8 
5.6 
5.1 
0.1 
0.8 
0.5 
0.1 
100 
90.2 
4.5 
5.2 
0.1 
0.9 
0.6 
0.7 
100 
89.5 
4.9 
5.7 
0.5 
1.1 
0.4 
0.5 
100 
87.5 
6.4 
4.2 
0.5 
1.1 
0.5 
0.2 
100 
85.9 
8.4 
5.1 
0.5 
1.5 
0.4 
0.6 
100 
81.6 
8.9 
5.6 
0.5 
1.5 
0.5 
2.0 
100 
Manufacturing 
1981 1984 
82.1 
9.0 
5.2 
0.1 
1.5 
0.5 
2.0 
100 
84.0 
7.4 
5.5 
0.1 
1.5 
0.5 
1.6 
100 
Source: Department of Employment Gazette (various issues). 
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reflected in the statistics on labour turnover in the manufacturing sector 
between 1975 and 1986 which are shown in Figure 2.9. These indicate a 
steady reduction in discharges from employment between 1975 and 1986 
broken only by a slight rise during 1980 and 1981 during the worst of the 
recession. However, engagements have also been on a downward trend 
throughout this period and, in fact, fell more dramatically than discharges at 
the beginning of the eighties. Thus, once unemployed, workers found it 
exceedingly difficult to find new employment because of the low level of 
engagements. 
The trend reduction in discharges and engagements indicates a longer 
average duration of employment spells which has important implications for 
the amortization of the fixed components of NWLCs such as training and 
redundancy costs. A lower rate of turnover implies that the returns to 
training and related once-over costs accrue over a longer period. Firms can 
cut down expenditure on training without reducing the average skill level of 
their workforce. Alternatively, by maintaining or increasing their level of 
expenditure on training, the average skill level will increase since individual 
workers, staying longer with the firm, will have greater exposure to training. 
Amounts spent on training by UK firms are quite small (see Tables 
2.10 and 2.11, column 9 for training expenditures by firms in different 
manufacturing sectors in 1981 and 1984). The increase which occurred 
between 1981 and 1984 may have been cyclical, with firms cutting back 
considerably on training during the worst of the recession. At present there is 
no available research on the effects of changing employment durations on 
training expenditures. 
Another important change in training provision which has occurred 
during the 1980s has been the increase in government support for the training 
of young people under the auspices of the Manpower Services Commission 
Figure 2 .9: 
"UK : Labour Turnover 
'Manufacturing Industries 1975-1986? 
3-r 
Per Cent i.s 
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79 Qi BO Qi Bl Qi B2 Qi B3 QJ 84 Qi. JB5 .Qi . B6 Qi (turnover within a 4 week period expressed as a percentage of total 
employment) 
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Table 2.10 
Labour Costs Addit ional to Wages and Salaries for Hours Worked in 1984 
SU Í2) in (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
1-5.4 
13.6 
3.2 
3.5 
8.2 
8.8 
2.4 
5.6 
0.2 
0.2 
19.4 
11.4 
0.2 
0.0 
2.8 
1.6 
1.3 
1.0 
-0 .1 
0.0 
52.2 
45.7 
Energy excluding coal 
Water Supply 
A l l Manufactur ing 12.4 1.6 9.9 1.7 0.4 7.9 0.2 1.7 0.5 -0 .1 36.3 
Other mineral and 
ex t rac t ion 
Ext rac t ion of ores nes 
Non meta l l i c mineral 
products 
Chemicals 
Man made f ibres 
Metal goods, 
engineering 
Metal goods nes 
Of f i ce Machinery 
E lect r ica l and 
electronics 
Motor Vehicles & parts 
Other t ransport 
Instrument engineering 
Other manufactur ing 
Food, drink & tobacco 
Text i les 
Leather 
Footwear & c loth ing 
Timber & wooden 
furn i ture 10.4 0.8 11.0 0.4 0.6 3.9 0.3 0.8 0.3 -0 .0 28.4 
Paper, pr in t ing 8c 
publishing 12.1 1.4 9.6 1.9 0.3 7.2 0.2 1.3 0.3 -0 .1 34.1 
Rubber 8c plastics 12.3 1.0 10.5 2.3 0.4 5.8 0.1 1.6 0.4 -0 .1 34.2 
Other manufactur ing 11.0 1.5 10.2 0.3 0.3 6.2 0.3 0.6 0.2 -0 .1 31.5 
Construct ion 9.6 0.7 9.9 0.7 0.6 5.2 0.3 0.8 0.5 -0 .1 28.3 
Column Headings for Table 2.10 (Figures are per cent additions to wages and salaries fo 
hours worked in 1984). 
Source: Department of Employment. 
(1) Hol iday and other t ime off w i th pay 
(2) Sick pay 
(3) Nat ional Insurance 
(4) Redundancy Provision 
(5) L iab i l i t y Insurance 
(6) Voluntary Social Welfare Payments 
(7) Benefi ts in Kind 
(8) Subsidised Services 
(9) Training (excluding wages) 
(10) Government Contributions 
(11) Tota l Addit ional Costs 
12.1 
11.7 
11.2 
12.9 
11.0 
13.5 
13.5 
13.6 
13.4 
14.3 
13.4 
13.2 
11.9 
12.2 
11.7 
10.8 
12.0 
1.8 
1.7 
1.1 
2.7 
2.0 
1.5 
1.2 
2.5 
1.9 
1.2 
3.1 
2.3 
1.3 
2.0 
0.8 
0.3 
0.4 
9.5 
10.1 
9.9 
9.2 
10.7 
10.2 
10.4 
9.4 
10.6 
9.6 
9.2 
10.8 
10.2 
10.0 
11.1 
11.0 
11.2 
2.1 
0.6 
2.0 
2.5 
2.1 
1.4 
1.2 
0.1 
1.8 
2.6 
2.0 
1.1 
1.6 
2.3 
0.5 
0.5 
0.9 
0.6 
1.1 
0.5 
0.4 
0.8 
0.5 
0.6 
0.1 
0.3 
0.6 
0.5 
0.2 
0.3 
0.3 
0.4 
0.6 
0.3 
10.2 
5.7 
6.0 
13.1 
2.8 
6.7 
6.7 
6.6 
6.3 
8.0 
9.2 
8.1 
6.1 
7.5 
3.4 
3.2 
2.8 
0.2 
0.2 
0.1 
0.3 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.0 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.3 
0.5 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
2.4 
1.4 
2.0 
3.2 
1.8 
1.6 
1.5 
1.9 
1.7 
1.4 
1.7 
1.8 
1.6 
2.3 
1.0 
1.5 
1.5 
0.5 
0.3 
0.2 
0.6 
0.3 
0.5 
0.3 
0.9 
0.6 
0.5 
0.7 
0.6 
0.3 
0.3 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
-0 .1 
0.0 
-0 .1 
0.0 
0.0 
-0 .1 
-0 .1 
o.o · 
0.0 
-0 .1 
0.0 
-0 .1 
-0 .2 
-0 .2 
39.3 
52.8 
33.0 
44.7 
31.5 
35.7 
35.3 
35.1 
36.6 
38.4 
40.0 
38.1 
33.5 
37.4 
29.2 
27.5 
28.9 
I I ) 
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Table 2.11 
Labour Costs Additional to Wages and Salaries for Hours Worked in 1981 
Al l Manufactur ing 
Food, Fr ink 8c Tobacco 
Coal & Petro leum 
Chemicals 8c A l l ied 
Metal Manufacture 
Mechanical Engineering 
Instrument Engineering 
E lect r ica l Engineering 
Shipbuilding 8c Marine 
Vehicles 
Metal Goods nes 
Text i les 
Leather 8c Fur 
Clothing 8c Footwear 
Bricks, Po t te ry , Glass 
Timber 8c Furn i ture 
Paper, Pr in t ing 8c Pub 
Other Manufactur ing 
Mining and Quarrying 
Construct ion 
Gas, E lec t r i c i t y 8c 
Water 
A l l Index of 
Product ion Industries 
(1) 
12.2 
11.6 
11.1 
12.2 
11.4 
12.4 
12.9 
12.7 
11.8 
14.2 
12.3 
11.5 
10.4 
11.6 
11.8 
10.5 
11.7 
11.9 
11.6 
9.5 
14.3 
11.9 
(2) 
1.6 
2.1 
2.5 
2.8 
0.8 
1.4 
2.3 
2.0 
1.8 
2.2 
1.0 
0.9 
0.2 
0.4 
1.0 
0.7 
1.3 
1.1 
1.8 
0.7 
3.6 
1.6 
(3) 
1.4 
12.1 
10.5 
11.5 
10.9 
12.7 
12.7 
13.2 
11.7 
11.8 
13.0 
13.6 
13.2 
13.9 
12.9 
13.0 
12.0 
13.1 
10.8 
12.8 
10.9 
12.3 
(4) 
3.0 
2.2 
1.3 
3.8 
7.3 
2.7 
3.4 
3.0 
0.8 
5.3 
2.3 
1.3 
0.5 
1.4 
2.6 
0.9 
2.0 
2.1 
4.3 
0.8 
3.0 
2.8 
(5) 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.4 
0.9 
0.7 
0.2 
0.3 
1.0 
0.4 
0.6 
0.5 
0.5 
0.3 
0.7 
0.6 
0.3 
0.6 
1.3 
0.8 
0.3 
0.6 
(6) 
7.2 
7.9 
17.0 
12.6 
8.6 
6.8 
7.9 
5.9 
5.7 
8.5 
5.6 
3.7 
3.0 
2.4 
6.2 
4.0 
6.9 
6.5 
15.7 
3.6 
20.4 
7.8 
(7) 
0.2 
0.4 
1.4 
0.1 
0.5 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
4.7 
0.1 
0.1 
0.4 
(8) 
1.8 
2.7 
3.8 
3.1 
1.2 
1.6 
1.9 
1.8 
1.4 
2.1 
1.3 
1.1 
1.3 
1.1 
1.6 
0.9 
1.2 
1.6 
4.0 
1.0 
2.0 
1.8 
(9) 
0.1 
0.4 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.5 
0.4 
0.6 
0.6 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.3 
0.6 
0.4 
1.1 
0.5 
(10) 
-0 .6 
- 0 . 1 
-0 .2 
- 0 . 2 
-0 .8 
-0 .9 
- 0 . 2 
-0 .6 
- 0 . 6 
-1 .3 
-1 .3 
-0 .9 
-0 .5 
- 1 . 0 
-0 .5 
- 0 . 6 
- 0 . 1 
- 0 . 6 
- 0 .1 
0.0 
0.0 
-0 .5 
(11) 
38.5 
39.5 
45.4 
47.1 
41.1 
38.1 
41.5 
38.9 
34.7 
45.6 
35.4 
31.9 
34.7 
30.3 
36.2 
30.4 
35.8 
36.7 
54.7 
29.6 
55.7 
39.1 
Column Headings for Table 2.11 (Figures are per cent additions to wages and salaries fo 
hours worked in 1981). 
Source: Department of Employment. 
(1) Holiday and other time off with pay 
(2) Sick pay 
(3) National Insurance 
(4) Redundancy Provision 
(5) Liability Insurance 
(6) Voluntary Social Welfare Payments 
(7) Benefits in Kind 
(8) Subsidised Services 
(9) Training (excluding wages) 
(10) Government Contributions 
(11) Total Additional Costs 
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Youth Training Scheme (YTS). Firms who are able to provide the MSC with 
acceptable proposals are able to claim the costs of employing and training 
young people who would otherwise be unemployed. Between June 1983 and 
June 1986, the number of trainees on YTS increased from 31 thousand to 305 
thousand. 
To some extent these trainees might have been taken on anyway. 
Equally, they may displace nonsubsidised trainees. Nevertheless i t is clear 
that the effect of this scheme is to reduce the effective cost of training to 
firms and thus their fixed costs. Ceteris paribus, recorded NWLCs should 
decline. Further, YTS schemes do not preclude training being f i rm specific. 
Thus the UK government has shown itself willing to increase the supply of 
skilled labour even when the demand may derive from a very small number of 
firms. 
Returning to general economic trends, output per person employed has 
grown at a rapid rate relative to historical trends: between 1973 and 1979 
output per head in manufacturing; rose by 0.7 per cent per annum, while 
between 1979 and 1986 its growth rate was 3.5 per cent. The changes in 
employment, unemployment and productivity are all indicative of very 
considerable change in the quantities transacted in the UK labour market 
during the 1980s. 
Yet, since 1983, nominal earnings growth has remained remarkably 
stable. Between January 1981 and January 1983 earnings growth fell from 17 
to 8 per cent. Since the beginning of 1983 i t has never risen above 8 per cent 
nor fallen below 7.5 per cent. One explanation of this stability is that, for a 
variety of reasons, the institutional arrangements of the UK labour market do 
not promote wage flexibil ity. For example, the "insider-outsider" argument is 
that unions wil l drive for as high a wage settlement as possible subject to the 
constraint that they will not wish to see their members becoming 
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unemployed. Thus, their wage demands are likely to be low when 
unemployment is rising and vice versa. Given this argument, it is the change 
rather than the level of unemployment that determines earnings growth. Thus 
earnings growth declined rapidly in the early part of the recession when 
unemployment was rising, but is now stable because unemployment has 
levelled off. Wage claims will be the same whatever the level of 
unemployment so long as it is stable. 
An alternative view is that the long-term unemployment causes a 
depreciation of human capital and a consequent reduction in effective labour 
supply. Wages can thus continue to grow quite rapidly even though recorded 
unemployment is high by historical standards. Budd, Levine and Smith (1985) 
investigate the increasing proportion of long-term unemployed in the UK 
labour market and find that it is quite consistent with the fact that the 
probability that an unemployed person finds a job declines with length of time 
unemployed. Not only may this occur because the long-term unemployed are 
less attractive to employers: it may also be the result of reduced search 
intensity due to the discouraging effects of long-term unemployment. 
Yet another alternative is that while nominal earnings growth has been 
rigid, total labour costs may have fluctuated considerably due to shifts in the 
non-wage components of labour costs. This would be evidenced by shifts in 
the ratio of wage to non-wage costs. However, a brief comparison of the 
1984 Labour Costs Survey with those from previous years (see Table 2.9) 
indicates that this is not the case. For manufacturing, there was a rise of 1.9 
per cent in the ratio of wage to total labour costs between 1981 and 1984. 
This can be almost wholly explained by shifts in the exogenous components of 
NWLCs. Firstly there was a reduction in National Insurance contributions 
from 9.0 to 7.4 per cent of total labour costs and secondly the fall in the "All 
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Other Costs" category from 2.0 to 1.6 per cent was almost wholly attributable 
to reductions in government subsidies to wages. 
In al l , there is no evidence of any cyclical response to conditions in the 
labour market in negotiations concerning the magnitude of employees' 
non-wage benefits. Slackness in the labour market did not cause employers to 
take actions to reduce these benefits nor apparently did i t make employees 
more ready to accept such reductions. This would seem to support the 
extension of the "insider-outsider" or the "hysteresis" arguments mentioned 
above to include employee non-wage benefits as well as earnings. From the 
l imited evidence available, i t appears that those endogenous non-wage 
benefits which are the outcome of employer/employee bargaining have been 
largely unaffected by the slackness of the external labour market in the UK 
during the recent past. 
This finding is confirmed in Tables 2.10 and 2.11 which break down 
labour costs by industry into payments for days not worked as well as 
expanding the non-wage categories contained in Table 2.9. (Unfortunately, 
the industrial classification differs between Tables 2.10 and 2.11 due to the 
changeover to the NACE system in the 1984 labour costs survey.) The results 
for total manufacturing indicate a slight increase in payments for days not 
worked and for voluntary social welfare, both endogenous to the 
employer/employee bargain. Note, however, that the main component of 
voluntary social welfare payments are contributions to employees' pension 
funds. Being long-term commitments, these are unlikely to be a contentious 
issue in the annual wage round. Indeed, the administration of the pension 
fund, once established, may be essentially independent of employer and 
employee interference and thus can almost be treated as exogenous. 
To summarize thus far, the period 1981 to 1984 was one where NWLCs 
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in UK production industries fel l . This was primarily the result of exogenous 
changes imposed by government. National Insurance contributions were 
reduced but were slightly offset by less government subsidisation of wages. 
Even though the labour market was slack, there was no evidence of any 
negative effect on the non-wage elements of bargains. Indeed, there was a 
small increase in payments for days not worked and for social welfare relative 
to direct remuneration for hours worked. This occurred even though direct 
remuneration has continued to grow at a higher rate than would have 
previously been expected given the apparent excess supply of labour. 
Theories such as the "insider-outsider" and "hysteresis" which attempt to 
explain this seeming anomaly could be extended to include non-wage benefits 
as well as direct earnings. 
Now consider whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the 
conclusion that the aggregate importance of NWLCs in the UK economy 
declined between 1981 and 1984. To extend this conclusion to the whole of 
the economy from the information on manufacturing alone is problematic, 
given that manufacturing employment now accounts for only 22 per cent of 
total employment. Such l imited information as is available for 
nonmanufacturing industries does tend to indicate that they have experienced 
a similar decline in NWLCs. For example, in insurance, banking and finance, 
which now employs 2 million individuals, compared with 5.3 million in 
manufacturing, NWLCs have fallen from 29.7 per cent of total labour costs in 
1981 to 26.9 per cent in 1984, thus seemingly confirming the downward trend 
in NWLCs at the industry level. 
I t is not necessarily the case, however, that the downward trend in 
NWLCs at the industry level necessarily implies reduced aggregate NWLCs. 
Composition effects arising from the rapid change in UK industrial 
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structure during the eighties may have resulted in an increased national NWLC 
bi l l . Employment in banking, insurance and finance rose by 260 thousand 
between the Censuses of Employment in 1981 and 1984 while employment in 
services as a whole rose by 433 thousand. In contrast, manufacturing 
employment fel l by 731 thousand (12.1 per cent) over the same period. If the 
service sectors which have expanded relative to manufacturing have a higher 
ratio of NWLCs to total labour costs than manufacturing, then notwithstanding 
a downward trend in NWLCs at the industry level, there may have been an 
increase in aggregate payments of NWLCs. 
Limited availability of data on NWLCs in the service sector prevents 
any definite conclusion on the importance of these composition effects being 
reached. Such information as is available suggests that there is wide 
variation in the importance of NWLCs within different parts of the service 
sector. For example, NWLCs accounted for only 16.2 per cent of total labour 
costs in distribution in 1984 against 16.0 per cent in manufacturing. In 
marked contrast, NWLCs made up 26.9 per cent of total labour costs in 
insurance, banking and finance, with significantly larger endogenous 
components in social welfare, benefits in kind and subsidised services. Any 
f irm conclusion on the overall importance of NWLCs would require more 
comprehensive cost information in the service sector, but i t is clear that the 
compositional switch out of manufacturing and into services such as finance 
wil l at least partly offset exogenous reductions in NWLCs since 1981 in 
determining aggregate expediture by employers on non-wage costs. 
Changes in the division of total labour costs between fixed and 
variable components should, ceteris paribus, alter the balance between the 
stock and util isation of labour. This possibility has received l i t t le attention in 
the UK partly because of the data problems inherent in accurately 
distinguishing fixed and variable labour costs. Layard and Nickell (1987) 
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characterise the postwar behaviour of working time in the UK as follows: 
Since the war, real wages in Britain have risen steadily 
and this has led workers to want a shorter working 
week. Given trends in fixed labour costs there has 
been no corresponding reduction in firm's demand for 
weekly hours. In order to reconcile these conflicting 
desires, there have been a number of negotiated 
reductions in the workweek and a continuing rise in the 
level of overtime premia. The latter is clearly an 
important equilibrating phenomenon. I t has to be 
admitted that there is l i t t le in the way of econometric 
evidence to back up this story. The problem here is 
that i t is dif f icult to obtain precise estimates of the 
level of fixed costs and, in any event, given the 
long-run endogeneity of normal hours, overtime premia 
and indeed, these fixed costs, disentangling the supply 
and demand side forces would be extremely di f f icul t ." 
(Layard and Nickell, 1987. p.53.) 
The gradual rise in overtime premia is shown in Figure 2.10. I t is clear that 
hiring workers beyond their normal hours has become increasingly expensive in 
the UK. 
The evidence of Figure 2.8 also suggests that average weekly hours in 
manufacturing industry have changed l i t t le in the last 10 years. There was a 
temporary reduction during the worst of the recession in 1981, but since then 
they have returned to the levels of the late seventies. The 1984 Labour Costs 
survey confirms this downturn in hours worked during 1981: hours worked per 
year rose in manufacturing between 1981 and 1984 (see Tables 6.4 and 6.5). 
This wil l have principally been a cyclical effect rather than any imposed 
Figure 2.10: 
Period 
HUK : Averoge Overtime Premium 1951 — 1982p 
1981-1982 
1976-1980 
0.8 0L9 â i i-i . J.2, 1.3 „ , i Ratio to Standard Hourly Rate 3 1.4 1.5 
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increase in the length of working t ime. Indeed, recent events, as we shall see 
below, suggest that extensive reductions in working t ime may be about to 
occur in the UK. 
Most of the large negotiated reductions in the UK working week took 
place in the late sixties whereas increases in paid holidays were common 
during the seventies. The increase in payment for days not worked between 
1981 and 1984 indicates that this phenomenon was not wholly arrested during 
the early eighties. Nevertheless the changes in working t ime in the UK during 
this decade have so far been less dramatic than those of the previous two. 
There is no reason, however, to assume that further reductions in working time 
wi l l not take place in the near future. The engineering unions are now close 
to settling an agreement with their employers which wi l l lead to a reduction in 
the working week for their members from 39 to 37.5 hours. This wi l l have an 
immediate impact on approximately 1.5 million workers and is likely to 
become the target for subsequent negotiations by other groups of workers. 
Prima facie, the explanation of such further reductions in the working 
week must lie on the supply side as Nickell and Layard suggest. Employers 
appear to be acceding to workers' demands rather than pushing to introduce 
lower hours and they are demanding compensation in the form of more 
efficient work practices, thus reducing the probability of "shirking" by 
improving the monitoring of work effort. The increases in real wages which 
have occurred throughout the eighties coupled with the dominance of the 
income effect in labour supply appear to underly a leftward shift in the supply 
surve of labour. Recent changes in labour costs have not been sufficient to 
motivate a significant change in the balance of demand for labour towards 
reduced uti l isation. 
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2.4 United States of America 
This section collates and discusses data on NWLCs in the USA for 
the period 1965-85. The data presented come from two sources: (a) the 
U.S. National Income and Product Accounts, and (b) the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce publication Employee Benefits. In Appendix 2.2 detailed 
information on NWLC data and data problems in the USA are presented. 
2.4.1 NWLCs by Type, 1965-1985 
Table 2.12 displays data on NWLCs as a proportion of total labour 
costs for all U.S. private domestic industries from 1965 to 1985. NWLCs 
are broken down into six groups: payments for time not worked (panel a), 
statutory social welfare costs (panel c), voluntary social welfare costs 
(panel d), benefits in-kind (panel e), other expenses of a social nature 
(panel f), and vocational training (panel g). Total social welfare costs 
(panel b) and total NWLCs (panel h) are also shown. As noted in Appendix 
2.2, the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts provide data only on 
statutory and voluntary welfare costs (panels b, c, and d). 
In preparing the figures in Table 2.12, the reclassification of U.S. 
NWLCs by the EC method, as presented in Table A2.6 of Hart (1984a), has 
been followed closely. Since Hart's Table A2.6 is wr i t ten with specific 
reference to the Chamber of Commerce data, no special comment is 
required regarding the Chamber of Commerce figures shown in Table 
2.12. However, use of the National Income and Product Accounts data 
required some minor reclassification that should be mentioned. For the 
Accounts data, statutory social welfare costs equal employer contributions 
for social insurance plus worker's compensation. Voluntary social welfare 
costs equal other labour income of private domestic industries minus 
workers' compensation. Note that because social welfare costs are the 
only NWLCs enumerated in the Accounts, total social welfare costs 
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Table 2.12 
Non-Wage Labour Costs as a Proportion of Total Labour Costs 
by Type of Cost, U.S. Private Domestic Industries 1965-1985 
Data Source 
Type of NWLC 
(a) 
Payments 
days not 
worked 
for 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
National Income 8c 
Product Accounts 
a 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
0.0762 
— 
0.0780 
0.0806 
0.0883 
0.0874 
0.0926 
0.0879 
0.0861 
0.0885 
0.0876 
0.0770 
0.0766 
0.0720 
0.0842 
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Table 2.12 (continued) 
Non-Wage Labour Costs as a Proportion of Total Labour Costs 
by Type of Cost, U.S. Private Domestic Industries 1965-1985 
Type of NWLC 
(b) 
Total social 
welfare 
costs 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Data Source 
National Income 8c 
Product Accounts 
0.0961 
0.0965 
0.0997 
0.1022 
0.1060 
0.1113 
0.1188 
0.1263 
0.1303 
. . 0.1365 
0.1444 
0.1501 
0.1524 
0.1542 
0.1554 
0.1563 
0.1$97 
0.1609 
0.1614 
0.1600 ; 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
0.1026 
— 
0.1129 
— 
0.1192 
— 
0.1298 
— 
0.1412 
— 
0.1510 
— 
0.1625 
0.1617 
0.1620 
0.1635 
0.1662 
0.1732 
0.1733 
0.1769 
0.1697 
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Table 2.12 (continued) 
Non-Wage Labour 
by Type of Cost, 
Costs as a Proportion of Total Labour Costs 
U.S. Private Domestic Industries 1965-1985 
Type of NWLC 
(c) 
Statutory 
social 
welfare 
costs 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Data Source 
National Income 8c 
Product Accounts 
— 
0.0493 
0.0492 
0.0495 
0.0507 
0.0499 
0.0513 
0.0547 
0.0620 
0.0634 
0.0625 
0.0657 
0.0674 
0.0699 
0.0717 
0.0704 
0.0729 
0.0727 
0.0742 
0.0783 
0.0780 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
0.0448 
— 
0.0532 
— 
0.0567 
— 
0.0558 
— 
0.0653 
— 
0.0681 
— 
0.0711 
0.0747 
0.0749 
0.0739 
0.0758 
0.0771 
0.0755 
0.0795 
0.0786 
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Table 2.12 (continued) 
Non-Wage Labour 
by Type of Cost, 
Costs as a Proportion of Total Labour Costs 
U.S. Private Domestic Industries 1965-1985 
Type of NWLC 
(d) 
Voluntary 
social 
welfare 
costs 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Data Source 
National Income Sc 
Product Accounts 
— 
0.0468 
0.0473 
0.0502 
0.0515 
0.0561 
0.0599 
0.0641 
0.0669 
0.0634 
0.0740 
0.0787 
0.0826 
0.0825 
0.0826 
0.0850 
0.0834 
0.08-70 
0.0868 
0.0831 
0.0820 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
0.0578 
— 
0.0597 
— 
0.0625 
— 
0.0740 
— 
0.0759 
— 
0.0829 
— 
0.0914 
0.0870 
0.0871 
0.0896 
0.0904 
0.0961 
0.0978 
0.0974 
0.0911 
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Table 2.12 (continued) 
Non-Wage Labour Costs as a Proportion of Total Labour Costs 
by Type of Cost, U.S. Private Domestic Industries 1965-1985 
Type of NWLC Year 
(e) 
Benefits 
in-kind 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1975 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Data Source 
National Income 8c 
Product Accounts 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
0.0040 
0.0031 
0.0026 
0.0023 
0.0028 
0.0026 
■ 
0.0022 
0.0020 
0.0018 
0.0023 
0.0023 
0.0015 
0.0016 
0.0015 
0.0015 
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Table 2.12 (continued) 
Non-Wage Labour Costs as a Proportion of Total Labour Costs 
by Type of Cost, U.S. Private Domestic Industries 1965-1985 
Data Source 
Type of NWLC 
(0 
Other 
expenses 
of a social 
nature 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Nat ional Income 8c 
Product Accounts 
a 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
0.0145 
— 
0.0158 
— 
0.0152 
— 
0.0143 
— 
0.0144 
— 
0.0146 
— 
0.0149 
0.0161 
0.Q169 
0.0149 
0.0141 
0.0149 
0.0146 
0.0156 
0.0163 
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Table 2.12 (continued) 
Non-Wage Labour Costs as a Proportion of Total Labour Costs 
by Type of Cost, U.S. Private Domestic Industries 1965-1985 
Data Source 
Type of NWLC 
(9) 
Vocational 
training 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
National Income 8c 
Product Accounts 
a 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
0.0008 
— 
0.0005 
— 
0.0006 
— 
0.0007 
— 
0.0006 
— 
0.0008 
— 
0.0009 
0.0010 
0.0012 
0.0015 
0.0016 
0.0017 
0.0019 
0.0019 
0.0021 
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Table 2.12 (continued) 
Non-Wage Labour Costs as a Proportion of Total Labour Costs 
by Type of Cost, U.S. Private Domestic Industries 1965-1985 
Type of NWLC 
(h) 
Total NWLCs 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Data Sourc 
National Income 8c 
Product Accounts 
— 
0.0961 
0.0965 
0.0997 
0.1022 
0.1060 
0.1113 
0.1188 
0.1263 
0.1303 
0.1365 
0.1444 
0.1501 
0.1524 
0.1542 
0.1554 
0.1563 
0.1597 
0.1609 
0.1614 
0.1600 
:e 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
0.1981 
— 
0.2101 
— 
0.2181 
— 
0.2355 
— 
0.2464 
— 
0.2614 
— 
0.2684 
0.2695 
0.2679 
0.2706 
0.2717 
0.2685 
0.2679 
0.2679 
0.2738 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, The 
National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 
1929-82; Statistical Tables (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1986); 
Survey of Current Business 66 (July 1986); U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, Employee Benefits, various years. 
a. The U.S. National Income and Product Acconts do not report the 
following as separate cost items: payments for days not worked, 
in-kind benefits, other expenses of a social nature, and vocational 
training. Payments for days not worked and benefits in-kind are 
included as direct wage and salary payments. Other expenses of a 
social nature and vocational training appear to have no counterpart in 
the Accounts. 
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(panel b) and total NWLCs (panel h) are the same for the Accounts. 
Panel h of Table 2.12 suggests that NWLCs have grown dramatically 
during the last 20 years in the U.S. Defining NWLCs as contributions to social 
welfare programmes (see the column headed "National Income and Product 
Accounts"), NWLCs have grown from just under 10 per cent of total labour 
cost in 1966 to about 16 per cent in the mid-1980s. Defining NWLCs more 
broadly to include payments for days not worked, benefits in-kind, other social 
expenses, and vocational training (see column headed "Chamber of 
Commerce"), NWLCs have grown from just under 20 per cent of total labour 
costs in 1965 to over 27 per cent in 1985. 
Although panel h of Table 2.12 shows that NWLCs as a whole have 
grown significantly during the past 20 years, other panels reveal that not all 
components of NWLCs have increased. The Chamber of Commerce data 
suggest that - although payments for days not worked grew as a proportion of 
total labour costs during the 1970s - between 1982 and 1985 they returned to 
roughly the same level as during the late 1960s (see panel a). Benefits in-kind 
actually fel l as a proportion of total labour costs during the 20-year period 
(panel e). Other social expenses grew insignificantly (panel f), and vocational 
training remained a minuscule proportion of total labour costs (panel g). 
The conclusion is that the growth of NWLCs during the 1965-1985 
period can be attributed almost entirely to the growth of statutory and 
voluntary employer contributions to social welfare (see panels c and d). 
Fortunately, these are the NWLC cost components that exist in both the 
Chamber of Commerce and National Income and Product Accounts data, so 
that reliable inferences can be drawn. 
Panels c and d of Table 2.12 suggest that the pattern of growth of 
statutory social welfare costs has been more even than that of voluntary social 
welfare costs over the past 20 years. The National Income and Product 
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Accounts data indicate that statutory social welfare costs grew (as a 
proportion of total labour costs) by 27 per cent from 1966 to 1975 (2.7 annual 
rate of growth), by 13 per cent from 1975 to 1980 (2.4 per cent annual rate of 
growth), and by 11 per cent from 1980 to 1985 (2.1 per cent annual rate of 
growth). (The Chamber of Commerce data suggest a similar pattern of 
growth of statutory social welfare costs, if percentage changes for 1967-75, 
1975-80, and 1980-85 are computed.) This seemingly even growth does mask 
some changes within the package of statutory social welfare costs: 
contributions to social security (OASDHI) grew slowly during the late 1970s, 
but have grown rapidly since the 1983 reform of the social security financing 
system (data are not shown in the table). Workers' compensation grew rapidly 
during the 1970s, only to decline as a proportion of total labour costs in the 
1980s (data are not shown in the table). Nevertheless, the overall pattern of 
growth of statutory social welfare costs is remarkably even. 
In contrast, the growth of voluntary social welfare costs slowed 
dramatically and reached a plateau during the 20 year period, as can be seen in 
panel d of Table 2.12. Both the National Income and Product Accounts and 
the Chamber of Commerce data show that voluntary social welfare costs grew 
dramatically between the mid-1960s,and 1975 - by 58 per cent in the Accounts 
data (5.2 per cent annual rate of growth), and by 43 per cent in the Chamber 
of Commerce data (3.7 per cent annual rate of growth). But voluntary social 
welfare costs grew less rapidly during the late 1970s (by somewhere between 8 
and 14 per cent as a proportion of total labour costs, or at an annual rate of 
1.6 to 2.8 per cent). Moreover, voluntary social welfare costs grew at a still 
slower rate during the early 1980s. Indeed, the Accounts data suggest that 
voluntary social welfare costs fell by over 3 per cent (as a proportion of total 
labour costs) between 1980 and 1985. A detailed discussion of these past, as 
well as the expected future, trends is left to chapter 5. 
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2·4-2 Estimates of Fixed and Variable Labour Costs 
Tables 2.13 and 2.14 display estimates of the percentage of total 
labour costs that, are fixed NWLCs, and of the fixed/variable labour cost 
ratio. In Table 2J3 these figures are derived for each of the one-digit 
industries reported in the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts in five 
selected years spanning the mid-1960s through 1985. In Table 2.14 the figures 
arc derived for each of the industries reported in the Chamber of Commerce 
data, eaain in five selected years spanning the mid-1960s through 1985. 
The figures displayed are based on methods developed in Hart (1984). 
Table 2.33's figures are conceptually similar to Hart's "Fixed NWLC Γ' and 
"Ratio I (fixed/variable)" measures in Table 2.8 (p.17), in that they exclude pay 
for time not worked, and hence implicitly treat pay for time not worked as a 
variable cost. Specifically, Table 2.33's figures take fixed NWLCs to be 
employer contributions to state Unemployment Insurance, supplemental 
unemployment insurance benefits, pensions, health insurance, and life 
insurance. In terms of the Accounts, then, fixed NWLCs are Unemployment 
Insurance plus Other Labour Income minus workers' compensation. Variable 
NWLCs, on the other hand, are employer contributions to social security 
(OASDHI) and workers' compensation. Again in terms of the Accounts, 
variable NWLCs are Social Insurance contributions (excluding Unemployment 
Insurance) plus workers' compensation. 
Because the Accounts do not enumerate each required item by 
industry, it was necessary to impute Unemployment Insurance and workers' 
compensation by industry. This was accomplished by using industry-level data 
from the Chamber of Commerce. Specifically, the ratio of UI contributions 
to the sum of UI and social security contributions was computed by industry in 
the Chamber of Commerce data, and the ratio applied to the Accounts figure 
for contributions for social Insurance, in order to obtain an estimate of UI 
contributions by industry. Also, a similar ratio was constructed for workers' 
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compensation contributions and applied to the Accounts data in order to obtain 
an estimate of workers' compensation contributions by industry. 
Table 2.14's figures are based on the Chamber of Commerce data. 
They are conceptually similar to Hart's "Fixed NWLC Π" and "Ratio Π 
(fixed/variable)" measures (Hart, 1984, Table 2.8, p. 17), in that pay for time 
not worked is now treated as a fixed cost. Consequently, Table 2.14's figures 
take fixed NWLCs to be all NWLCs except employer contributions to social 
security (OASDHI) and worker's compensation, which are taken to be variable. 
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Table 2.13 
Estimates of Percentage of Fixed/Total Labour Costs 
by Industry, 1966, 1971. 1976. 1981, and 1985: 
U.S. National Income and Product Accounts Data 
Industry 1966 1971 1976 1981 1985 
Fixed NWLC as per 
cent of total labour 
cost: 
All private domestic 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Construction 
Manufacturing: 
Durable 
Nondurable 
Transportation 
Communications . . 
Utilities 
Trade: 
Wholesale 
Retail 
Finance and insurance 
Services 
6.01 
2.99 
8.82 
3.94 
7.90 
7.22 
5.22 
12.53 
10.23 
3.88 
4.16 
8.14 
3.32 
6.54 
2.88 
8.97 
3.84 
9.25 
7.28 
6.16 
17.03 
11.58 
4.93 
6.89 
8.84 
6.85 
8.90 
4.96 
11.35 
7.40 
12.02 
9.97 
9.22 
17.21 
16.41 
6.44 
5.07 
12.29 
5.77 
9.28 
5.47 
10.99 
8.63 
12.42 
11.58 
8.66 
16.93 
14.49 
6.71 
5.61 
10.99 
6.46 
9.59 
5.57 
10.96 
10.28 
12.26 
11.68 
9.89 
16.73 
14.61 
7.66 
6.70 
10.80 
6.97 
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Table 2.14 
Estimates of Fixed/Variable Labour Costs 
in the U.S. by Industry, 1965, 1971, 1977, 1981, and 1985: 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Data 
Industry 1965 1971 1977 1981 1985 
Fixed NWLCs as 
percent of total ·> 
labour cost: 
All 
Manufacturing 
Food.tobacco 
Textiles, apparel 
Wood products 
Printing and publishing 
Chemicals 
Petroleum 
Rubber and plastics 
Stone, glass 
Metals: 
Primary 
Fabricated 
Machinery: 
Electrical 
Other 
Transportation Equip. 
Instruments, other 
Nonmanufacturing 
Utilities 
Trade: 
Department stores 
Other 
Finance 
Insurance 
Hospitals 
Other 
17.6 
16.6 
18.8 
12.9 
14.1 
15.3 
19.2 
19.9 
17.4 
15.8 
17.6 
15.9 
16.7 
17.0 
16.5 
16.4 
19.2 
19.3 
16.3 
16.4 
22.5 
18.7 
-
-
20.2 
19.7 
21.1 
14.8 
18.2 
18.4 
22.5 
23.5 
19.7 
19.8 
21.9 
18.3 
19.5 
19.7 
22.3 
20.3 
20.8 
21.9 
15.4 
16.0 
~~>23.6 '" 
^ 21Æ 'Î 
• · ■ ­ ­ · ­ ­ ' : * ' · 
­ ' ■ · . '■ 
23.0 
23.0 
22.3 
17.8 
20.6 
22.2 
26.5 
25.8 
22.8 
21.9 
25.8 
23.0 
23.0 
23.2 
24.0 
21.4 
23.0 
25.2 
20.3 
19.1 
25.5 
23.7 
16.4 
21.7 
22.8 
22.9 
22.3 
18.8 
21.3 
22.7 
26.1 
27.2 
21.7 
22.4 
24.8 
22.6 
23.1 
23.0 
23.4 
21.5 
22.7 
'· 25.8 
18.6 
18.6 
24.2 
24.2 
19.4 
20.7 
23.0 
23.7 
23.3 
19.6 
20.2 
21.3 
26.0 
23.4 
23.0 
20.5 
27.9 
24.8 
23.8 
24.0 
25.0 
21.0 
22.5 
25.3 
18.5 
19.2 
21.6 
23.5 
21.2 
21.2 
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Table 2.14 (continued) 
Estimates of Fixed/Variable Labour Costs 
in the U.S. by Industry, 1965, 1971, 1977, 1981, and 1985: 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Data 
Industry 1965 1971 1977 1981 1985 
Fixed /Variable Labour 
Cost Ratios: 
All 
Manufacturing 
Food, tobacco 
Textiles, apparel 
Wood products 
Printing and publishing 
Chemicals 
Petroleum 
Rubber and plastics 
Stone, glass 
Metals: 
Primary 
Fabricated 
Machinery: 
Electrical 
Other 
Transportation Equip. 
Instruments, other 
Nonmanufacturing 
Uti l i t ies 
Trade: 
Department stores 
Other 
Finance 
Insurance 
Hospitals 
Other 
0.213 
0.199 
0.231 
0.148 
0.164 
0.180 
0.238 
0.249 
0.211 
0.188 
0.213 
0.189 
0.200 
0.205 
0.197 
0.201 
0.238 
0.239 
0.195 
0.196 
0.290 
0.250 
-
-
0.253 
0.2463 
0.268 
0.174 
0.222 
0.226 
0.290 
0.307 
0.246 
0.247 
0.280 
0.224 
0.242 
0.246 
0.287 
0.254 
0.263 
0.280 
0.182 
0.190 
0.308 
0.270 
-
-
0.298 
0.299 
0.287 
0.217 
0.260 
0.286 
0.361 
0.347 
0.296 
0.280 
0.348 
0.299 
0.299 
0.302 
0.315 
0.274 
0.298 
0.337 
*. 
0.255 
0.256 
0.345 
0.510 
0.196 
0.277 
0.296 
0.297 
0.287 
0.252 
0.271 
0.295 
0.553 
0.373 
0.277 
0.288 
0.350 
0.292 
0.500 
0.299 
0.505 
0.265 
0.294 
0.548 
0.229 
0.229 
0.520 
0.520 
0.240 
0.261 
0.299 
0.510 
0.304 
0.244 
0.253 
0.270 
0.352 
0.305 
0.298 
0.257 
0.387 
0.329 
0.312 
0.315 
0.333 
0.291 
0.359 
0.227 
0.258 
0.276 
0.507 
0.269 
0.269 
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2.5 Some Wider International Comparisons 
Table 2.15 shows, for 1981, the three most important NWLC items as 
proportions of total labour costs in manufacturing industry for our four 
featured economies together with France and Italy. While, in general, the 
data are compiled so that each main category conforms to the EC 
classification of labour costs (for computational details, see Hart, 1984a) 
precise matching is impossible to achieve in practice. Nevertheless, the 
information is reliable enough to indicate the most important differences 
among the countries. Two of these stand out in particular. In the first place, 
payments for days not worked in Japan are considerably below the other 
countries. In the second place, European countries - though particularly 
France, FRG and Italy - have far higher statutory compared to voluntary 
social security contributions while in Japan and the USA there is reasonable 
balance between these two cost items. 
The relatively high levels of statutory relative to voluntary social 
security contributions in Europe compared to Japan and the USA also pertain 
to the respective growth rates. This is illustrated in Table 2.16 which shows 
the growth of private and statutory schemes for the same six countries 
between 1965 and 1985. Noticeably, France, FRG and Italy exhibit far higher 
growth rates in statutory relative to voluntary contributions over the period in 
contrast to Japan where they are of similar magnitude and the USA where the 
relative position is reversed. (Although, as indicated in the previous section, 
the recent shorter term trends in the USA indicate a falling-off in the growth 
of voluntary contributions.) Interestingly, the UK appears to stand alone 
among the major European economies in showing more longer term growth in 
private relative to statutory schemes (see section 2.5 for a detailed 
examination of shorter term trends). 
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Table 2.15 
Main NWLC items as proportions of total labour costs 
and fixed/variable cost ratios: Selected OECD countries 
(Manufacturing Industry), 1981. 
Payment for days 
not worked 
Statutory Social 
Security 
Voluntary Social 
Security 
France FRG Italy Japan UK USA 
8.5 11.5 10.4 2.2 10.9 8.7* 
18.9 16.1 21.9 7.2 9.4 7.8» 
6.8 3.6 1.5 6.7 6.3 8.9» 
Ratio I 
Ratio Π 
0.14 
0.24 
0.07 
0.21 
0.03 
0.15 
0.15 
0.18 
0.12 
0.26 
0.13 
0.25 
Sources: Hart (1984a); OECD (1986); Tables 2.4 and 2.6. 
Note: * all industries. 
Table 2.16 
Growth of employers' contributions to social security schemes, 1965-85 
(Percentage of total employee compensation) 
Private Statutory ' Total 
France 
FRG 
Italy* 
Japan 
UK 
USA 
*1965-82 
Source: OECD (1986) 
Schemes 
-0.5 
1.1 
-0.5 
2.6 
5.5 
5.8 
Schemes 
5.0 
4.6 
0.7 
3.0 
2.4 
2.8 
4.5 
5.7 
0.2 
5.5 
5.9 
8.4 
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Comparative estimates of the ratios of fixed to (total) variable 
labour costs are also presented in Table 2.15 for Ratios I and Π (see section 
2.2 in particular). Given the problem of allocating payments for days not 
worked into fixed and variable costs, Ratio I is perhaps the safest on which to 
base international comparisons. The picture is one of rough comparability 
among France, Japan, UK and USA with FRG and Italy showing considerably 
smaller degrees of fixity on this narrow definition. 
As we will see in section 4.2, a crucial comparison in relative degrees 
of labour fixity in the literature concerns Japan and the USA. On the ratio 
definitions relevant to Table 2.15 and given the uncertainty over allocating 
payments for days not worked, there is little to choose between the two 
countries. As argued by Hashimoto and Raisian (1987) (see also sections 2.2 
and 4.2), the key consideration is where Japanese bonus payments should be 
allocated. If these authors are correct and bonuses should be regarded 
primarily as returns to specific investments, then the more broadly based 
Ratio m (see Tables 2.6 and 2.7) applies and the relative picture is 
transformed. As we have also seen earlier (see Tables 2.4 and 2.5), Japanese 
bonus payments comprised about 19 per cent of total labour costs in 1981. 
This figure is far in excess of bonus payments in any other OECD country. 
Although it is difficult to match the Japanese definition of bonus, it is 
nonetheless a simple matter to establish the large difference. For example, 
if we take the somewhat broader EC definition, 'bonuses and premiums', then 
Italy - at 9.1 per cent of total labour costs - had the largest proportion of 
total cost in this category of the remaining five countries. This is only half 
of the Japanese bonus figure. 
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Appendix 2.1 
Sources and Construct ion of Data on Japanese Labour Costs 
A2.1.1 Data Sources 
Consistent data for Japanese labour costs have been constructed 
f rom several data sources, since there exists no single data set that sat isf ies 
all requi rements. Two data sets were constructed: (i) t ime-ser ies data for 9 
sectors (min ing, construct ion, manufactur ing, wholesale and re ta i l , f inance 
and insurance, rea l estate, t ransportat ion and communicat ion , e l ec t r i c i t y -
gas-water supply, and services) f rom 1965 to 1985, and ( i i ) cross-sectional 
data set of 20 manufactur ing industries for 1984. 
In order to construct a consistent set of data f r o m several sources 
w i t h d i f fe ren t bases and d i f ferent coverages, the fo l low ing procedure was 
adopted. The "Basic Surveys of Wages" was selected fo r the base of the 
consistent data set and was combined w i th the f igures of other data sources 
(af ter adjust ing them by the ra t io of cont ractua l , or regular, wages (= 
contractual wages + non-contractual wages) obtained f rom the "Basic 
Surveys"). Since sampling bases of data and sampling dates in the year are 
generally d i f f e ren t f rom survey to survey, this procedure may generate 
cer ta in biases in the constructed data set. No a t temp t has been made to 
cor rect fo r these, however. 
The major data sources used in our surveys are as fo l lows: 
A Basic Surveys of Wages (Min is t ry of Labour). 
This is by far the most extensive survey on wages and other re lated 
i tems fo r establishments w i th over 10 employees. The ext racted i tems are 
hours worked, contractual and non-contractual cash payments, annual special 
payments, numbers of employees, and wage distr ibut ions. 
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Β Welfare Surveys (Minist ry of Labour). 
This survey, sampled f rom enterprises w i th more than 30 employees, 
includes various components of NWLCs and deta i led decomposit ion of 
obl igatory and non-obl igatory wel fare costs. The ex t rac ted i tems are 
severance payment , benefi ts in k ind, obl igatory wel fare costs, non-obl igatory 
wel fare costs, costs of housing and food services in non-ob l igatory wel fare 
costs, regular cash payments, recru i tment costs, t ra in ing costs, other 
non-wage labour costs, and s ta tu tory and other paid hol idays. 
C Surveys on Systems of Wages and Working Hours (Min is t ry of Labour) 
The ex t rac ted i tems are t ravel l ing allowances, housing allowances, 
fami ly al lowances, s ta tu tory paid annual holidays ac tua l l y taken, and al l 
i tems l is ted in Β fo r 1984. (The Welfare Survey of 1984 did not cover these 
i tems.) The sample is taken f rom enterprises w i th more than 30 employees. 
D Labour Cost surveys (Minist ry of Labour) 
This survey was conducted f rom 1965 to 1971 fo r the i tems l isted 
under B. However, each sector was covered only every three years: 
manufactur ing was covered in 1965, 1968 and 1971; min ing, construct ion 
t ranspor ta t ion and communicat ion, and e lec t r i c i t y -gas -wa te r supply in 1966 
and 1969; and wholesale and re ta i l , f inance and insurance, and services in 
1967 and 1970. Real estate sector was excluded in th is 'survey. 
E Survey on Wage Composition (Ministry of Labour) 
This, sampled over enterprises w i th more than 30 employees, was 
conducted only before 1965. Figures for various al lowances in contractual 
wages as l is ted in C for 1965 are l is ted. 
F Survey on Wage Conditions (Central Labour Commi t tee) 
This is a very small survey (about 500 enterprises) and is l im i ted to 
large enterprises w i t h more than one thousand employees and more than f ive 
hundred m i l l i on yen of capi ta l . This was used only fo r various allowances in 
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contractual wages in 1984 and 1985 and for the in fo rmat ion on the service 
sector, since these are lacking in the of f ic ia l s tat is t ics of the Min is t ry of 
Labour. 
G Survey on Working Hours and Holidays (Central Labour Commi t tee) 
This survey has a small sampling base s imi lar to Survey on Wage 
Condit ions, but i t has been conducted only every other year . The series on 
s ta tu tory paid annual holidays which were actual ly taken is of relevance here 
and the usable period was f rom 1968 to 1984. 
There are some missing data in the original s ta t i s t i ca l sources. 
Major cases are as fol lows. 
1 The decomposit ion of labour costs was given only every three years 
fo r each sector during the period f rom 1964 to 1971. No in terpolat ion was 
done for the missing years. In terpolat ion would have produced very a r t i f i c i a l 
results, because observed years are d i f fe rent f rom industry to industry. 
2 The in fo rmat ion on benefits in kind is lacking in the o f f i c ia l s tat is t ics 
fo r 1984 and 1985: they were included in other non-wage labour costs. 
Since there are no rel iable data available for these i t ems , they are l e f t as 
missing. 
A2.1.2 Computat ion of Costs for Paid Holidays 
In Japanese o f f i c ia l s ta t is t ics , the costs for paid holidays have never 
been calculated w i t h the exception of several sporadic t r ia ls in the Surveys 
on Labour Costs. Even stat is t ics on the numbers of paid holidays are rather 
poor: the numbers were given on the annual basis only a f te r 1980, and the 
f i tures on non-statutory paid holidays were published only once during the 
period f rom 1964 to 1985. The method adopted to compute a consistent 
series of costs for paid holidays involved construct ing consistent data for paid 
holidays f rom a few sources and then convert ing them in to costs for paid 
holidays by some mult ip ly ing factors . 
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For paid holidays, the complete annual data fo r the nine sectors are 
only avai lable f rom Data C (see previous section) for the period 1980-1985. 
Data D give such figures for the period 1965-1971, but they are too sporadic 
to be used fo r present purposes. Instead we employ Data G. However, this 
set of data has also many defects. Namely, this survey is conducted only 
every other year, and i t uses a d i f fe ren t industry c lass i f icat ion which lacks a 
real estate sector . Furthermore, the sample size is ra the r small (about 500 
in 1984) and l im i t ed to large enterprises w i t h more than 500 employees and 
more than 500 mi l l ion yen of cap i ta l . As the resul t , the variances of the 
series are re la t i ve ly large. In order to min imize the ef fets of these 
problems, OLS is f i t t e d to the observed series as a l inear funct ion of t ime 
af ter removing some outl iers, and est imated values are assumed to represent 
annual data points. As mentioned, one serious problem of Data G is that 
they contain no in format ion on the rea l estate sector . However, Data C 
show that the movement of paid holidays of this sector is very simi lar to that 
of the const ruct ion sector during the period 1980-1985. Therefore, i t is 
assumed tha t the movement of paid holidays was also the same in real estate 
and const ruct ion throughout the whole period, although the i r levels might be 
d i f fe ren t . In th is way, a set of annual data of paid hol idays was constructed 
for al l the sectors and for the whole per iod. Then th is 'data set was scaled so 
that the values of 1980 of the set are equal to those of Data C. These steps 
provide a consistent set of annual data which consist of Data C for the period 
1980-1985 and the newly generated data for the per iod 1965-1979. This 
series is only fo r statutory paid holidays actual ly taken, excluding non­
s ta tu tory paid holidays. Since Data Β of 1975 are the only published 
s tat is t ics , we are obliged to assume that the ra t io of s tatutory and non­
s ta tu tory paid holidays was stable for each sector throughout the whole 
per iod. Adjust ing the series by this ra t io for each sector , an annual series of 
to ta l paid annual holidays for nine sectors is obtained. 
16) 
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The f ina l conversion of to ta l paid holidays into costs of to ta l holidays 
involved the fo l lowing formula: 
. , _ HT n Monthly regular wages 
H L = χ ο X 
12 
Monthly regular working hours 
where HT and HC denote to ta l paid holidays and costs of paid holidays, 
respect ive ly . 
A2.1.3 Conversion into EC-Compat ib le Data 
Japanese and European classif ications of labour -cost s ta t is t ics are 
d i f fe ren t . Table A2.1.1 shows how to convert Japanese data in to 
EC-compat ib le data. Although i t seems that this conversion is on the whole 
quite reasonable, some discrepancies exist (see Japanese Min is t ry of Labour 
(1967) fo r detai led discussion of these points.) The main problems are: 
1 Japanese benefits in kind include some t rave l l i ng costs, such as 
commut ing fares, while ECs do not. Since the avai lable data do not 
give detai led decomposition of benefits in k ind, such discrepancies 
are not dealt w i t h . Accordingly, converted f igures are s t i l l larger 
than correct figures for benefi ts in kind, whi le the f igures of other 
labour costs are smaller by the same amount. 
2 Japanese welfare costs include personnel expenses such as wages and 
salaries of doctors, nurses, and training personnel. This makes the 
we l fa re costs and the tota l labour costs in Japan larger than those in 
the EC countries. 
5 Japanese data do not contain the costs of f inancia l services. 
Therefore, the Japanese labour costs are smal ler by this amount than 
the European equivalent. 
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A2.1.4 Computat ion of Quasi-Fixed and Variable Labour Costs 
As mentioned in the main tex t , one of the most impor tant 
decompositions of labour costs involves the dist inct ion between quasi- f ixed 
and variable costs. Some labour costs, such as t ra in ing costs, are incurred 
only when ex t ra employees are h i red. This kind of costs are per-worker 
costs, or quasi - f ixed costs. On the other hand, costs such as wages, changing 
w i t h the amount of man-hours, are variable costs. Therefore we can express 
the to ta l labour costs as 
LC = zN + vhN = (z + vh)N, (i) 
where z, v, h, N denote, respect ively, quasi-f ixed and variable labour costs, 
average hours worked, and the number of workers. 
Some labour costs are easily classified into e i ther f ixed or variable 
costs: wages and over t ime payments are variable, whi le several NWLC i tems 
belong unambiguously to quasi- f ixed costs. Bonus payments - in some of our 
presented s ta t is t ics - are classif ied as f ixed costs, wh ich might be a l i t t l e 
controvers ia l . There are some ambiguit ies on payments fo r days not worked. 
Social secur i ty costs contain both f ixed and var iable cost elements in 
most countr ies. The employer's contr ibut ion consists of the amount of 
wages mul t ip l ied by a cer ta in ra te in the case of an employee whose wages 
l ie between the f loor wages and the ceil ing wages s ta tu to r i l y prescribed. 
This port ion of social security costs is proportional to man-hours, so thai i t is 
var iable. On the other hand, the employer pays a f ixed amount of 
contr ibut ions in the case of an employee whose wages are either under the 
f loor wages or over the cei l ing wages. This part of social security costs, 
proport ional only to number of employees, is quas i - f ixed. 
Major social welfare contr ibut ions in Japan cover health, pension, 
unemployment and accident insurance. Only health and pension insurance 
incorporate the ' f loor -ce i l ing ' system. The contr ibut ions of other social 
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insurance are proport ional to employers' wages so tha t all these costs are 
var iable. In the case of health insurance, there exist two systems, one 
operated by the government and the other operated by unions. The schemes 
of f l oo r -ce i l i ng and standard income classif icat ion are the same for the two 
systems, whi le the contr ibut ion rates d i f fe r . The pension insurance has only 
one system, but the contr ibut ion rates are d i f ferent f o r males and females. 
Table A2.1.2 and Table A2.1.5 summarize employers' cont r ibut ion schemes 
w i t h respect to heal th and pension insurance. 
Our method of est imating the f ixed and var iable components of the 
heal th and pension insurances is f i r s t to obtain the wage distr ibut ions of 
industr ies and then d i rect ly to compute the two components of social secur i ty 
costs according to the contr ibut ion schemes of the insurances (see Har t and 
Kawasaki (1987) fo r the application of the same method to FRG data). 
The data source of wage distr ibut ions is found in Data A. The data 
are in the form of numbers of employees for each wage class. For s imp l ic i t y 
of computat ion, we approximate these discrete distr ibut ions by some 
continuous distr ibut ions. In order to u t i l ize fu l ly the in fo rmat ion contained 
in the discrete distr ibut ions, we avoid the usual f i t t i ng of a simple probabi l i ty 
funct ion - such as the log-normal d ist r ibut ion - and instead use the spline 
approximat ion of the empirical distr ibut ions. Considering that the data are 
given in a discrete fo rm, we f i r s t convert the or ig ina l distr ibutions in to 
cumulat ive distr ibut ions, and then apply the spline method to obtain 
continuous wage distr ibutions. 
A wage convenient form of spline is a cubic spl ine. Let t ing x, and 
y k represent an observed point for k = l , 2, .... n, where x . < x „ < .... < χ , the 
cubic spline is defined as: 
y = f k ( x ) = A k + Bkx + C k x 2 4 D k x 3 . (ϋ) 
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The parameters A. , B, , C. and D k are uniquely determined by the cont inu i ty 
condit ions which require that the func t ion , the f i rs t and second der ivat ives 
are all continuous at the k given points and by some end point conditions such 
as zero second derivat ives at the end points. The cubic spline, however, 
produces o f ten more or less non-monotonic functions as a resul t , which are 
c lear ly inappropr iate for the cumulat ive distr ibut ions in our cases. One 
solut ion to this problem is to use a special rat ional spline developed by Spaeth 
(1975). In this case, the interpolat ing funct ion is given by 
y = f k ( x ) = A k u + B k t 4 C k u 3 / ( p t + l ) + D k t 5 / ( pu+ l ) ( i i i ) 
where t = ( x - xk ) / ( xk+ l - xk ) , u = 1-t, and - 1 < p. I f ρ is zero, this funct ion 
reduces to the normal cubic spline defined in ( i i) above. As ρ becomes 
larger, the func t ion approaches the l inear interpolat ing func t ion which is just 
the l inear spl ine. I f the observed points are all monotonical ly located, the 
in terpo la t ing func t ion can be made monotonie by adjust ing p. We have 
incorporated a search procedure to select the smallest ρ that keeps the 
func t ion monotonie. 
Given the wage distr ibut ions, contr ibut ion ra tes , f loor wages and 
cei l ing wages of social insurances, we can compute the quasi- f ixed and 
variable components of employers' contr ibut ions to heal th and pension 
insurance. Since the distr ibutions of male and female wages are quite 
d i f fe ren t , we compute the two components separately fo r male and female, 
and then combine them to obtain the f inal results. Another point to be noted 
is that the contr ibut ions are computed continuously by integrat ing the 
product of the ra te , wages, and wage density funct ion. In rea l i t y , however, 
the employer pays contributions discretely according to the standardized 
income classes in which given wages f a l l . The discrepancy does not seem 
s ign i f i cant ly large, however. 
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The quasi-fixed social security costs are incurred either when the 
employers' wages are under the floor level or when they are over the ceiling 
level: 
Wf oo 
FC = f(w^ ƒ f(w) dw + w ƒ f(w) dw). (in) 
'c 
f 0 c wr 
where FC, r, w f , WQ , f(w) are respectively the quasi-fixed costs, the 
contribution rate, the floor wages, the ceiling wages, and wage density 
function, while the variable costs (VC) are given by 
w c 
VC = r ƒ w f(w) dw. (iv) 
w f 
In actual computation, we differentiate between male and female 
employees, health and pension insurances, and government and union schemes 
of health insurance. Thus, fixed and variable costs are computed for each 
case and then aggregated to obtain the desired two components of costs. 
The quasi-fixed and variable costs of health and pension insurances 
were computed for two sets of data, namely for nine sectors from 1965 to 
1985, and for twenty manufacturing industries in 1984. The amount of 
computation and necessary wage distribution data are so huge that we used 
the following convention in the case of the nine sectors: the two components 
were computed only for the total sector for each year and the computed 
proportion was assigned to the nine sectors of the same year, assuming that 
the ratio of the fixed to variable costs is the same for the nine sectors for a 
given year. 
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Table A2.1.1 Reclassification of Japanese Labour Costs by EC Method 
EC Classification 
I. Direct remuneration 
II. Over-time payment 
III. Bonuses and 
gratuities 
IV. Payments for days 
not worked 
Japanese Equivalent 
A. Regular cash earnings 
- Travel allowance (A) 
- Housing allowance (A) 
- Family allowance (A) 
B. Over-time payment 
C. Bonuses and other irregular 
payments 
Estimation: 
Regular cash earnings 
Regular working hours 
χ 8 χ 
(days of paid holidays actually 
taken) 
1 
12 
V. Statutory social 
welfare costs 
VI. Customary, 
contractual, 
or voluntary social 
welfare costs 
VII. Benefits in kind 
Vili. Vocational training 
cos t 
IX Other labour costs 
D. Statutory social welfare costs 
E. Non-obligatory social welfare 
cos ts 
- Food and housing costs (E) 
+ F. Severance payment 
+ Family allowance (A) 
G. Benefits in kind 
+ Housing allowance (A) 
+ Food and housing costs (E) 
H. Vocational training cost 
+ I. Recruitment cost 
J. Other labour costs 
+ Travel allowance (A) 
Note: The letter in parentheses denotes the item to which the 
item with this letter originally belonged. 
Table A2.1.2 Employer Payroll Tax Rates and Wage Limits of Health Insurance in Japan 
Government 
Year Membership 
( 10,000) 
1965 1143 
1966 1170 
1967 1220 
1968 1253 
1969 1285 
1970 1315 
1971 2602 
1972 2600 
1973 2673 
1974 2741 
1975 2772 
1976 2812 
1977 2872 
1978 2904 
1979 2971 
1980 3060 
1981 3129 
1982 3091 
1983 3149 
1984 3193 
1985 3233 
Union 
Rate 
( * ) 
■3.15 
3-25 3.5 
3.6 
3.8 
3.9 
4 
4.2 
ϋ.2Γ. 
4.2 
Date of 
Revision 
1960/1 
• 1966/4 
1967/8 
1973/1 
1974/11 
1976/1 
?1978/2 
1981/3 
1982 /ll 
1984/3 
Membership 
( 10,000) 
710 
733 
759 
803 
851 
909 
2124 
2225 
2326 
2464 
2557 
2609 
2639 2674 
2696 
2703 
2750 
2793 
2837 2862 
2911 
Rate 
( % ) 
3.962 
4.027 
4.045 
4.059 
4.042 
4.036 
4.042 
4.039 
4.033 
4.033 
4.071 
4.156 
4.348 
4.429 
4.447 
4.498 
4.557 
4.578 
1.610 4.616 
4.625 
Wage Limits 
( Yen ) 
Floor 
3000 
3000 
20000 
30000 
30000 
30000 
68000 
Ceiling 
52000 
104000 
200000 
320000 
380000 
470000 
710000 
Date of 
Revis ion 
1957/4 
1966/4 
1973/1 
1976/7 
1978/7 
1982/1 
1984/1 
Sources Annals of Social Welfare (Federation of Health Insurance Unions) and communication with Social Insurance Agency, Ministry of Health and Welfare 
Table tø.1.3 Employer P a y r o l l Tax R a t e s and Wage L i m i t s of P e n s i o n I n s u r a n c e in J a p a n 
Year 
Membership 
( 10,000) 
Rate 
( * ) 
Male Female 
Wage Limits 
( Yen ) 
Date of Floor 
Revis ion 
Ceiling Date of Revision 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1763 
1842 
1916 
1992 
2072 
2158 
2226 
2251 
2307 
2371 
2365 
2365 
2385 
2390 
2418 
2471 
2524 
2570 
2603 
2636 
2675 
1.75 
2.75 
3.1 
3.2 
3.8 
4.55 
? 
5.3 
6.2 
1.5' 
■1.95 
. 1960/5 
. 1965/5 
2,30 1969/11 
2.40 1971/11 
2.90 1973/11 
'3-65 
14.45 
4.50 
•4.55 
4.60 
4.65 
5.65 
1976 /8 
1980 /1 
1985 /1 
3 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 
10000 
10000 
20000 
30000 
45000 
68000 
36000 
60000 
100000 
134000 
200000 
320000 
410000 
470000 
1960/5 
1965/5 
1969/11 
1971/11 
1973/11 
1976/8 
1980/1 
1985/1 
Sources : Annals of Social Welfare (Federation of Health Insurance Unions) and communication with Social Insurance Agency, Ministry of Health 
and Welfare 
Appendix 2.2 
NWLC Data and Data Problems in the USA 
Tracking NWLCs in the U.S. poses a severe problem because 
govenment e f fo r t s to maintain suitable stat ist ics have been sporadic. The 
Nat ional Income and Product Accounts are an excel lent source of data on 
employer contr ibut ions to both legal ly mandated and vo luntary social wel fare 
programmes, but the Accounts suf fer f rom omission of other types of 
NWLCs. Speci f ica l ly , the Accounts subsume payments fo r days not worked 
and in -k ind benefi ts under d i rect wage and salary payments. Also, the 
Accounts have no counterpart to various other expenses of a social nature or 
to vocat ional t ra in ing. These deficiencies are augmented by a reluctance of 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Depar tment of Commerce 
to publish detai led data. For example, although the BEA publishes a series 
on Employer Contr ibut ion to Social Insurance (Table 6.12) by one-dig i t 
industry, i t does not disaggregate these contr ibut ions in to the i r components -
ch ie f ly contr ibut ions to social secur i ty (OASDHI) and unemployment 
insurance. Simi lar ly , although the BEA does disaggregate Other Labour 
Income - composed mainly of contr ibut ions to pensions, heal th insurance, l i fe 
insurance, workers ' compensation, and supplemental unemployment insurance 
- in to i ts components on an economy-wide basis, ' i t does not publish 
disaggregations by industry. Although i t is possible to adjust the Accounts 
data using other data sources in order to par t ia l l y overcome these 
aggregation problems, the usefulness of the Accounts remains l im i ted for our 
speci f ic purposes. 
I t is wor th noting that the Bureau of Labor Stat is t ics (BLS) of the 
U.S. Department of Labor gathered excellent data on NWLCs for about a 
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decade. I t is unfor tunate that the Survey of Employer Expenditures for 
Employer Compensation (EEEC) was gathered only f r om 1966 through 
1977. Since 1977, BLS has gathered data for the Employment Cost Index 
(ECI), but these data are published in a way that makes them extremely 
awkward to use. (Also, the ECI public-use data f i les on magnetic tape are 
unwieldy.) 
Because of the lack of current government s ta t i s t i cs on NWLCs, 
the pr ivate U.S. Chamber of Commerce has gathered data on NWLCs since 
the late 1940s. The Chamber of Commerce data have the advantage that 
they are the only available source of data for several NWLCs, such as 
payments fo r days not worked, in -k ind benefi ts, other expenses of a social 
nature, and vocat ional t ra in ing. However, they have the disadvantage that 
they are taken f rom a se l f - repor ted survey of a se l f -se lec ted sample of 
employers. As a resul t , they pose four problems. F i rs t , the composit ion 
of the sample has changed over t ime , and yea r - t o - yea r changes that are 
observed may be sensitive to that changing composi t ion. Second, in any 
given year, the f igures shown in the Chamber of Commerce survey seem 
not to represent average labour costs of U.S. employers, again because of 
se l f -se lec t ion in response (this can be seen in panel d of Table 2.12. Thi rd, 
cross-sect ional comparisons of industries or groups of workers may be 
d is tor ted by which employers in each industry choose to respond to the 
survey. F inal ly , se l f - repor t ing could give rise to various biases that can 
only be guessed at . A l l of these problems suggest that the Chamber of 
Commerce survey could give a biased picture of NWLCs in the U.S. 
Various ways of benchmarking the Chamber of Commerce data so 
as to overcome the sampling bias that exists in the data have been 
explored. Unfor tunate ly , these at tempts have not been successful to 
date. The basic strategy of benchmarking would be to f ind elements of 
80 
the Chamber of Commerce data that are shared with 
scientifically­sampled surveys such as the National Income and Product 
Accounts and the Survey of Employer Expenditures for Employee 
Compensation (the survey that ended in 1977). By comparing the 
components of compensation that are reported in both the Chamber of 
Commerce and the scientifically­sampled surveys, it should in principle be 
possible to adjust the components of compensation that are uniquely 
available in the Chamber of Commerce survey. Attempts to do just this 
have been unsuccessful for two reasons. First, the Chamber of Commerce 
data and the National Income and Product Accounts overlap only in two 
series ­ legally mandated and voluntary contributions to social welfare 
programmes. In one of these series ­ legally mandated contributions ­ the 
two data sources are in reasonable accord (see Table 2.12, panel c). In the 
other ­ voluntary social welfare costs ­ they diverge in some years by over 
25 percent (see Table 2.12, panel d). How similar or divergent other series 
would be is a matter of speculation; hence, it would be unwise to adjust all 
Chamber of Commerce figures downward by some fixed percentage. 
Second, use of the EEEC as a benchmark has been stymied because the 
EEEC, contrary to the belief of many researchers, appears not to be 
representative of the population of all firms in the U.S. *·■ The Employment 
Cost Index (ECI) still needs to be fully explored as a possible benchmark for 
the Chamber of Commerce data, but the task has not yet been undertaken. 
The figures reported in section 2.4 that come from the U.S. 
National Income and Product Accounts make use of the recently completed 
major revisions to the Accounts. Unfortunately, unpublished disaggrega­
tions of the Accounts (disaggregations of certain cost items and dis­
aggregations by industry) that have been requested have not yet been 
received. Certain adjustments have been made to the Accounts data as a 
result. 
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Chapter 3 Employment and Labour Utilisation 
Fixed NWLCs are independent of the length of working hours. They 
are a price that attaches only to the stock dimension of the labour input. 
Their growth relative to variable - i.e. hours related - labour costs may 
promote the cost minimising strategy by firms of increasing labour util isation 
relative to employment. Such potential substitution between the stock and 
util isation dimensions of the labour input has provided an important aspect of 
the general study of employment and labour compensation and the intention of 
this chapter is to review the most recent work in the related research fields. 
Three main employment areas are highlighted. The first - and most 
important in a European content - concerns the trade-off between standard 
working hours on the one hand and employment/overtime hours on the other. 
Cuts in working hours in order to stimulate the creation of new jobs has been a 
central consideration in the European working time 'debate' and a recent 
upsurge in theoretical and empirical investigation has helped to clarify the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of this form of worksharing. The second 
relates to the policy strategy of attempting to stimulate employment by 
reducing f i rms' social security payroll taxes, often regarded as a 'tax on 
jobs'. Since payroll taxes contain both fixed and variable elements, changes 
in tax rates and tax ceiling l imits also involve hours/workers substitution 
responses. The third topic concerns working time with respect to working l i fe 
rather than shorter per-period spells. In particular, we focus on retirement 
and show that several parallels to the discussion in the previous sections 
pertain. The fourth area relates to the strong current interest into the link 
between profit sharing and job creation. I t would appear that introducing the 
notion of labour f ix i ty and the workers-hours trade-off into the profit sharing 
l iterature provides some interesting modifications to the existing policy 
discussion. 
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3.1 Cuts in Working Time 
3.1.1 Theory and policy background 
In the relatively depressed years of the late 1970s/early 1980s, a 
considerable debate took place - in such diverse economies as Australia, West 
Germany and Norway (and elsewhere) - on the efficacy of relieving high and 
persistent levels of unemployment through cuts in the standard working time 
of full time employees. The debate is summarised in Hart (1984c and 
1987a). Over the same period to the present time, considerable economic 
research work on the relationships between employment and working time was 
undertaken. 
The most important aspects of this work has developed in a 
microeconomic context and NWLCs have featured prominently in both 
theoretical and empirical modelling. Since a rather thorough analysis of these 
studies already exists (Hart, 1987a), the intention here is to restrict comment 
to two areas of interest. First, we will attempt to explain the importance of 
NWLCs to these analyses. Secondly, we will summarise some very recent -
and potentially influential - new research findings. 
In the late 1960s/early 1970s, economists developed a class of labour 
demand models that differentiated the labour input into a stock dimension and 
a utilisation dimension. The former refers to numbers of workers while the 
latter, usually, refers to average working hours per worker per period of time 
(e.g. a week or a year). Interestingly, although the issue of hours cuts has 
never been seriously in the policy domain in the USA, it was North American 
economists who made the early breakthroughs. The most quoted work is that 
of Brechung (1965), Rosen (1968), Ehrenberg (1971) and Nadiri and Rosen (1969 
and 1973). 
The work of Brechung and Ehrenberg, in particular, incorporated the 
vital distinction between standard and overtime hours. The first variable was 
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treated as being determined exogenously - through national-level collective 
bargaining - so that the typical firm had no short-term control over standard 
hours. Overtime hours, on the other hand, were regarded as being 
endogenously determined by the firm itself. Both Brechling and Ehrenberg 
examined the effects of an exogenous cut in standard hours on employment 
and overtime working. In the context of the Australasian and European 
'debate' a decade or so later, these early studies were seen as useful models on 
which to build and a recent surge of, largely European, interest has produced 
some significant advances. The early demand models have been further 
developed by Raisian (1978), Bell (1982), Hart (1984a. b), FitzRoy and Hart 
(1985a). Santamãki (1983. 1984, 1986 and 1987), Calmfors and Hoel (1987a) and 
others. 
Most of these models produce the conclusion that, at best, a policy of 
increasing employment/reducing unemployment through cuts in working time 
should be treated with great caution while, at worst, such a policy should be 
avoided completely. Inevitably, there exist several variations on the central 
model and the following is a brief attempt to summarise the workings of a 
simple version of the most standard of the models. 
The typical methodology proceeds as follows. Separate demand 
functions for workers and hours of work (and, in some studies, their capital 
equivalents - the stock of capital and capacity utilisation, respectively) are 
derived as functions of relative factor prices (fixed and variable labour costs 
and user capital costs) and scale variables (e.g. output and technology). A 
critical assumption is whether the firm in equilibrium works overtime. 
In the first place, suppose that the firm does work overtime in 
equilibrium. As mentioned above, overtime is treated as being endogenously 
determined while standard hours are exogenous. The essential point to grasp 
is that if a firm makes a decision over whether to employ an extra (overtime) 
hour of work or a new worker, it must consider the price at the so-called 
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intensive relative to the extensive margin. The intensive margin involves 
changes in labour utilisation - especially changes in working hours - while the 
extensive margin involves changes in the stock of workers. At the intensive 
margin, the firm must pay overtime premium rates while at the extensive 
margin it has to incur training, hiring and other fixed NWLCs of employment. 
Recall, such fixed costs are, by definition, independent of hours worked and so 
attach only to the stock dimension of the labour input. If one makes 
relatively simple assumptions concerning wage schedules - e.g. that wages are 
paid at standard rates up to the end of standard working hours and then at a 
premium rate that has a fixed relationship to the standard rate (e.g. 
•time-and-a-half') thereafter - then unequivocal results are obtained. A 
reduction in standard hours will increase the price of a new worker relative to 
an extra hour of work and the firm will substitute at the margin more 
overtime working for less employment. It turns out that this result is 
obtained over different specifications of this model-type although, as shown 
by Santamãki (1983 and 1984), alternative assumptions concerning the wage 
schedule and the production function can produce ambiguity over outcomes. 
Few versions of the model, however, produced the result that reductions in 
standard hours will increase employment. 
It is worth dwelling on this somewhat surprising conclusion for a 
moment. Suppose that the firm's prime goal is to* minimise its costs of 
production while meeting an exogenous production requirement. For 
simplicity, therefore, we treat the product demand as a given variable, outside 
the firm's control. Also, we assume that its capital stock is fixed. If the firm 
is initially in (cost minimising) equilibrium and it experiences a cut in standard 
hours then, in order to meet its given demand, it must either increase the 
workforce or overtime hours per worker or a combination of both. At the 
extensive margin, marginal labour costs would rise with a workforce increase: 
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a smaller propor t ion of each worker 's per-period work ing hours are now 
compensated at the cheaper standard rate. A t the intensive margin, i f we 
regard the over t ime premium as some fixed proport ion of the standard ra te , 
marginal costs remain unal tered. The optimum st ra tegy for the f i rm would 
therefore be to meet demand through a combination of a smaller workforce 
working longer average to ta l hours per worker. I f , inc identa l ly , we were to 
assume the more general object ive of prof i t maximisat ion, in which output is 
regarded as endogenous or control led by the f i rm i tse l f , then we would expect 
an even worse e f fec t on employment in this s i tua t ion (see, especially, 
Calmfors and Hoel , 1987a). The same hours-worker subst i tu t ion ef fect would 
occur but now i t would be reinforced by a negat ive scale ef fect on 
employment as higher labour costs are ref lected in reduced output. 
In the second place, what i f the f i rm works only standard hours in 
equi l ibr ium? While there are some important except ional cases, i t would be 
predicted that a cut in standard hours is l ikely to increase employment in this 
event. This is especially the outcome for a cost min imis ing f i rm wi th a f ixed 
number of shi f ts and no pa r t - t ime working. Typ ica l ly , a p ro f i t maximising 
f i rm in this s i tuat ion w i l l experience employment-hours subst i tut ion given the 
cut in hours of fset - as in the cost minimising case above - by employment 
reduct ion due to an unfavourable scale e f fect . 
The d is t inc t ion between 'over t ime ' and 'non-Over t ime' f i rms wi l l be 
returned to in the review of recent empir ical f indings below. First , however, 
i t is wor th repor t ing on two other empir ical approaches, both of which also 
feature NWLCs quite prominent ly. 
In the work just described the f i rm's quit ra te is usually taken into 
considerat ion, but t reated exogenously. The inf luence of quits is closely t ied 
to that of f ixed NWLCs. Certain costs, such as those concerned wi th hir ing, y 
redundancy and t ra in ing, entai l once-over expenditures by the f i rm . Clear l the 
I / ] 
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the higher the quit rate, ceteris paribus, then the higher are once-over costs. 
In a recent study, however, quits play a far more central rôle in the 
theoretical developments (Hoel and Vale, 1985 and 1986). This work is linked 
very closely to the efficiency wage literature, especially with the so-called 
labour turnover model (for summaries, see Stiglitz, 1984, Akerlof and Yellen, 
1986; Katz, 1986). Firms with relatively high skilled labour are likely to 
display a tendency to protect their share of human capital investments in 
specific training in order to minimise the costs associated with unexpected 
quits. A rise in quits results in two types of labour cost increase. In the first 
place, the amortisation period and, therefore, the expected return to specific 
human capital investments are reduced. Secondly.the firm will need to 
replace at least some of its quits by new hires and this involves extra 
once-over expenditures on search, hiring and training. Variations in costs 
associated with guits not only occur as a result of fluctuations in product 
demand but also through changes in working time. The idea can be illustrated 
with a simple example. 
Suppose that a firm works only standard hours with no opportunity for 
overtime working. Further, assume that its only significant specific 
investment involves training expenditure for a given proportion of its 
workforce. If there is no other slack time, its effective total working hours 
per period are equal to standard hours adjusted for non-productive training 
time (in the immediate sense) and multiplied by the size of the workforce. As 
mentioned above, the training time itself has to be adjusted by the quit rate 
since a higher rate of quits, provided they are matched by new hires, involve a 
greater proportion of total working time devoted to training. A cut in the 
standard workweek will reduce the proportion of productive to total working 
time. The firm's effective wage rate will increase and there will be an 
e.incentive for the fïrm to attempt to re-establish the former level of wages by 
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reducing quits. Firms may attempt to do this by increasing their actual wage 
rates relative to that of their near competitors. Therefore, in this type of 
model, quits and wage rates are endogenously determined. Also, it is not 
difficult to imagine that this sort of wage reaction as a means of optimising 
the rate of quits may not be conducive to a growth in employment. 
In this framework, Hoel and Vale investigate the effects of an 
exogenous cut in working time on a representative wage setting and profit 
maximising firm in a competitive market. They integrate both demand and 
supply aspects of the problem. In the simplest version of their model they 
show that a reduction in working time will increase the rate of unemployment 
and reduce effective labour input in both the long and short-run. Their 
general conclusion, after investigating a range of possibilities, is that 'shorter 
working hours is a very uncertain policy for reducing unemployment - as the 
effect might very well be the opposite of what is intended' (Hoel and Vale, 
1985. p.23). 
Note that negative employment/unemployment reactions are predicted 
in this work despite the assumption of exogenously given standard hours. In 
the foregoing labour demand models, the assumption of hours exogeneity gave, 
at least, some hope of more beneficial labour market repercussions. 
The work of Hoel and Vale undoubtedly points the way to important 
new avenues of research. As it stands at present, however, there are two 
limitations of the approach. In the first place, the work does not allow for 
endogenous changes in labour utilisation, such as less labour hoarding or more 
overtime working. This is a marked deficiency compared to the foregoing 
myopic optimising models. Secondly, no allowance is made for the fact that 
specific investments are shared investments. There is a well-known 
literature (e.g. Hashimoto, 1975 and 1981, and Okun, 1981) that convincingly 
argues that it is in firms' and the workers' mutual interest to share the 
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quasi-rent accruing from specific training and other investments. In order to 
protect these investments, there may well be an advantage for both sides to 
undertake long-term, seniority-based, contractual commitments with a large 
element of deferred compensation (such as fringe benefits, pension rights and 
so on). In part, therefore, firms attempt to insure against unanticipated quits 
by designing a payment structure that favours longevity within the firm. 
Quits are perhaps more likely to be minimised by long-term contractual 
arrangements rather than short-run variations in the wage rate . 
Recent developments in the theory of trade unions (for example, 
Oswald 1982, and Sampson, 1983) have provided a strong conceptual 
framework for studying the effect of working time reductions in a situation 
where a large monopoly union controls wages leaving it to the employer to set 
the level of employment. While the collective bargaining set-up in many 
countries limits the importance of this type of model, it is perhaps a 
reasonable paradigm for (sections of) several economies, particularly the 
Scandinavian. Two reasonably similar approaches within this framework are 
provided by Calmfors (1985) and Hoel (1984, 1986). One limitation of these 
studies is that they consider only the case of working hours as an exogenous 
factor input. Very recently, Booth and Schiantarelli (1987; see also 1986) 
have extended the model structure to allow for (endogenous) overtime 
working. Their model is dynamic with utility and profits maximised 
intertemporally and with fixed NWLCs indirectly measured in terms of 
employment adjustment costs. 
In this type of model, the union chooses a wage rate that maximises 
utility defined in terms of employment, wages and leisure. The firm is a 
profit maximiser with equilibrium employment a function of relative factor 
prices. Then, in a recursive manner, the union optimising wage is a given 
variable to the firm which then determines the employment level. If a cut in 
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working t ime increases the desired wage, via the union u t i l i t y funct ion, the 
f i r m cuts back on hours of work and employment. The models generally show 
that the e f fec t of standard hours w i th in the union u t i l i t y funct ion can move 
the wage in e i ther d i rect ion. Indeed, the shor t - run e f fec ts in these papers are 
somewhat ambiguous although, in a long-run context given a desired re tu rn on 
cap i ta l , Hoel shows that a reduction in hours w i l l lead to a fa l l in employment. 
F ina l ly , i t should be added that a number of micro-studies have 
extended the type of analyses mentioned above by including other 
in terconnected variables lying outside the immediate labour market - fo r 
example, in ternat ional trade considerations, product iv i ty ef fects of hours 
changes and in f la t ion t rade-of fs . Examples include Drèze and Modigl iani 
(1983), Strom (1984) and Brunstad and Holm (1984). This last study is also 
concerned w i t h the product iv i ty impacts of hours reduct ions, as is the work of 
Hübler (1987) and de Regt (1987) (see below). 
In summary, the key to much of the above work is that the prices of 
adjusting labour at the extensive and intensive margins are not the same -
given the existence of f ixed NWLCs - and i t therefore becomes necessary to 
untangle the decision to change employment f rom tha t of changing hours. 
This in tu rn provides the possibil i ty of dividing hours into an exogenous 
standard component and an endogenous overt ime component so as to analyse 
the impl icat ions of changes in the former variable both*on the la t te r variable 
as wel l as workers and/or the stock of capi ta l . 
3.1.2 Recent Empir ical Evidence 
The bulk of the empir ical invest igat ion of the above theory has 
concerned the impact of hours reductions w i th in the f i r s t type of model 
f ramework ; that is, through the development of labour demand models for 
workers and hours. Much of the earl ier quant i ta t ive work into this question 
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proved to be largely inconclusive (see Hart, 1987a, ch.6), probably due to a 
combination of over­simplified modelling and the use of somewhat aggregate 
data on which to test the essentially micro theory. More recent 
developments, however, have remedied some of the earlier deficiencies. 
Without going into much technical detail, it is nevertheless worth 
writing down the general forms of the production and cost functions typically 
incorporated in these studies. The (instantaneous) production function can be 
written 
Q = F(h,N.K) F.>0, F..<0. F.j>0 (3.1) 
where Q is output, h is average hours per worker, N is the size of the 
workforce and K is the capital stock. Total costs, C, are expressed 
C = [w h +w(h­hs)4Z]N+rK (3.2) 
where w is the standard wage, h is standard hours, w is the overtime wage 
rate, ζ is fixed NWLCs and r is the user cost of capital. In most studies, the 
overtime wage is expressed simply as 
w = aw a¿l (constant) ·· (3.3) 
where a is the overtime premium (e.g. a = 1.5). 
Expression (3.1) is written generally with particular functional forms 
(often Cobb­Douglas or close variants) incorporated in specific research 
investigations. The main point is that there is no presumption ­ following 
arguments by Feldstein (1967), Benanke (1986) and others ­ that returns to Ν 
and h should be equal. Expression (3.2) is incomplete since it omits variable 
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NWLCs although these can easily be accommodated (see Hart and Kawasaki, 
1987) and act in the same way as wages. The overtime function in (3.3) is the 
simplest possible; as mentioned earlier, Santamãki (1983, 1984, 1986 and 1987) 
has examined a fairly comprehensive range of more elaborate alternatives. 
In the standard labour demand approach to modelling, two alternative 
optimising assumptions are made. In the f irst, and simpler, i t is assumed that 
the f i rm minimises costs in (3.2) subject to the production constraint in (3.1) 
with output, Q, treated as being exogenously determined. The second 
assumption is that the f i rm maximises revenue (given by Q in (3.1) multiplied 
by product price) net of cost (given by 3.2). 
From these optimising rules, i t is possible to derive factor demand 
functions for desired factor inputs (h*. NK and K*). Taking the cost 
minimising method as an example, these functions take the general forms: 
h* = h^Wj.z.hj.a.r.Q). h* - 0 i=l 6 (3.4) 
N* = N^w^z.hg.a.r.Q), Nf <0 i = l , 2, N* >0, ( J < 5 ) 
N.* -0 , 1=4.5.6 
K* = K*(ws,z,hs,a,r,Q), K* - 0 i= l 6, (3.6) 
where the h*. (etc) notation denotes the signs of the partial derivatives. 
Complete derivations of the equations in (3.4)-(3.6) can be found in Hart 
(1984a, b) and König and Pohlmeier (1986). Often, more explicit functional 
forms are obtained by an explicit choice of functional form in (3.1). This also 
may allow more unambiguous signs of partial derivatives to be obtained. For 
example, in this latter respect, the choice of Cobb-Douglas technology 
produces, among other new unambiguous outcomes, 3h*73h >0 and 3h*/3z<0 
(see König and Pohlmeier, 1986, and Hart, 1987a). The two most important 
expectations in the context of this chapter are: 
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(A) A rise in fixed­to­variable NWLCs induces a fal l in N* and rises in h* 
and K*. 
(B) A fal l in h induces a fall in N* and rises in h* and KK. 
Comparable outcomes for a profit maximising f i rm using 
Cobb­Douglas technology can be found in Hart (1987b). 
In what follows, we examine the evidence for (A) and (B), 
concentrating our attention on two of our four highlighted countries, the FRG 
and the UK. 
FRG studies 
Recently, König and Pohlmeier (1987a, b) have presented estimates of 
factor demand elasticities to the static system of equations in (3.4)­(3.6). 
Their estimation method follows a methodology suggested by Hall (1973) to 
allow linearisation of the system given the init ial problem of the non­linear 
(due to overtime working) cost function in (3.2). The method permits the use 
of flexible functional forms for the cost functions; these are translog, 
generalised Cobb­Douglas and generalised Leontief functions. (See Guilkey et 
aL, 1983, for a useful comparative analysis of these functions.) Their work is 
based on aggregate FRG manufacturing data. 
König and Pohlmeier's results with respect to expectation (A), as in 
several other studies, are mixed. While a rise in fixed" costs, z, induces a fal l 
in N, i t also has a negative influence on h; using a different construction of z, 
König and Pohlmeier (1986) obtain the expected hours­effect. (See Ehrenberg 
and Schumann, 1982, for extensive investigations of the rôle of ζ in USA 
overtime equations.) Changes in variable costs also have mixed outcomes vis 
à vis the underlying theory. I t should be pointed out, however, that the 
general functional forms adopted by König and Pohlmeier preclude 
unambiguous sign predictions in most cases. On the other hand, their results 
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with respect to expectation (B) are far more in line with theoretical 
prediction. They estimate that a reduction in standard hours will serve to 
decrease employment, increase overtime working and produce substitution in 
favour of capital. 
The König and Pohlmeier work represents an attempt at estimating 
the standard system in such a way as to match the underlying model structure 
and thereby produce a more consistent set of estimates. To this extent, their 
model may be regarded as providing a more reliable test of the underlying 
theory than many of the earlier aggregate studies. Nonetheless, as with much 
of the earlier work, they use aggregate data on which to test the essentially 
micro theory. 
Hübler (1987), by contrast, tests a modified version of the standard 
theory using FRG socio-economic household panel data that characterises 
1031 individuals who worked overtime over a period in 1984. The 
modification to the theory involves an attempt by the author to integrate the 
relationship between work effort and average hours per period. For example, 
effort may increase with working hours over the first part of the working day 
and then, after reaching a peak, decrease as fatigue (and boredom) set in. De 
Regt (1984) (see also Hart, 1987a) provides a useful representation of this type 
of effort function. 
Now, the effect of standard hours reductions on employment/overtime 
working will additionally include the length of an individual's existing average 
hours in relation to her/his effort curve. One particularly strong appeal of 
Hübler's formulation is the prediction that, if overtime is worked and in the 
range of overoptimal work intensity, a reduction in standard hours can result 
in a reduction in average total hours. In the conventional models the sign 
prediction is usually opposite contrary to empirical findings. Clearly, 
questions related to an individual's position on the effort curve involves 
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studying heterogeneous workers, and not the homogeneous work force 
imp l i c i t l y assumed in many studies; hence the use of more detai led individual 
panel data. Hübler is able to distinguish in this sample between young and 
old, ski l led and unski l led, and shor t - and long-tenured workers. 
Hübler est imates an overt ime equation - w i th measures of z, w and h 
as arguments - in order to test whether his 'varying labour intensi ty ' model is 
superior to the standard model. One extremely in terest ing feature of the 
work is that his household sample is spl i t between workers w i t h short and long 
tenure (def ined as less than or equal to 3 years and greater than 3 years, 
respect ively) . Using appropriate techniques to cor rec t for the potent ia l 
se lec t iv i t y biases associated with distinguishing between both 
over t ime /non-over t ime and long/short tenure workers, Hübler est imates 
separate equations for the d i f ferent tenure lengths. He obtains support fo r 
the need to account for work intensity in studies of this type. In l ine w i th the 
standard theory (and expectat ion A), he also finds that over t ime hours increase 
w i t h a rise in f ixed NWLCs and w i th fal ls in the wage ra te and standard hours. 
I t should be added that de Regt (1987), working along the same lines as 
Hübler, al though w i t h both overt ime and employment demand funct ions, does 
receive some support for a positive employment response to a cut in working 
hours. De Regt estimates a dynamic labour demand model based on Dutch 
aggregate manufactur ing data fo r the period 1952-82, along the lines 
suggested by Nicke l l (1984). His results for the over t ime funct ion are 
general ly ra the r unconvincing, however, and despite the re la t ive sophist icat ion 
of the dynamic system, Hübler's micro panel data appear to provide the more 
re l iable (and believable) set of estimates. 
Moreover, Hübler tests - w i th some success - the interest ing 
hypothesis tha t young workers w i th short tenure w i l l have higher opt imal work 
intensi ty than others. Once-over f ixed NWLCs concentrate in the f i rs t phase 
95 
of a worker's l i fet ime with the f irm and - given sharing agreements over these 
costs (Hashimoto, 1981) - i t is in the interest of both firms and workers to 
work overtime in the initial years of working l i fe. For their part, firms are 
able to discount specific investments more speedily while the workers are able 
to maintain earnings that would otherwise have been eroded by their share of 
investment costs. 
UK studies 
Two recent UK studies also examine hours reductions in a 
micro-context. While the first does not explicitly integrate the rôle of 
NWLCs, its findings relate closely to the quasi-fixed cost theory outlined 
earlier. I t consists of a series of questionnaire-type surveys carried out on 
establishments in UK manufacturing industry between 1979-1983. The work 
is reported in White (1983) and White and Ghobadian (1984). The first survey 
(in 1979/80) was undertaken shortly before a national engineering industry 
agreement on shorter working hours - involving a one hour reduction in the 
standard workweek - was concluded. Case studies were made of companies 
that had introduced working time reductions. The second survey covered 
establishments in industries that had introduced shorter hours through national 
agreements in 1981. The industries covered here were engineering, 
pharmaceuticals, printing and construction. A third "survey, carried out in 
1982/83, was a follow-up study of establishments affected by working hours 
reductions. An attempt was made to quantify the effects of shorter hours 
through examining production and accounting data from the companies 
involved. Overall, the surveys show quite conclusively that the hours 
reductions had either a zero or a negative effect on employment while 
overtime tended to rise. With respect to the latter variable, however, i t 
proved to be extremely difficult to ascertain if the overtime reaction resulted 
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f rom standard hours cuts or extraneous demand e f fec ts . On the 
employment-s ide, the authors re jec t any notion that the employment cutbacks 
were less than might have been the case had there been no workweek 
reduct ion. A t the very least, the fac t that the over t ime and employment 
react ions work in opposite direct ions is in line w i t h the predict ions f rom the 
convent ional theory. 
The second study (Hart and Wilson, 1987) is an econometr ic analysis 
that concentrates on a more homogeneous sub-set of establishments over a 
s imi lar t ime period to the White and Ghobadian study. I t is based on a 
detai led set of data (see Wilson, 1985, for f u l l in format ion) on 52 
establishments in the Br i t ish meta l working industry f o r 5 separate years, 
1978-82. An a t tempt is made to est imate as closely as possible fu l l labour 
demand speci f icat ions arising f rom the underlying standard theory as wel l as 
incorporat ing a wide range of impor tant control var iables. 
Of the 52 enterprises, 43 worked some over t ime in one or more years 
of the study: these are classif ied as 'overt ime establ ishments' . Hart and 
Wilson est imate labour demand equations based on a l l the establishments as 
wel l as, separately, on the over t ime and non-over t ime establishments. 
Moreover, they est imate separate equations for workers, to ta l average hours 
and average over t ime hours. The hours variables r e f e r to annual average 
hours. (Depending on the model speci f icat ion, three* types of est imat ing 
techniques are adopted; these are ordinary least squares, TOBIT est imat ion 
and pooled cross-sect ion/ t ime-ser ies GLS estimation.) 
The general feature of the Hart -Wi lson results w i t h respect to cuts in 
scheduled annual hours are summarised in Table 3 .1 . 
I n general , they lend reasonably strong support for the theoret ica l 
predict ions of the type of workers/hours responses discussed in section 3.1.1 . 
In par t i cu la r , evidence is found that is much in l ine w i t h expectat ion (B). In 
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Table 3.1 
Workers/Hours Responses to a Cut in Scheduled Annual Hours: 
Hart/Wilson Study 
Al l Establishments 
(a) average total hours a significant less-than-proportional fall 
with elasticities similar to those found in 
another UK study (Neale and Wilson, 1985) 
(b) average overtime hours a significant rise - in those enterprises 
working some overtime that is more than 
proportional to the cut in scheduled hours. 
(c) workers an insignificant response in the size of the 
workforce. 
Overtime Establishments 
(a) average total hours a significant less-than-proportional fall. 
(b) workers a significant reduction in the size of the 
workforce. 
Non-Overtime Establishments 
(a) workers an increase in the size of the workforce** 
* Although this result lies outside the significance, bounds of a standard 
5% t- tes t . 
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the case of expectat ion (A), however, while Hart and Wilson obtain a negative 
impact on employment given a rise in the ra t io of f i xed - to -va r iab le labour 
costs, they do not obtain the opposite impact in the hours equation. This 
var iable also enters w i th the 'wrong' sign in two of the three König and 
Pohlmeier empi r ica l papers. The fa i lure of this var iab le, in both FRG and UK 
studies is almost certa in ly due to an inadequate measure of f ixed costs, 
however. 
3.1.3 Microeconomic versus Macroeconomic Studies 
On the face of i t pol icymakers should be qu i te encouraged by the 
f indings of the more careful ly undertaken macroeconometr ic studies of 
employment responses to working t ime reductions. A rev iew of a var ie ty of 
European models and results is presented by van Ginneken (1984) and Har t 
(1987a) whi le Whit ley and Wilson (1986 and 1987) produce extensive UK 
evidence f r o m simulat ions on UK systems. Al though the outcomes of these 
and other studies are, inevi tably, condit ional on varying underlying 
assumptions and subject to many qual i f icat ions, they nevertheless seem to 
point f i r m l y to the conclusion that a reduct ion in the standard workweek w i l l 
serve, to a greater or lesser extent, to s t imulate employment . This seems to 
be al l the more encouraging because this type of study covers economic 
relat ionships that are of ten erroneously held f i xed in the more par t ia l 
approaches. In this la t te r respect we would include internat ional trade 
considerat ions, assumptions concerning monetary and f iscal responses and 
several aspects of capi tal markets. 
Notwi thstanding the advantages of the broader approaches, the 
outcomes of these models should be treated w i t h u tmost caut ion and cer ta in ly 
they should not be used as the basis for hard pol icy decisions. 
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The fundamental problem w i t h all the existing macroeconomic models 
is that they do not represent adequately underlying labour market re la t i on -
ships. The bet ter micro-studies are at pains to dist inguish carefu l ly between 
stocks and f lows of employment and the interact ion among (components of) 
input factors given scale and re la t ive factor price changes. In the case of 
fac to r pr ices, great improvements have been made in a t tempt ing to separate 
f ixed f rom variable labour costs. Almost without except ion, macroeconomic 
models do not separate the impor tant components of the labour input and they 
come nowhere near to measuring re la t ive factor pr ices accurately. For 
example, no single macroeconomic study to date, at least to the author's 
knowledge, has fu l l y specif ied and integrated complete measures of labour 
costs, both f ixed and var iable. But this is a c r i t i c a l omission since 
microeconomic theory - f rom a range of underlying model l ing assumptions -
tel ls us that i t is the ra t io of these costs that plays an impor tant part in 
determining the re la t ive changes in labour stocks and u t i l i sa t ion . Few macro 
models come anywhere near this level of analysis. Indeed, when the recent 
West German col lect ive bargaining discussions were held involving a 35 hour 
workweek demand, at least one internat ional ly we l l -known econometr ic model 
faced the somewhat fundamental problem of being unable to simulate the 
l ike ly e f fec t because not even hours of work were included wi th in the 
system! Even where this somewhat basic requi rement is sat isf ied, 
s impl i f icat ions and crude specif icat ions in some models have led to ludicrously 
opt imis t ic predict ions about employment responses to hours cuts (see van 
Ginneken, 1984, forsorne examples). 
Inadequate modell ing of the labour market leads to fundamental 
misspecif icat ions and makes i t impossible for factor subst i tu t ion ef fects to be 
measured or even the scale impacts to be accurately determined. Moreover, 
i f the immediate labour market representation is inaccurate, then i t does not 
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appear to be particularly illuminating to study the interaction of other 
markets in the system since errors are merely compounded. 
3.1.4 Related Extensions 
Part- t ime employment 
Where part-t ime employment occurs the labour input can be divided 
into workers and average hours of both part-t ime and ful l - t ime employees 
together wi th their respective factor prices. Then, changes in the ratio of 
f ixed-to-variable labour costs of one category of worker may have 
implications not only for the demand for the uti l isation dimension of that 
category but also for the demand for both stock and util isation of the other 
category. Also, a reduction in weekly standard hours - affecting only 
fu l l - t ime employees - may now produce cross-responses in part-t ime workers 
and hours. The full-range of possibilities within the conventional demand 
model framework are explored by FitzRoy and Hart (1986). Empirical work 
can be found in Owen (1979), Disney and Szyszczak (1984) and Ehrenberg et al 
(1987) and a wide review is presented in Hart (1987a). 
Two policy issues are worth noting here. First, although hard 
evidence is dif f icult to obtain, increases in statutory job protection for 
part-t imers in Europe and elsewhere are likely to have had the effect of 
increasing fixed NWLCs of part-time relative to fu l l - t ime workers. While 
there are undeniable benefits to workers of such legislation, there is a 
potential offsetting cost. Rises in fixed costs may serve to lead to a greater 
emphasis by employers on extending utilisation rates of existing employees at 
the expense of part-t ime jobs. (See Nickell, 1979, for a related discussion as 
well as section 4.3.) Secondly, reductions in standard hours may not only 
produce hours-worker substitution among ful l - t ime workers but also increase 
the proportion of part-time workers whose relative cost advantage would 
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improve. As pointed out by Hart (1987a), this is a rat t ier i ronic outcome vis 
vis typ ica l t rade union policy over pa r t - t ime work. Unions in Europe are 
general ly opposed to the extension of par t - t ime work but favour workweek 
reduct ions. I t may wel l be that the two goals are incompat ib le since success 
in the l a t t e r may inevi tably exacerbate the growing t rend towards pa r t - t ime 
employment (see also Robinson, 1984). 
Sh i f t -work ing 
For closely related theoret ical reasons, increases in f ixed NWLCs and 
standard hours may st imulate another type of intensive margin react ion by 
f i rms . They may t r y to minimise costs by increasing the number of shifts per 
per iod. Developments here in re la t ion to the foregoing variables and ideas 
are comprehensively presented in Calmfors and Hoel (1987b). 
3.2 Changes in Payroll Taxes and Ceilings 
As is c lear f rom chapter 2, statutory social secur i ty contr ibutions by 
f i rms comprise one of the most important elements of NWLCs. In almost all 
OECD countr ies, the basic system of payment is the same. Firms contr ibute 
to state pension, heal th, unemployment and (sometimes) other benefit schemes 
in the fo rm of a payrol l tax which, for a given period o f t ime and over some 
min imum cei l ing l i m i t varies d i rect ly w i th wages up to an upper-wage cei l ing 
c u t - o f f l i m i t . For employees w i th wages above this ce i l ing, the contr ibut ion 
per period is calculated as a tax rate (where the rates may or may not vary 
across each main benefi t i tem) mul t ip l ied by the ce i l ing wage. In such cases 
the contr ibut ions act as fixed NWLCs since changes in per period average 
working hours do not alter the contr ibut ion (unless, of course, wage ceilings 
are crossed). Current ly in most countries, the payrol l tax ceilings operate 
102 
towards the upper-tails of national average wage distributions. At one end of 
the spectrum, a firm with a predominantly female or low-skilled workforce is 
likely to experience purely wage-related, or variable, social security 
contributions. At the other, high technology, male-dominated firms may 
experience a high degree of fixity in their total contributions. 
The necessary division of statutory contributions into fixed and 
variable NWLCs automatically links any analysis of changes in tax rates and 
ceilings limits to the foregoing hours/utilisation discussion. In particular, for 
reasons earlier established, it is important to study the employment effects of 
the changes within a framework that includes the distinction between stock 
and utilisation dimensions of the labour input. 
But why discuss tax and ceiling changes? One policy argument that 
has prevailed in Europe since the mid-1970s and during the ensuing 
employment/unemployment problems is that rises in real social security 
contributions have effectively represented a tax on jobs. At the same time, 
ever more generous tax relief and depreciation allowances on capital have 
adversely affected the relative factor prices and stimulated capital-labour 
substitution. The view is succinctly summarised by a group of EC experts: 
"The granting of interest rate subsidies, tax relief in respect 
of depreciation, and investment aids (regional or others) 
lowers the cost of using capital. Furthermore, the use of 
wages as the base for social security contributions and 
certain parafiscal charges lead to changes in the parameters 
within which the employer makes his calculations and tends 
to accelerate the substitution of capital for 
labour." Commission of the European Communities (1976) 
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In this section, we will attempt to explore these issues emphasising the 
rôle of social security contributions as fixed and variable NWLCs and thereby 
linking them to the demand for workers and hours. The discussion will 
concentrate on the UK and FRG economies. A detailed assessment of the 
effect of recent social security contribution changes on employment in the UK 
is presented and this is followed by a report on quantitative work undertaken 
for FRG. 
3.2.1. Recent UK experience 
From Table 2.8 (see also Figure 2.7) it is clear that the major change 
in NWLCs that occurred during the period 1981-1984 was the reduction in 
employers' contributions with respect to National Insurance (NT) 
contributions. Between 1981 and 1984, NI payments fell as a proportion of 
total labour costs in manufacturing by 1.6 per cent, from 9 per cent to 7.4 per 
cent. This change accounted for 84 per cent of the reduction in NWLCs from 
17.9 per cent to 16 per cent of total labour costs over this period. 
Thus, having steadily increased as a proportion of total labour costs 
between 1964 and 1981, employers' statutory NI contributions have become a 
less important component of the cost of labour in recent years. The reasons 
why this reversal has taken place can be found by briefly considering the UK 
macroeconomic environment. Changes in employers' NI rates from 1975 to 
1986 are plotted in Figure 3.1. 
Following the sterling crisis of 1976 a much tighter control of public 
sector borrowing was instigated. This involved both reducing public spending 
and increasing tax revenues. One method of increasing revenue was through 
the introduction of a "temporary surcharge" on employers' NI contributions. 
This was introduced, initially, at 2 per cent by the Labour administration in 
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early 1977. Much resented by employers, this tax was nevertheless increased 
to 3.5 per cent in 1978 and maintained by the new Conservat ive administ rat ion 
who were also keen to maintain contro l over public sector borrowing through 
the Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) which sought to reduce the size 
of the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement as a proport ion of GDP. 
Proceeds f rom the National Insurance Surcharge formed part of the 
government 's general tax revenue rather than being added to the Nat ional 
Insurance Fund. This di f ference in t reatment of the proceeds was the reason 
fo r not consolidating the contr ibut ion rates. In f a c t , the NI surcharge 
d i f fe red f rom standard income tax only insofar as i t was paid by the employer 
and not the employee. 
Not only were employers required to pay the N I surcharge, they also 
had to pay increased standard rates of contr ibut ion: these rose f rom 10.2 per 
cent in Apr i l 1981 to 10.45 per cent in Apr i l 1984. Contr ibut ion rates 
remained at this la t te r ra te through 1986, though as is discussed subsequently, 
lower income earners are now subject to reduced rates of contr ibut ion. 
The reason why the overal l N I burden on employers has been reduced is 
that the NI Surcharge was gradually decreased af ter 1982 and f inal ly abolished 
on 1 October 1984. One explanation put fo rward by contemporary 
commentators for the disastrous performance of the UK labour market in 1981 
and 1982 was that labour was too heavily taxed vis a vrs other fac tor inputs -
in l ine w i t h the previous EC experts quote - and that th is was at least par t ly 
responsible fo r the rise in unemployment. The debate on the NI surhcarge was 
largely couched in terms of the t radeoff between labour and capi ta l : more 
subtle points such as the shifts in the tradeoff between changes in the size and 
the u t i l i sa t ion of the labour stock arising f rom changes in the NI scheme 
received l i t t l e a t tent ion. 
Employers found the Conservative admin is t rat ion more sympathetic to 
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their v iews, showing some commitment to shi f t ing the tax burden f rom d i rect 
to ind i rec t taxa t ion . Thus the surcharge was f i rs t reduced f rom 3.5 per cent 
to 2 per cent in August 1982 for all employers other than Local Author i t ies . 
This l a t t e r (somewhat bizarre) exclusion was presumably the result of a feel ing 
by Centra l Government that Local Author i t ies were overstaf fed, ine f f i c ien t 
and should be encouraged to reduce employment. A fu r the r reduct ion to 1.5 
per cent in the surcharge rate occurred in 1983 w i t h , as mentioned above, fu l l 
abol i t ion coming in 1984. 
Not only have the overall rates of N I changed in recent years -
thereby a l ter ing the quant i tat ive importance of NWLCs - but there have also 
been impor tan t detai led changes in the administrat ion of the schemes that 
have a f fec ted the balance of NWLCs as between f ixed and variable 
components. These came as a result of the 1985 Finance Ac t which 
int roduced lower contr ibut ion rates for low paid employees and the i r 
employers. These were financed by abolishing the upper earnings l i m i t on 
employers' contr ibut ions. 
The precise changes were as fol lows: 
(1) For employees earning less than £35.50 per week no NI contr ibut ions 
were payable. 
(2) For those earning between £35.50 and £54.99 an employee's 
cont r ibu t ion of 5 per cent and employer's cont r ibut ion of 5 per cent on 
al l earnings was payable. 
(3) For those earning between £55.00 and £89.99 an employee's 
cont r ibu t ion of 7 per cent and employer's contr ibut ion of 7 per cent on 
al l earnings was payable. 
(4) For those earning between £90.00 and £129.99 an employee's 
cont r ibu t ion of 9 per cent and employer's cont r ibut ion of 9 per cent on 
a l l earnings was payable. 
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(5) For those earning between £130.00 and £265.00 an employee's 
contribution of 9 per cent and employer's contribution of 10.45 per 
cent on all earnings was payable. 
(6) For those earning above £265.00 per week no additional employees' 
contribution was payable but employers still had to contribute 10.45 
per cent of earnings to the National Insurance Fund. 
(7) These regulations applied to those who were contracted in to the state 
scheme's additional pension. For those who contracted out (i.e. with 
their own pension arrangements), employees paid the same rates of 
contribution up to the lower earnings limit (£35.50 per week) and then 
reduced rates (by 2.15 per cent) thereafter. Employers similarly paid 
the same rates of contribution up to the lower earnings limit and 
thereafter rates reduced by 4.1 per cent below the contracted-in 
rates. Above the upper earnings limit (£265.00 per week), however, 
employers had to contribute at the full rate of 10.45 per cent (i.e. at 
the same rate as for contracted in employees). 
The new regulations are clarified in Figure 3.2 which plots weekly pay 
against employers' annual NI liability for the years 1984 and 1985. In 1984 a 
single rate of duty was payable and there was a ceiling on employers' 
contributions. The more complicated scheme with reduced rates as described 
above was introduced in 1985. Also shown superimposed on this figure is the 
earnings density function for all adult workers over the age of 21 in April 
1985: this gives an idea of the proportion of the adult workforce that 
experienced changes in the NI regulations. The total number of workers 
affected by the reduced rates will be somewhat greater than that indicated by 
the Figure because young workers aged 18-21 are not included in the displayed 
earnings distribution. Nevertheless it is clear that the reduced rates are 
Figure 3.2: 
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likely to be relevant to only a small proportion of workers since they are 
operational only in the lower tail of the earnings distribution. 
The removal of the earnings ceiling on contributions reduced the fixed 
component of NWLCs while increasing the variable component for a 
significant group of high income earners. Since the change has no effect on 
the "consumption wage" there wi l l be no effects on labour supply. Rather the 
effects wi l l come on the demand side where the degree of substitutability 
between high and low wage earners, between high paid workers and capital and 
the possibilities of substitution between the utilisation and the stock of high 
paid employees must all be considered. At present no evidence is available on 
such effects though one suspects that there may be l i t t le latitude to vary the 
utilisation of high paid workers since part of the reason for them being highly 
paid is that they are self motivated and are already prepared to supply 
whatever hours are necessary. Further, i f these high paid workers have a 
monitoring rôle, then i t may be suboptimal for a f irm to change its monitoring 
technology by changing the ratio of high paid to low paid workers, thus 
reducing the possibility of substitution between the high and low paid. 
Finally, i t is arguable that highly skilled (and therefore highly paid) workers 
are complements rather than substitutes for capital. Thus, presumably as the 
government hoped, i t is not clear that the removal of the ceiling on high 
income earners wil l have any significant effect -on their employment 
opportunities. West German empirical evidence on these sorts of questions is 
reported on in the next section. 
The reduced rates of contribution for low paid workers were clearly 
introduced in the hope of increasing employment amongst the low paid. This 
reflects the view that excess supply of labour is most acute amongst the 
unskilled and low status workers. Bell (1981) discusses the theoretical effects 
of changes in contribution rates on employment and labour utilisation in the 
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context of a labour costs funct ion which re f lec ts both cont r ibu t ion ceilings and 
premium ra les of pay for over t ime working. Applying his argument, reduced 
rates w i l l tend to lower variable costs re lat ive to f i xed labour costs and so 
promote u t i l i sa t ion re la t ive to employment. However, large increases in 
u t i l i sa t ion w i l l incur substantial f ixed cost penalties i f the consequent increase 
in earnings takes workers above the earnings l i m i t for the relevant 
cont r ibut ion band. Thus the argument for increased u t i l i sa t ion only applies 
w i th in each of the contr ibut ion ranges: once these ranges are crossed the 
f ixed associated penalty makes the argument less c l ea r - cu t . 
UK pol icymakers probably viewed subst i tu t ion between hours and 
workers as being a less impor tant e f fec t of the changes in N I regulations than 
the potent ia l employment gains arising f rom subst i tu t ion between labour and 
cap i ta l . A number of macroeconomic studies including those of Layard and 
Nicke l l (1986) have found s igni f icant fac tor subst i tu t ion ef fects arising f r om 
changes in re la t ive prices or have concluded that the evidence is supportive of 
the classical proposit ion that the demand for labour is a negative funct ion of 
the real product wage. In par t icu lar , Layard and N icke l l argue that the 13 per 
cent r ise in "employment taxes" has raised UK unemployment by 1.4 per cent 
(approx. 390 thousand). The cuts in NI cont r ibut ion rates are presumably 
expected to reverse some of this increase by boosting employment at given 
levels of demand. 
The upper and lower bands on NI contr ibut ions have been adjusted w i t h 
changes in earnings during recent years. (The lower band here refers to the 
lowest level of weekly income under both the p r e - and post-1985 N I 
regulat ions whi le the upper band refers to the cei l ing on employee 
contr ibut ions since post-1985 there has not been a cei l ing on employer 
contr ibut ions.) The relationship between average earnings for the whole 
economy and the upper and lower bands is shown in F igure 3.3. While in 1975 
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average earnings were close to the contributions ceiling, changes since then 
have maintained the lower l imit at about 75 per cent below average earnings 
and the upper l imi t around 75 per cent above the average. (The ratio of the 
upper to the lower contribution l imi t deviates very l i t t le from a factor of 7.4 
from year to year.) 
I f the earnings distribution were stable this close linkage of 
contribution l imits to ceilings would imply l i t t le change in the proportion of 
workers below, between and above these l imits. This would then imply no 
overall change in the ratio of the fixed to the variable components of NI 
contributions across the earnings distribution. However, an increase in the 
dispersion of earnings wil l lead to a greater proportion of the workforce with 
earnings either below the lower l imi t or above the upper contribution l imi t , 
thus increasing the proportion of NI contributions that are f ixed. 
There is evidence that earnings inequality in the UK has increased 
since 1979. Figure 3.4 plots the ratio of the highest to the lowest earnings 
decile for the period 1973 to 1985. After reaching a minimum of 2.3 in 1976, 
this ratio has clearly increased, though the upward trend has not been uniform 
from year to year. This seems to imply, notwithstanding the close relation 
between the contribution limits and average earnings, that the degree of f ix i ty 
of NI contributions in the UK has been increasing in recent years because the 
increase in the dispersion of earnings implies that a greater proportion of 
workers have been earning less than the lower contribution l imi t or more than 
the upper contribution l imit (prior to 1985). 
To conclude this section, the major change in NWLCs in the UK in 
recent years has been the reduction in NI contributions. This has come about 
mainly as a result of the removal of the NI surcharge. This was possible 
through changes in UK macroeconomic policy which sought to alleviate the 
problem of unemployment by easing the pressure on labour costs. Not only 
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did overall rates of contribution come down, there was also a radical change in 
the structure of NI with lower contribution rates for low income earners and 
the removal of the ceiling on employers' contributions. 
These factors changed the ratio of fixed-to-variable labour costs in a 
fairly complex manner although the main motivation for the introduction of 
the lower contribution bands was to increase the demand for labour by 
reducing the real product wage. Finally, although the contribution l imits have 
changed l i t t le relative to average earnings in recent years, the effect of the 
increased dispersion of earnings wi l l be to increase the proportion of workers 
for whom NI contributions constititute fixed NWLCs. 
3.2.2. FRG empirical evidence 
In the previous section, we commented on possible employment 
impacts of recent changes in social security contribution rates and ceilings in 
the UK. While the government's prime aim in reducing contributions was to 
induce favourable employment scale responses, changes in the ratio of 
f ixed-to-variable labour costs may also have led to substitution responses 
between stocks and utilisation rates of labour. Hart and Kawasaki (1987) have 
attempted to quantify these effects for FRG. 
They develop a profit-maximising demand model of the same basic 
structure as (3.4)-(3.6) and carry out estimation and'simulation using FRG 
aggregate annual manufacturing data for the years 1951-81. Social security 
contributions are divided into fixed and variable elements by f i t t ing 
distributions to the FRG wage data and then estimating mean contributions for 
employees wi th wages above and below the wage ceilings. All other fixed and 
variable NWLCs as well as direct wage costs are included in the demand 
analysis. The special problem of Christmas payments (Weihnachtsgeld) -
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affecting the allocation of fixed and variable social security contributions - is 
also accommodated. 
After estimating the three factor demand system (for workers, 
effective hours, and the capital stock) - augmented to allow for the dynamic 
interrelation of factor inputs due to adjustment costs - Hart and Kawasaki 
carry out simulations based on the year, 1981. The simulations involved three 
basic questions: 
(1) What are the factor demand implications of changes in tax ceiling 
limits? 
(2) What are the factor demand implications of changes in payroll tax 
rates? 
(3) What would be the required change in existing capital subsidies - from 
1981 levels - to produce the equivalent effects on employment as each 
given wage ceiling and tax rate change? 
Before commenting on the results, it is important to establish that, in 
1981, the wage ceilings (in common with most other OECD countries) were 
situated towards the extreme right tail of the aggregate (monthly) wage 
distribution. (In 1981, variable social security contributions (VT) in FRG 
accounted for 11.8% of total labour costs in manufacturing and fixed NI 
contributions (FT) for only 1.2% - see Figure 2.1). 
Given wage ceilings located towards the right tails of wage 
distributions, a given percentage change in the ceiling produces a more than 
(less than) proportionate change in fixed (variable) payroll tax contributions. 
Therefore, for example, a cut in the wage ceiling increases the ratio of fixed 
to variable labour costs. From the last three columns of Table 3.2, it can be 
seen that a cut in the wage ceiling is predicted to produce percentage 
increases in all three factors. The percentage increase in workers are 
significantly greater than those for average hours. These outcomes are 
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Table 3.2 
Simulated Effects of Payroll Wage Ceilings and Payroll Tax Rates 
on Per-Capi ta Social Security Contributions and Factor Demand: 
FRG Manufacturing Industry, 1981 
percentage changes in estimated percentage changes in 
wage ceilings variable fixed number of effective capital 
payroll payroll workers average stock 
contr i - cont r i - hours 
butions butions 
(VT) (ZT) (N) (h) (K) 
-5.00 
-10.00 
-15.00 
5.00 
10.00 
15.00 
-3.30 
-7.48 
13.12 
2.57 
4.57 
6.50 
25.75 
58.33 
101.80 
-20.52 
-36.70 
-52.05 
0.65 
1.28 
1.92 
-0.66 
-1.33 
-2.15 
0.04 
0.23 
0.68 
0.08 
0.25 
0.54 
0.17 
0.38 
0.63 
-0.15 
-0.29 
-0.49 
payroll tax r a t e s (VT) JZI1 (N) M. IMI 
-5.00 
-10.00 
-15.00 
5.00 
10.00 
15.00 
-5.00 · 
-10.00 
-15.00 
5.00 
10.00 
15.00 
-5.00 
-10.00 
-15.00 
5.00 
10.00 
15.00 
-0.27 
-0.56 
-0.86 
0.26 
0.51 
0.74 
0.86 
1.78 
2.76 
-0.81 
-1.58 
-2.32 
0.12 
0.24 
0.37 
-0.11 
-0.22 
-0.31 
Source: Har t and Kawasaki (1987) 
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almost cer ta in ly explained through favourable scale responses. Total payrol l 
costs are reduced since, on the average, less tax is l iable on that proport ion of 
the work fo rce that l ies between the old and the new cei l ing l im i ts . The 
est imated induced employment increases, f rom a sample population of 5.8 
mi l l ion workers, range f rom 37.7 thousand for a cei l ing cut of 5 per cent to 
111.4 thousand fo r a cut of 15 per cent. Note that fo r cei l ing increases, the 
stock variables ( i .e. workers and capital) are predicted to decrease whi le 
average hours increase sl ight ly. 
Therefore, as far as ceil ing changes are concerned, these results give 
some, albei t ra ther modest, support for a government i n i t i a t i ve to reduce tax 
cei l ings. I t might be added, by contrast, that the recent policy by most 
European governments has been to increase the ceil ings towards the upper ta i l 
of the wage distr ibut ions thereby inducing ( l ikely) negat ive scale impacts on 
employment. 
Across- the-board cuts in payroll tax rates have the e f fec t , as shown in 
the lower hal f of Table 3.2, of increasing labour u t i l i sa t ion and reducing both 
stock var iables. For tax rate reductions in the range 5-15 per cent, the 
magnitudes of the respective employment decreases l ie between 15.6 and 49.9 
thousand workers: the comparable hours ef fects - f r om a monthly average in 
1981 of 138.5 hours - l ie between increases of 1.19 and 3.82 hours. Tax ra te 
increases reverse the di rect ion of response in each fac tor " input . 
These l a t t e r simulations provide a stark i l l us t ra t ion of a l ikely major 
source of weakness in policy in i t ia t ives to cut N I contr ibut ions. Our 
est imates indicate that payroll tax decreases do s t imu la te labour-capi ta l 
subst i tu t ion, but only w i th respect to the ut i l i sa t ion dimension of tota l labour 
input. This, in large part , ref lects the important var iab le, hours-related, 
element in the taxes and emphasises the result ing necessity of dividing labour 
services in to stock and ut i l isat ion components when analysing these sorts of 
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questions. As a corol lary, increasing payroll taxes does not, on our est imates, 
decrease numbers employed suggesting that the sort of pol icy s ta tement 
represented by the EEC-quote on page 90 requires, at least, substantial 
mod i f i ca t ion . 
From a "pol icy effect iveness" standpoint, i t is also impor tant to 
consider another aspect of this work. In their fac tor demand equations, Har t 
and Kawasaki 's fac to r adjustment coeff ic ients reveal that the mean 
adjustment t ime of workers to new "desired" levels is considerably longer than 
that of average hours (12.9 compared to 0.6 years). In e f fec t , the shor t - run 
tax changes on the size of the workforce are negligible w i t h hours adjustment 
bearing the main burden of the to ta l labour response. 
The simulated ef fects of changing capital subsidies in order to obta in 
equivalent employment changes to those result ing f r om the tax changes i n 
Table 3.2 are reported in Table 3.3. 
As an example, suppose the government wanted to know the required 
magnitude of change in existing ( i .e. 1981) capi tal subsidies in order to achieve 
the same employment gain as that for a 5 per cent cu t in wage ceilings ( i .e . 
0.65 per cent f rom Table 3.2). An employment gain would be achieved by 
reducing user cost of capital subsidies thereby increasing the price of capi ta l 
re la t ive to labour and inducing labour-capi ta l subst i tu t ion. Detai led 
manufactur ing estimates for 1981 (Gerstenberger e t * a l . , 1984) reveal that 
to ta l subsidies ( i .e. tax and depreciat ion allowances) reduced user costs f rom 
thei r unsubsidised, or basic, price by 9.7 per cent. The results in Table 3.3 
reveal tha t exist ing subsidies would need to be reduced by one-half in order to 
induce th is size of employment e f fec t . Indeed, the magnitude of the required 
subsidy changes revealed by Table 3.3 - especially w i t h respect to cei l ing 
changes - are such as to l ie beyond credible sho r t - t e rm pol icy objectives. 
This conclusion is reinforced when i t is considered tha t , in any case, the 
119 
Table 3.3 
Estimated Changes in User Cost of Capital Subsidies to 
percentage 
in payrol l w 
ceil ings 
-5 .0 
-10.0 
5.0 
10.0 
Produce 
changes 
age 
Eguivalent Waqe Ceil ing and Tax Rate Employment E f fec ts : 
FRG Manufacturing Industry. 1981 
equivalent percentage percentage change 
changes in exist ing in payrol l tax rates 
capital subsidy rate 
-51 -5 .0 
-104 -10 .0 
50 5.0 
98 10.0 
equivalent percentage 
changes in exist ing 
capi ta l subsidy rate 
21 
42 
-20 
-40 
Source: Hart and Kawasaki (1987). 
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workforce is estimated to be extremely sluggish to adjust. Again, the earlier 
quote of the EEC experts should be treated somewhat cautiously. 
3.3 Retirement, Employment and Pension Contributions 
Recent interest in the relationships between employment and labour 
utilisation has also featured another dimension of working time, that is the 
length of working l i fet ime. The main attention has focused on the subject of 
retirement. This has included the employment implications of changes in 
fu l l - t ime mandatory, early and partial retirement (for a comprehensive 
review, see Hart. 1987a). One specific topic of particular relevance to this 
present study is the relationship between changes in pension contributions -
both statutory and voluntary - and employment. Clearly, this area is closely 
related to the discussion of the relationship between employment and payroll 
taxes in the previous section since statutory pension contributions comprise a 
sub-set of such taxes. 
The majority of state and private pension schemes impose actuarial 
penalties on those who remain in employment beyond a mandatory retirement 
age. I t might be imagined that attempts to reduce such penalties might serve 
to worsen employment prospects of workers in the younger age cohorts as 
older workers would tend, on the average, to postpone retirement. Some 
evidence for this has been found with respect to recent USA legislation along 
these lines (see Guslman and Steinmeier, 1985). I t might appear that policies 
that seek to increase such penalties or that reduce actuarial losses for those 
who ret ire before the mandatory age may achieve beneficial employment 
effects. As pointed out by Ehrenberg (1979) and Hart (1987a), however, such 
an employment strategy involves a series of potential complicating factors 
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that would be expected to produce offsetting negative impacts on 
employment. Five of these are mentioned here. 
First, i f earlier retirement is encouraged in this way, workers in the 
pre-retirement cohorts may attempt to adjust their income streams in order 
to offset the anticipated income losses. They may, for example, work longer 
average hours. Burkhauser and Turner (1978 and 1982) find USA support for 
this possibility in their estimation of an asset maximisation l i fe cycle model. 
The authors are interested in the effects on pre-retirement work patterns of 
both social security benefits that penalise older workers and 'earnings tests' 
that reduce the net wage of those who accept the benefits. They estimate 
that the offsetting lifecycle reallocation of work has increased the workweek 
of prime age males by over 2 hours. Evidence on earnings tests is by no 
means consistent, however; Blinder et al. (1980) for the USA and Zabalaza et 
ah (1980) for the UK have queried their importance in general retirement 
decisions. 
A second employment problem relates closely to the foregoing section 
on payroll taxes. If pension benefits are improved for the pre-retirement 
workforce as an inducement to retire early then this would almost certainly be 
accompanied by higher average pension contributions. But we have already 
seen that, given the typical configuration of tax ceilings, this would mainly 
increase variable labour costs and so would be likely to result in both a 
negative scale impact on employment combined wi th an hours-worker 
substitution effect. 
Thirdly, increased pension contributions connected with a policy of 
inducing early retirement would serve to exacerbate existing pressure on 
pension financing. The age-distribution of most advanced industrial countries 
is such that the retirement cohort is rising relative to the total population 
with the accompanying demographically-led pressure on social security. The 
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posit ion is especially problematic in Japan where great e f fo r ts are cur rent ly 
being made to increase the average age of mandatory re t i r emen t . 
Four th ly , i t may be the case that net increases in pay-as-you-go 
social secur i ty contr ibut ions arising, at least in par t , f r om pension f inancing 
serve to depress pr ivate saving (e.g. Feldstein, 1974 and 1977). In a longer 
term perspective this may result in capital shortages and thus to reduced 
growth rates of output, product iv i ty and employment. 
F inal ly , early re t i rement changes the discount period over which 
human capi ta l investments are amort ised. Part ia l ear ly re t i rement - where 
an older worker shares her/his job w i th a young new rec ru i t who, under most 
European schemes, has been previously unemployed - involves compl icat ions 
w i t h amort isat ion periods fo r two classes of worker. While, under typ ica l 
s i tuat ions, the result ing impl icat ions for employment are ambiguous, i t is 
shown in Har t (1987a) that negative employment e f fec ts are not unl ike ly . 
In a l l , as w i th the previous discussion on payrol l taxes and 
employment, the relationships among re t i rement , employment and pensions 
involve complex issues and employment policy prescr ipt ion w i t h respect to 
changes in pension f inancing should be approached w i th considerable caut ion. 
3.4 P ro f i t Sharing 
The pol icy discussion in this chapter has centered on labour responses 
at both the intensive and extensive margins to changes in working t ime and 
labour costs. This type of t reatment of the labour market would appear to be 
highly re levant to the current interest in the in t roduct ion of p ro f i t sharing 
schemes as a means of s t imulat ing employment. The seminal work of 
Weitzman (e.g. 1983 and 1985) has st imulated a large theoret ica l , empir ical 
and pol icy interest (e.g. Estrin et a l . , 1987) that has progressed as far as 
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producing some act ive government support in European countr ies l ike France 
and the UK . 
The fundamental idea behind the Weitzman story can be explained by 
means of a simple micro example, although much of Weitzman's own work is 
cast in a macro perspect ive. In the neoclassical theory , the 'convent ional ' 
opt imising f i r m pays a wage that equates the marginal cost and marginal 
product of labour. We might label such a wage as the marginal wage. I f the 
f i r m switches to p ro f i t sharing, workers in the short run would be paid a base 
wage that is less than the conventional marginal wage as wel l as a share of 
pro f i ts . The l a t t e r payment does not a f fec t the margin but, rather, drives a 
wedge between average and marginal labour costs. Assuming that the f i r m 
fol lows the opt imis ing condit ion stated above, there is an incent ive to increase 
employment. This can be the outcome even i f the t o ta l compensation under 
p ro f i t sharing ( i .e. the base wage plus the p ro f i t share) is higher than the 
conventional marginal wage. 
Most of the theoret ical work in this area has suf fered from (at least) 
one serious shor tcoming. The labour market has been modelled solely in 
terms of the extensive margin wi thout regard to the intensive dimension. The 
inclusion of hours of work - and other labour u t i l i sa t ion variables - serves to 
modi fy the Wei tzman results. The int roduct ion of p ro f i t sharing not only 
alters the marginal wage but also alters the re la t ive pr ice of labour at the 
extensive compared to the intensive margin. In o ther words, in line w i t h 
ear l ier arguments in this chapter, scale responses of changes in wage costs w i l l 
be augmented by subst i tut ion ef fects between workers, hours (and the capi ta l 
stock). As ear l ier , these results hinge on the fac t that there are fixed NWLCs 
attached to the labour stock but not to ut i l isat ion rates. 
I t can be shown (see Har t , 1987b fo r technica l details; see also 
F i tzRoy , 1987) that the inclusion of labour ut i l isat ion in to the Weitzman model 
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serves to modify earlier outcomes. Not only might the profit share benefit 
the unemployed through the creation of new jobs but also i t might benefit 
existing employees by inducing longer average working hours. The reason is 
that the reduction in the marginal wage due to profit sharing may have a 
positive scale effect on employment but also an incentive for firms to increase 
average hours since, in most circumstances, the price of labour on the 
intensive margin falls relative to the extensive margin. 
To our knowledge, no empirical work exists on this aspect of profi t 
sharing. I t should be interesting to test empirically whether, ceteris paribus, 
profit sharing firms utilise their workforce more intensively (i.e. through 
longer average hours, more shifts and so on) than conventional f irms. Also, 
but involving a somewhat more dif f icult task, i t is worth testing for an inverse 
relationship between employment gains to profit sharing and the ability of 
firms to vary their rates of labour utilisation. 
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Chapter 4 Labour Market Fluctuat ions and Non-Wage Labour Costs 
4-1 Adjustment Costs, the Demand for Labour Services and Employment 
Mul t ip l ie rs 
A t various earl ier stages, we have discussed a number of costs that 
may produce caut ion on the part of employers in decisions to hire new 
workers. The most obvious of these are 'once-over ' f i xed NWLCs that involve 
investments in workers ' specif ic human capi ta l . These would include search, 
select ion and t ra in ing costs. They may also include po ten t ia l once-over costs 
that occur at la te r stages of working l i fe w i th a given employer. For 
example, ant ic ipat ion of high s ta tu tory redundancy costs in the event of layof f 
may induce the employer to be risk averse in her/his h i r ing st rategy. 
Once workers are hired, f i rms may be re luc tan t to resort to 
subsequent layo f f - given unanticipated fal ls in product demand - i f they have 
invested heavi ly in specif ic human capital (Oi , 1962; Becker, 1964). This 
l a t t e r type of argument is of ten advanced to suggest tha t f i rms w i th re la t ive ly 
high speci f ic investments are l ikely to hoard labour during shor t - run periods of 
depressed economic conditions. Indeed, there are strong theoret ical reasons 
fo r supposing that both employers and workers may f ind i t to be in their jo in t 
in terest to remain together during, at least, short periods of depressed 
economic condit ions (Hashimoto, 1975 and 1982). 
Since such sunk specif ic investments are not, i n the main, attached to 
hours of work , one sensible react ion to unant ic ipated changes in product 
demand may be fo r f i rms to adjust average working hours and then, i f demand 
changes are deemed to be long- last ing, gradually to change the size of the 
work force over a somewhat longer adjustment per iod. From early 
contr ibut ions in the 1960s - notably including Brechl ing (1965), Fair (1969) and 
Nadir i and Rosen (1969) - to the present t ime , tests of d i f ferent ia l 
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workers/hours adjustment lags have been undertaken in numerous studies (see 
Hamermesh, 1976, for a summary of early work and Hamermesh, 1987, for 
updated references). In most cases, the findings support the hypothesis of 
longer adjustment lags in employment relative to average hours. 
In line with the underlying theory, researchers have also found that 
workers with relatively high skills (as a proxy for specific human capital 
endowment) exhibit relatively lower employment adjustment speeds than less 
skilled workers. In studies by Morrison and Berndt (1981) for the USA and 
Nissim (1984a, b) for the UK, non-production workers (with relatively high 
skills) are found to have significantly slower adjustment than production 
workers (with relatively low skills). Kraft (1987) estimates separate workers 
and hours for blue- and white-collar workers for FRG 2—digit industries. He 
obtains moderate support for the hypothesis of faster employment adjustment 
in the former compared to the latter group due to skill differentials. Also, in 
line with most other studies, he obtains strong support for significantly 
speedier adjustment in hours compared to workers. 
The employment lags discussed above are associated with two broad 
categories of adjustment cost. One arises from the hiring costs that are 
incurred in the decision to increase the workforce given an unanticipated 
demand upturn. The other relates to sunk costs that would be written-off in 
the event of layoff due to anticipated demand falls. Hamermesh (1969) 
presents evidence for US manufacturing industry that these cost categories 
act asymmetrically on firms' employment decisions with the adjustment lag 
related to the latter form of cost estimates as being shorter than the lag 
attached to the former. 
As will be discussed in section 4.3, the main policy oriented research 
arising from the employment lag effects of adjustment costs relates to the 
study of job security legislation. Since the formal protection of jobs and 
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employees' rights often imposes fixed adjustment costs on the employer, 
economists have tried to gauge the effect of such policy indirectly by testing 
for possible changes in employment/hours lags following the introduction of a 
given piece of legislation. 
In this section, we wil l concentrate on two - highly related - areas of 
research that involve adjustment costs. To the extent that employment 
exhibits a lagged response to unanticipated changes in product demand, 
combined with f irms' ability to vary labour utilisation more speedily, we are 
likely to observe relatively small short-run, or impact, employment 
multipliers. In other words, employment wil l be observed to vary less than 
proportionately to output. The costs associated wi th these expected 
observations have already been referred to above and relate principally to the 
once-over fixed costs of labour: the higher such costs then the longer the 
expected lag of actual to desired employment levels. 
The second research area concerns the decision over the size of the 
f irm's inventory holdings to a given set of economic circumstances. Firms 
may well make interrelated decisions between hoarding physical product in 
times of unanticipated demand falls and hoarding labour. To give extreme 
examples and assuming no layoffs, a f irm may either hold normal inventories 
and increase labour hoarding so as to accommodate fully the demand reduction 
or require labour to work normal per-period hours at normal intensity and 
build-up inventories by the amount equivalent to the demand downturn. In 
general, the higher the costs of holding inventories relative to hoarding labour, 
the longer would be the expected employment response lag and the smaller the 
associated impact multipliers. Such propositions have been tested on USA 
manufacturing data - under the so-called 'reserve labour hypothesis' - by 
Miller (1971) and Greer and Rhoades (1977). Further, i f the f irm faces 
significant levels of fixed labour or inventory costs then we may expect to 
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observe large discrepancies between short- and long-run employment 
multipliers. (Long-run multipliers measure employment-output responses 
after full labour market adjustment is allowed for.) Until recently, no 
attempt has been made to unravel short- and long-run multiplier responses and 
to include both fixed labour and inventory costs. 
Hart and McGregor (1987) have undertaken a somewhat more detailed 
analysis of these questions using a two-stage estimation procedure. In the 
first stage, they estimate an interrelated factor demand system - with 
workers, effective hours and inventories as inputs - based on models earlier 
proposed by Nadiri and Rosen (1973), Topel (1982) and Rosanna (1983). The 
explanatory variables consist of lagged dependent variables, anticipated sales, 
unanticipated sales, quantities of other stocks and a time trend to represent 
technological improvement. Estimation is carried out on quarterly data, 
1964(1)-1982(4), for 28 separate FRG industries. For each industry, they 
obtain estimates of three employment parameters. These are: 
(i) the employment own-adjustment lag, 
(ii) the unforecasted sales impact multiplier, and 
(iii) the unforecasted sales long-run multiplier. 
Most of the results are in line with those obtained in earlier studies. 
The main findings are: 
(1) Employment exhibits much more sluggish own-adjustment than hours 
of work. 
(2) The own adjustment lags of employment and inventories are of similar 
orders of magnitude. 
(3) Estimated employment and hours impact multipliers are generally 
larger with respect to unforecasted than to forecasted sales. 
(4) There is weak evidence of meaningful inventory responses to 
forecasted and unforecasted sales. 
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In the second-stage, the authors construct industry cross-section 
equations wi th the measures in (i), (ii) and (iii) as dependent variables. The 
explanatory variables in these regressions include the fixed labour and 
inventory cost arguments above as well as a set of control variables. 
Specifically, the explanatory variables are: 
FTXRAT proportion of quasi-fixed to total labour costs, 
STOSAL stock of finished goods expressed in production equivalents, 
BIGFMS proportion of large to total firms, 
FEMRAT proportion of females in the total labour force, 
SKLRAT proportion of skilled workers. 
The f irst measure, FIXRAT, is intended as a direct proxy for 
employment adjustment costs. I t should be noted that i t contains all fixed 
NWLCs including fringe benefits; theoretically i t is not appropriate to restr ict 
f ix i ty measures merely to costs related to specific human capital. The 
second, STOSAL, is intended as a proxy for inventory costs. I t would be 
expected to be negatively related: firms holding small amounts of inventories 
relative to output may reasonably be regarded as facing relatively high 
inventory costs. 
Some reasons for including the remaining control variables are as 
follows. Following arguments in Freeman (1981) and Woodbury (1983) (see 
also section 6.2 below), large firms would be expected to pay larger fringe 
benefits than small firms. Since fringes contain significant elements of 
deferred compensation that represent essentially fixed costs, then controlling 
for f i rm size might well be important to an analysis of this type; hence the 
inclusion of BIGFMS. On first reflection, the proportion of females 
(FEMRAT) in the total workforce might be expected to be positively related to 
adjustment speeds since females are often attached to jobs with low fixed 
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costs. A complication arises in FRG, however, since a high proportion of 
females work part-time (30% of total female employment in 1983) and so a 
significant element of female labour adjustment may take place on the 
intensive margin - in the form of variations in part-time hours - and this 
would serve to reduce the sizes of employment adjustment parameters. 
Finally, the proportion of skilled employees (SKLRAT) is included to improve 
the proxy of training and set-up costs for which it is notoriously difficult to 
obtain reliable information. 
Second-stage results are presented in Table 4.1 and they are largely in 
line with a priori expectations. Both fixed and inventory costs exert negative 
influences on the employment own-adjustment.speed. Fixed costs display an 
asymmetrical association with the two multipliers. Hart and McGregor argue 
that there are two countervailing effects of fixity on the long-run 
unanticipated sales multiplier. The first is the 'hoarding effect' which would 
be expected to depress the size of the multiplier. The second is the 'industry 
effect' which refers to the sort of employment response to unforecasted sales 
expected in a given industry irrespective of hoarding. The authors argue that 
their data indicate that such industries are relatively prone to employment 
adjustment since industries with low degrees of fixity (like clothing and 
textiles) were greatly affected by long-term structural influences over the 
study period. The overall results indicate that the industry effect is stronger 
than the hoarding effect. Since the short-run unforecasted sales multiplier 
comprises a linear combination of own-adjustment and long-run multiplier 
parameters, its sign is indeterminate. It is clearly dominated by the long-run 
multiplier since it is significantly positive. The inventory cost proxy, 
STOSAL, exerts a positive influence on both multipliers, a result in line with 
the reserve labour hypothesis. Hart and McGregor argue, with respect to the 
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Table 4.1 Determinants of Employment Own-Adjustment, Impact Multiplier 
and Long-run Multiplier Parameters: FRG Industries 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Estimated Estimated Estimated 
Own-Adjustment Impact Multiplier Long-run Multiplier 
FIXRAT 
STOSAL 
VARSUN 
BIGFMS 
FEMRAT 
SLKRAT 
R'2 
F 
-0.045 
(1.085) 
0.074* 
(1.834) 
-0.133 
(1.238) 
-0.091 
(3.407) 
-0.120* 
(4.245) 
0.056 
(0.525) 
0.50 
4.53 
0.066* 
(1.736) 
0.007* 
(2.506) 
-0.045 
(0.451) 
-0.037 
(1.416) 
-0.040 
(1.550) 
0.225* 
(2.148) 
0.19 
1.76 
0.800* 
(2.678) 
0.683* 
(2.321) 
-0.643 
(0.829) 
-0.380* 
(1.964) 
-0.173 
(0.845) 
2.884* 
(3.632) 
0.37 
2.94 
Significant at the 5% level 
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long-run mu l t i p l i e r , that these outcomes may also pa r t i a l l y r e f l ec t s t ruc tura l 
industr ial character is t ics . 
4.2 Unemployment and Internat ional Labour Market F lex ib i l i t y 
One extraord inary labour market phenomenon over the past 15 years 
or so has been Japan's persistently low rate of unemployment compared to the 
rest of the OECD bloc. The comparat ive p ic tu re is i l lus t ra ted by 
Tachibanaki (1987) for the period 1970-83. Dur ing this per iod, Japan 
averaged 1.9% unemployment w i th FRG at 3.9% i ts closest r i v a l . For other 
major economies, l ike France, I ta ly , UK and USA the equivalent rates lay 
between 5.8% (UK) and 6.8% (USA). 
Not surpr is ingly, European and United States pol icy makers have 
shown great interest in t ry ing to discover reasons fo r Japan's re la t ive 
success. Explanations are varied but there is a growing consensus among 
in ternat iona l labour market economists that one key explanat ion may l ie in the 
fac t t ha t , i n cer ta in respects, Japan displays fa r more labour market 
f l ex i b i l i t y than elsewhere. In part icular i t is now reasonably wel l established 
that Japanese working hours and labour compensation systems exhibit greater 
degrees of cyc l i ca l var iat ion than in other large OECD economies whi le 
employment and unemployment remain re la t ive ly s table. Recent explanations 
of these tendencies have focussed on the re la t ive degree of labour f i x i t y in 
Japan compared to the United States and elsewhere and so this whole area is 
very re levant to the developments here. 
4.2.1 Evidence 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show, respect ively, average annual hours and 
manufactur ing employment between 1950 and 1983 in our four featured 
economies as wel l as in France. Japanese hours display a degree of cyc l ica l 
Figure 4 . 1 : Average Annual Hours per Worker in Manufacturing Industry: 
FRG, France. Japan, UK, USA, 1950-83. 
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Figure 4 . 2 : Numbers of Workers in Manufacturing Industry: FRG, France, 
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variability not shared by the other four countries. In fact hours in the USA 
have been remarkably stable over the entire period while in Europe they have 
shown a fairly persistent downward trend. By contrast, employment in the 
USA reveals high cyclical variability with Japan exhibiting extremely strong 
growth until the mid 1970s after which time, following a fal l around the f i rst 
oil shock, i t has remained fairly constant. Compared to Japan, European 
manufacturing employment has grown less spectacularly during the 1950s and 
1960s and, contrary to both Japan and the USA, i t has declined systematically 
since the mid 1970s. European countries and, particularly, Japan have 
experienced less employment variability than the USA. Corroborating 
evidence of these relative patterns of hours/worker variabil i ty can be found in 
Gordon (1982) and Tachibanaki (1987). 
Hart (1987a) has analysed the data represented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 
in more detail. He compares the trends in total hours (Nh: i.e. employment 
multiplied by average hours) with those of hours (h) and workers (N) 
separately. In the USA, deviations from the Nh trend are dominated by 
movements in N rather than h. At the other end of the spectrum, the relative 
positions are reversed in Japan. Further, in the init ial year following the f irst 
OPEC oil shock, i t is found that all countries appear to respond by reducing 
hours below trend with employment adjusting downwards in the following 
years. This is in accord with the differential hours/employment adjustment 
discussed in the previous section. In Japan and the UK, however, the largest 
part of the total Nh adjustment to the stock is through h rather than N while, 
in FRG and USA, i t is N that plays the decidedly dominant overall rôle. 
Over and above the evidence of relative Japanese employment 
stability in recent years, Hashimoto and Raisian (1985a) have established that 
Japanese workers average significantly longer f irm tenure than in the USA. I t 
should be added that the USA itself experiences fair ly long job durations by 
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workers w i t h i n a given f i rm (see Hal l , 1982). One reveal ing s ta t is t i c given by 
Hashimoto and Raisian is that by the t ime the typical Japanese male worker 
reaches 65 he w i l l have changed jobs approximately 5 t imes on average 
compared to the equivalent US worker who w i l l have experienced 11 changes. 
Further , Hashimoto and Raisian show that while tenure is longer in large 
f i rms , workers in smal l Japanese f i rms, contrary to popular bel ief , also enjoy 
re la t i ve ly long tenure. 
A pr incipal reason for the far greater cyc l i ca l var iab i l i t y of 
employment in the USA is that temporary layoffs provide a far more prevalent 
means of react ing to demand downturns than in other countr ies. Feldstein 
(1975) and L i l i en (1980) show that , on average, about two- th i rds of all layof fs 
in US manufactur ing are temporary in the sense that the la id -o f f workers 
subsequently re tu rn to their or iginal employer. Topel (1982) provides 
industr ia l breakdowns and shows that temporary layof fs account for just under 
one-hal f of al l employer in i t ia ted layoffs. I t would appear that temporary 
layof fs play a rôle in the USA that is equivalent to average hours f luctuat ions 
in Japan. 
As f o r wages, Gordon (1982) finds far greater nominal wage changes 
re la t ive to hours worked or employment in Japan compared to the USA. In a 
more deta i led analysis, Hashimoto and Raisian (1987) conclude that : 
' . . .procyc l ica l hourly compensation adjustments holding weekly 
hours worked constant are ... much more pronounced in Japan 
than in the US, especially the proport ion of compensation 
a t t r ibu tab le to bonus payments. In the US, much of the 
procyc l ica l var iab i l i ty in hourly compensation is instead 
a t t r ibu tab le to wage premiums associated w i t h procycl ical 
week ly hours var iabi l i ty rather than pure procycl ical 
compensation var iabi l i ty in the absence of hours var iab i l i t y . ' 
(Hashimoto and Raisian, 1987, p.26) 
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Final ly , Hashimoto and Raisian (1985a) also show that the typical 
Japanese worker has a more steeply r ising earning pro f i le than US workers and 
that the prof i les peak in about the same year a f ter enter ing the current f i r m 
in both countr ies. These results hold af ter control l ing fo r type of industry and 
educational a t ta inment . 
4.2.2 Explanations 
I t would appear that one explanation of the d i f f e ren t unemployment 
experiences between Japan on the one hand and Europe and the USA on the 
other l ies in the fac t that Japan shows greater wage and labour ut i l isat ion 
f l ex ib i l i t y in the face of unantic ipated economic events whereas the other 
countr ies re ly far more on quant i ty adjustment. In o ther words, wages and 
hours act as a buf fer to economic f luctuat ions in Japan. But, of course, the 
fundamental question is why Japan has greater recourse to such adjustment 
mechanisms. 
One possible answer to this question is that Japanese workers are 
endowed w i t h higher degrees of specif ic human cap i ta l investments. Given 
sharing agreements over the returns to such investments (Hashimoto, 1981), i t 
may wel l be in the interests of both employers and workers to avoid costly 
separations in t imes of unforeseen fal ls in demand by agreeing to work sharing 
and wage reduct ions. Fol lowing standard theory, providing (expected) 
marginal product covers variable labour costs, i t w i l l pay the parties to remain 
together during downturns in demand that are perceived to be temporary. 
As we have seen in Table 2.15, section 2.5, there is no evidence that 
Japanese f i x i t y rat ios are s igni f icnt ly d i f ferent f rom elsewhere on the basis of 
conventional measures of f i x i t y . Of crucial impor tance is the interpretat ion 
of the bonus. I f the bonus i tsel f is considered to be par t of the returns to 
speci f ic invetments then, without any doubt, Japanese f i x i t y levels would be 
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considerably higher than elsewhere (see the evidence presented in sections 2.2 
and 2.5). Hashimoto (1979) argues strongly that the bonus largely does 
represent such returns although there are varied views among economists on 
the primary function of the bonus system (see Tachibanaki, 1987, for a useful 
review). Even if the bonus only partially reflects returns to specific 
investments, however, this would still mean that Japanese fixity is in excess of 
other countries given its parity as far as the narrower fixity measures are 
concerned. 
Hashimoto and Raisian (1985a and 1987) also argue that the steeper 
wage and longer tenure profiles of Japanese workers compared to their United 
States counterparts may further be indicative of higher worker specificity. 
They summarise the position thus: 
'... a Japanese male worker who enters a large firm 
immediately after the completion of schooling can expect to 
see his earnings increase by 214 per cent after twenty years of 
employment, most (85 per cent) of which is attributable to 
firm-specific tenure. In contrast, a similar individual from 
the US can expect a 93 per cent earnings growth, less than 
half (39 per cent) of which is attributable to firm-specific 
tenure ... On the basis of shapes of wage-tenure profiles for 
the two countries, we also project that Japanese workers 
invest more than twice as many resources as US workers on 
the development of income-producing human capital.' 
(Hashimoto and Raisian, 1987, p.29) 
But even if we accept the view of relatively high fixity in Japan, this 
still begs the further question of why Japanese employers and employees are 
willing to incur high degrees of specific investments. Hashimoto and Raisian 
(1987) argue that the reason can be found in the fact that there are lower 
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' t ransact ion costs' attached to these investments in Japan. Transaction costs 
in this context re fe r to the exchange of in format ion. Evaluat ing returns to 
speci f ic investments requires knowledge concerning product demand, process 
and product innovat ion, technological change, work organisat ion, etc., that are 
l ike ly to a f fec t the own- f i rm and i ts competi tors. The in format ion costs 
involved are both high and asymmetr ica l . Hashimoto and Raisian argue, and 
c i te other supporting evidence, tha t the general system of industr ial re lat ions 
in Japan - w i t h i ts high levels of employer-employee t rust and cooperation - is 
such that the transact ion costs are rendered below i ts main compet i tors. 
I f investment in Japanese human capital is indeed s igni f icant ly higher 
than elsewhere then, as mentioned at the beginning of this sect ion, 
worksharing and f lexible wages may be jo int ly agreed by employers and 
workers in order to avoid sub-opt imal separations that would involve net 
investment losses. In turn , this may provide a mechanism that detaches 
labour costs f rom their market clearing rôle (see also F i t zRoy and Har t , 1987) 
thereby providing employment and unemployment s tab i l i t y . A t the present 
stage of research, such conclusions should be t reated w i th considerable 
caut ion, however. 
In the f i rs t place, the Japanese wage-tenure prof i les observed above 
could be in terpreted in a way that is largely divorced f rom (specific) human 
capi ta l theory . Under the agency hypothesis, for example, the steep earnings 
prof i les may be interpreted as a mechanism to induce opt imum product iv i ty 
prof i les w i thou t incurr ing s igni f icant monitor ing costs that may be par t icu lar ly 
high in large and complex f i rms. Agency theory does not depend on human 
capi ta l investments and so provides radical ly d i f fe ren t interpretat ions of 
re la t ive var iat ions of stock and ut i l isat ion variables. Al though Hashimoto and 
Raisian (1985) argue that the c i rcumstant ia l evidence tends to favour human 
capi ta l ra the r than agency explanations, i t certa in ly cannot be claimed that 
the ma t te r is set t led. 
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Secondly, there is some evidence to suggest that the picture of 
Japanese unemployment as both very low and very stable is oversimpl i f ied and 
that cor rec t ing for measurement problems as well as age, occupational and 
sectoral d ivers i ty serves to reduce the gap between the unemployment rates in 
Japan and elsewhere. This subject area is reviewed by Tachibanaki (1987). 
Given in terpretat ional and measurement problems, internat ional 
economic comparisons of ten do not yield conclusive evidence concerning 
d i f fe rent economic pract ices between countries. One way forward in this 
par t icu lar area would be to investigate in much more depth the elements that 
make up labour f i x i t y , i ts quant i tat ive importance and i ts e f fect on labour 
market variables in d i f fe rent sectors of Japan i tse l f . This might be carr ied 
out, fo r example, by means of a disaggregated industr ia l analysis. That there 
does exist large dif ferences among Japanese industr ial sectors in employment/ 
hours var iat ions is i l lust rated in Table 4.2 for the broad aggregates, mining, 
const ruc t ion, manufactur ing, e lec t r ic i ty and services. In mining and 
e lec t r i c i t y , the standard deviations of monthly percentage changes of 
employment are fa r greater than those of hours of work for all four sub-
periods in the range 1971-1984. In construct ion, manufactur ing and services 
the re la t i ve var iab i l i t y reverses. The sectors are too large and heterogeneous 
to in fer anything meaningful concerning their re la t ive degrees of f i x i t y - and 
besides the deviations are also certainly due in part to s t ructura l and other 
extraneous economic influences which would need to be control led for - but 
they do at least indicate that examining measures of f i x i t y in the l ight of more 
disaggregate Japanese data may prove to be rewarding. 
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Table 4.2 
Var ia t ion of employment and hours worked by the main Japanese 
industr ial sectors, 1971-84 
Standard deviations of monthly 
per cent changes 
1971-74 1975-79 1980-84 1971-84 
Mining 
Construct ion 
Manufactur ing 
E lec t r i c i t y 
Services 
Employment 
Hours worked 
Employment 
Hours worked 
Employment 
Hours worked 
Employment 
Hours worked 
Employment 
Hours worked 
11.66 
3.56 
3.66 
5.22 
1.56 
8.19 
8.56 
4.46 
2.00 
5.08 
13.63 
3.58 
2.28 
5.32 
1.74 
7.72 
8.17 
4.31 
1.79 
5.50 
16.41 
3.92 
2.41 
5.25 
1.34 
7.30 
9.32 
4.46 
1.65 
5.76 
41.20 
3.70 
2.79 
5.27 
1.56 
7.72 
8.71 
4.41 
1.81 
5.48 
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4.3 Job Security 
In most of the major OECD countries since the 1960s there has been a 
marked rise in measures designed to secure greater employee job secur i ty . 
Some of these have fol lowed employer-union col lect ive bargaining agreement 
while others have derived f rom s ta tu tory government leg is lat ion. Examples 
include pro tec t ion against arb i t rary or unfair dismissal, special compensation 
in the case of redundancy and the implementat ion of rules concerning the 
ordering of layof fs (e.g. inverse senior i ty) . A detai led examinat ion of the 
range of job protect ion policies in OECD countries is provided by Gennard 
(1979 and 1985). 
Cer ta in policy in i t ia t ives have been undertaken w i t h the view to 
achieving job securi ty provisions fo r disadvantaged groups of workers that are 
on a par w i t h the norms fo r other workers. Perhaps the most impor tan t 
example in this respect is the legislat ion recent ly enacted, or current ly 
proposed, to provide pa r t - t ime workers w i t h working condit ions equivalent to 
comparable f u l l - t i m e workers (see Robinson, 1984, and Disney and Szyszczak, 
1984). 
This whole policy area is highly re levant to the discussion here since 
the typ ica l job securi ty agreements and regulations const i tu te f ixed NWLCs to 
the f i r m . I n other words, job protect ion or redundancy provision or senior i ty 
privi leges o f ten involve costs that are independent of the ra te of ut i l isat ion of 
workers as measured, say, by average working hours over some t ime period. 
Of course, the costs of job secur i ty provision may also include examples of 
variable NWLCs. For example, this would be the case where redundancy 
payments are in some way l inked to previous earnings. 
Recent at tempts have been made to evaluate the re la t ive strengths 
and weaknesses of job securi ty policies as opposed to the pract ice of 
emp loymen t -a t -w i l l where dismissal, redundancy payments and other 
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provisions are left solely to the discretion of the employer. In very general 
terms, European countries and Japan have developed far more in the former 
direction compared to the USA where, despite some recent changes towards 
more job security, employment-at-will is a more common phenomenon. 
Lazear (1987) has attempted to evaluate theoretically the broad economic 
arguments for and against the two employment strategies. 
Proponents of the retention of employment-at-wil l typically argue 
that: 
(a) The fixed NWLCs associated with job security provision may actually 
act as a disincentive to employment and, rather, encourage employers 
to increase labour utilisation and/or induce capital-labour substitution. 
(b) Where eligibil ity to redundancy payments and job projection is not 
vested as soon as the worker is employed or does not apply i f the 
worker works too few hours per period of t ime, this may encourage 
employers to terminate employment before el igibi l i ty is established or 
to l imi t severally per period working hours, respectively. 
(c) Job security provision adds to employment costs and produces 
competitive disadvantages in sectors - due to localised collective 
bargaining agreements or partial legislative coverage - that have to 
bear a disproportionate burden. 
Proponents of job security legislation typically advance arguments 
that include: 
(a') Obstacles to permanent layoffs help to preserve jobs that otherwise 
would have been more easily terminated, 
(b') Job security provides a form of insurance against temporary layoffs 
during unanticipated downturns in economic act iv i ty. 
(c') Job security may produce more committed and motivated workers 
thereby enhancing productivity. 
144 
We wi l l comment on each of these issues in turn. There is l i t t le 
doubt, under (a), that most economists believe - in the context of work sharing 
versus job security - that the existence of fixed costs can lead to 
inefficiencies in the labour market that may serve to impair employment or 
worsen unemployment (see Nickell, 1979; Hart, 1984a; Lazear, 1987). In 
times of unanticipated declines in demand, constraints on employment 
reductions, but not on hours of work, wi l l produce sub-optimum factor 
allocation since firms wi l l be forced to respond by moving away from their 
optimal mix of labour inputs. This may produce longer-term substitution 
between capital and labour or between groups of workers endowed wi th 
different levels of job security. Given unanticipated upturns in demand, on 
the other hand, firms may be reluctant to employ workers to levels that would 
have been reached in the absence of security rules in the anticipation of the 
subsequent employment constraints in relation to fixed costs. 
Concrete evidence on (b) is hard to obtain. One likely possibility, 
often referred to in the literature, concerns the lower wage ceilings for social 
welfare contributions. Suppose, for a given wage rate, there is a lower wage 
earnings ceiling that is reached by working h hours per period. Below h no 
social welfare contributions are incurred while at and beyond h contributions 
are incurred for the interval [0-h ] as well as for [h-h ] . This, for example, is 
the system that operates in FRG. As shown in Hart (1987a, Ch. 6), the 
payment for the below-ceiling interval represents a fixed NWLC to the f i rm. 
(It pays for the interval whether employees work few or many hours above the 
ceiling.) Accordingly, firms may attempt to avoid such costs by employing 
part- t ime workers on very short average hours; that is, for hours which, at 
the given wage rate, would ensure that earnings are below h . Buechtemann 
(1987) quotes figures that are, at least, consistent wi th this reaction. A 
recent series of FRG studies have all found that working time 
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preferences fo r those wi l l ing to work pa r t - t ime concentrated largely in the 
range 25-35 weekly hours. In contrast , 89 per cent of the (considerable) 
expansion of p a r t - t i m e employment in FRG between 1976 and 1984 has 
involved hours in the range of up to 20 per week. 
Sectoral labour cost disadvantages due to the unequal incidence of job 
secur i ty rules - as mentioned under (c) - may occur w i t h respect to re la t ive 
work force sk i l l (see Hamermesh, 1987), pa r t - t ime and f u l l - t i m e employment 
(see F i t zRoy and Har t , 1986) and d i f fe rent industr ial sectors compared i n t r a -
or in ternat iona l ly (see Lazear, 1987). Increases in re la t i ve f ixed NWLCs due 
to job secur i ty provision fa l l ing disproport ionately among sectors may cause 
labour subst i tu t ion against the sectors that experience the greatest 
increases. Not only may this represent a generally i ne f f i c i en t al locat ion of 
resources but also i t may induce temporary bot t lenecks due to job 
mismatching that could cause shor t - and med ium- te rm employment and 
unemployment problems. 
While the view under (a') may be true for exist ing employees - at least 
in the shor t - run - note should also be made of the longer te rm disadvantages 
ment ioned under (a) above. Support for the combined s t ra tegy of job securi ty 
and hours reduct ions during rest ructur ing in the European steel industry ra ther 
than a much greater rel iance on worker adjustment as pract ised in the United 
States steel industry is given by Houseman (1987). During systematic 
industr ia l res t ruc tur ing , Houseman argues that both jobs and plant were 
preserved in Europe due to a work sharing/job secur i ty strategy. Her 
comparat ive empir ical evidence is based on employment adjustment equations 
fo r the s tee l industries of France, FRG and USA. (Bi t t l ingmayer , 1987, 
provides an interest ing cr i t ique of these empir ical results.) In a simi lar vein, 
Odagir i (1986) argues, in the background of a Keynesian macroeconomic 
analysis, tha t a general st rategy of f i rms emphasising employment s tab i l i ty 
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rather than maximising short-run profits helps to stabilise both macro-
employment and national income. In line with expectation, he finds that in 
Japan, France and the UK the employment trends in relation to GNP and other 
measures seem to indicate that employment stability strategy dominates 
short-run optimisation while the USA evidence is not consistent with this 
ranking. 
From the contributions of Baily (1977) and others, there is a well 
established literature that views employment contracts as a form of insurance 
arrangement. As suggested in (b'), job security rules can be viewed in similar 
fashion. When comparing work sharing in Europe with temporary layoffs in 
the United States, however, a similar kind of insurance principle can be 
arguably said to apply in both situations. As Houseman (1987) points out, 
differences between the two strategies in times of cyclical demand 
fluctuations are not critical since one is simply comparing subsidised short-
time working in Europe with subsidised temporary layoffs (given less-than-
perfect experiencing rating) in the USA. Indeed, short-time working is funded 
through the state unemployment insurance system in FRG in fairly similar 
fashion to temporary layoffs in the USA. Perhaps more importantly, Lazear 
(1987) stresses that an insurance principle that is not designed to approximate 
individuals' optimum insurance wages is inefficient. The information costs 
that would be required to enable the government to provide such insurance are 
likely to be prohibitively high, however. Lazear recognises that job security 
legislation at least overcomes the problems of enforceabilty encountered in 
privately undertaken implicit contracts but argues that, given the inefficiency 
arguments, it would be better for the government to play the rôle of enforcer 
of explicit contracts undertaken privately between the worker and the firm. 
The last point, under (c*), is perhaps the most difficult to evaluate. In 
employment-at-will arrangements, productivity gains comparable to those 
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(possibly) achieved through job secur i ty may be realised by re lat ing the wage 
par t ia l l y to performance (Bellmann, 1987). Such moni tor ing costs would then 
be compared w i t h the costs pertaining s t r i c t l y to job secur i ty , highl ighted 
under (a) and elsewhere. 
As ment ioned in section 4 . 1 , empir ical tests of the labour market 
impacts of job secur i ty rules usually feature employment (and of ten hours) 
adjustment equations. The examples featured here cover most aspects of job 
secur i ty leg is la t ion re fer red to above. 
N icke l l (1979) has tested fo r the ef fects on employment and hours 
adjustment of the increasing incidence of job secur i ty policies in Br i t ish 
manufac tur ing industry over the period 1955-76. In accord w i th expectat ion, 
he f inds tha t the adjustment lag in employment rose over this period whi le 
that of hours decl ined. In a fu r ther analysis, N icke l l (1982) at t r ibutes the 
reduct ion of both hir ing and f lows f rom employment to an increase in unfa i r 
dismissal leg is lat ion between the middle 1960s and 1970s. 
Hamermesh (1987) has broadened Nickel l 's 1979 study geographically 
by test ing fo r separate changes in employment adjustment and hours 
adjustment to unanticipated output changes in twelve OECD countries during 
the 1970s. For wel l known reasons largely re lated to o i l supply shocks, many 
countr ies adopted protect ionist policies in the 1970s tha t were designed to 
slow the ra te of employment adjustment. Hamermesh estimates an 
in tegrated vector-autoregression model using quar ter ly data for the period 
( for most countr ies) 1961:1 to 1985:11 w i th a break point at the end of 1973:111 
(thereby coinciding w i t h the f i rs t oi l shock) to f ac i l i t a te the test for changes 
in average length of lag. For the six largest countr ies - Canada, France, 
FRG, Japan, UK and USA - there is clear evidence that the average 
employment adjustment lag exceeds that of hours. Results for other 
countr ies are more d i f f i cu l t to in terpret . Further, Hamermesh finds a fa i r l y 
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general tendency for the average lag of employment to have increased in the 
1970s. However, in only two countries - Japan and UK - does Hamermesh 
replicate Nickell's UK observation of both lengthening employment lags and 
shortening hours lags during this period. 
An obvious means of effecting greater job protection is through 
expanding the existing social security programmes. Changes in social security 
payroll taxes can also have differential implications for workers/hours 
adjustment. This arises essentially, as discussed in chapter 3, because payroll 
taxes contain both fixed and variable cost elements. One particularly 
interesting set of payroll taxes are those relating to unemployment 
contributions by employers in the USA. Since, in general, such taxes are 
eligible up to relatively low wage ceiling limits, they constitute fixed labour 
costs for most US employees. In other words, they may be expected to 
influence employment/hours adjustment in similar fashion to most types of job 
protection legislation (see Hart, 1982, and FitzRoy and Hart. 1985, for 
theoretical discussion). Some direct empirical evidence for this is provided by 
Hamermesh (1978) who finds that an extension of the unemployment insurance 
programme produced short-run hours-employment substitution. (See also 
Brechling, 1977 and 1981 for theoretical and empirical analyses, respectively, 
of the factor demand effects of changes in USA unemployment insurance 
taxes.) 
As a final example of the use of employment adjustment models to 
test for the effects of increased job security, it is worth commenting on the 
work of Disney and Szyszczak (1984) on part-time employment. Before 1975, 
there was relatively little employment protection in the UK for part-time 
workers employed for less than 21 hours per week. The Employment 
Protection Act in that year considerably narrowed the gap in protection 
enjoyed by full-timers and part-timers. The authors find that, due to low 
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adjustment costs, var iat ions in pa r t - t ime employment were used as a 
substi tute to var iat ions in average hours of work before the Ac t whi le , a f te r 
1975, d i f fe ren t ia l speeds of adjustment between the two categories of 
employment were e l iminated. 
4.4 Non-Wage Labour Costs and Macroeconometric Models 
The pol icy discussion so far in this chapter, as wel l as in the previous 
chapter, has been carr ied out against the background of somewhat par t ia l 
empir ical analyses that have tended to concentrate on l im i ted aspects of the 
labour market . Empir ica l work at a more detai led macroeconomic level is 
c lear ly hampered by the fact that macroeconometric systems rare ly include 
any t rea tment whatsoever of NWLCs. I t is possible, however, to gain some 
insights into the rôle in such models of at least one impor tant non-wage 
component, that is employers' contr ibut ions to social secur i ty . The systems 
generally do include, as exogenous policy instruments, ra tes of employers' (and 
employees') social secur i ty contr ibut ions. We have already paid quite close 
at tent ion to the ef fects of changes in contributions on fac to r inputs in section 
3.2. Here, the emphasis is switched to macroeconomic impl icat ions of 
contr ibut ion changes using a UK model. (Relat ive ly l i t t l e empir ical work 
involving NWLCs has been undertaken for the UK, a point we dwell on in the 
Appendix to this chapter.) 
As is clear f rom Table 2.9, employers' Nat ional Insurance 
contr ibut ions are the largest components of NWLCs in the UK. I t is possible 
to vary rates of NI contr ibut ion and examine their fu l l macroeconomic ef fects 
using various UK macroeconometr ic models. The remainder of this section is 
taken up w i t h describing the results of just such a s imula t ion using the London 
Business School (LBS) model of the UK economy. 
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In the LBS model, employers' NI contr ibut ions par t ly determine the 
real product wage by adjusting upward hourly earnings def lated by producer 
prices. Employment is then determined by the real product wage and the 
level of output . The coef f ic ient on the product wage is not the e last ic i ty of 
demand for labour since the level of output is endogenous. Nevertheless, this 
fo rmula t ion is one way of wr i t ing the demand for labour equation. Hence the 
LBS model assumes that the outcome in the labour marke t must l ie along the 
demand fo r labour schedule. Thus employers re ta in the r igh t to determine 
employment. In the Liverpool model - another UK macro-system - by 
contrast , the wage is determined only by those fac to rs which a f fec t the 
union's bargaining posit ion such as benefi t levels and the par t ic ipat ion r a t i o , 
e tc . This is the "union monopoly" model. In the LBS wage equation, fac tors 
which a f fec t the unions and the employer play a rôle in determining the "Nash 
bargain". 
N I contr ibut ions form part of the " tax wedge" between product and 
consumption wages. They also form part of real labour costs, reductions in 
which w i l l induce employers to increase their demand fo r labour. Thus the 
ra te of N I contr ibut ions appears d i rect ly in the employment equations both fo r 
manufactur ing and non-manufactur ing. 
As we l l as the direct ef fects on the labour marke t occurring through 
the employment equations, the change in NI contr ibut ions w i l l also change 
government f inances. Since this is a simple s imulat ion ra ther than a scenario 
building exercise, no compensating alterat ions have been made in other tax 
instruments. The f iscal stance becomes one of being less rest r ic t ive rather 
than being maintained at a constant leve l . The increase in demand has a 
fu r ther benef ic ia l e f fec t on employment. However, the increase in 
employment leads to lower unemployment, increased wage demands and higher 
prices. The exchange rate depreciates which fur ther boosts price. Nominal 
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wages have to rise to maintain workers target real wages. Further the 
increase in prices has a negative impact , via wealth e f fec ts , on consumption 
and thence on output . The fu l l impact on the economy of, say, a 1 per cent 
cut in employers' N I contr ibut ions is thus d i f f i cu l t to pred ic t a p r io r i . Figures 
4.3 and 4.4 p lot percentage changes in the major aggregates: output, pr ices, 
employment and wages arising as a result of a one per cent cut i n employers' 
N I contr ibut ions for a seven year simulat ion on the LBS model . 
By the end of the period the employment e f f ec t has become almost 
ins igni f icant whi le the e f fec t on output has become negat ive. The cause of 
this disappointing outcome is the extent to which the i n i t i a l improvement in 
the labour market feeds through into wage demands and worsens in f la t ion . 
The public sector borrowing requirement increases throughout the s imulat ion 
f inishing £320m higher. With the f inal increase in employment being only 30 
thousand, this impl ies a cost per job created of approximate ly £10,000. 
Nevertheless this cost compares favourably w i t h equivalent cuts in income tax 
(£18,000) or reduct ions in VAT (£20.000). 
These simulat ions demonstrate that the fu l l macroeconomic impact of 
a change in NWLCs may be quite d i f ferent f rom that wh ich appears to fo l low 
f rom microeconomic considerations of the pol icy change. In part icular, in an 
economy as open as the UK, changes in prices and wages are crucial since they 
feed through to the exchange rate and therefore a f fec t the level of demand. 
Nevertheless, the LBS model indicates that reductions in employers' National 
Insurance contr ibut ions are at least as cost e f fec t ive in increasing employment 
as are income tax or VAT rate cuts. 
Note f ina l ly , however, that the exclusion of labour ut i l isat ion ef fects 
of con t r ibu t ion changes in this simulat ion may have biased the results in 
favour of employment responses (see section 3.2). 
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Appendix 4.1 
Research on NWLCs in the United Kingdom 
Labour market research in the UK has tended to focus on areas such as 
the rôle of t rade unions or on aggregate labour market models in recent years 
and re la t i ve ly l i t t l e a t tent ion has been devoted to the in f luence or importance 
of NWLCs even though employers' organizations have f requent ly argued tha t 
high NWLCs have an adverse e f fec t on employment. I n this Appendix an 
at tempt is made to describe areas of current "mainst ream" UK labour market 
reseach which do consider NWLCs, albeit somewhat casual ly. 
Econometr ic models of the aggregate UK labour marke t , as developed 
by e.g. N icke l l and Layard (1986) have centred round a more carefu l ly 
specif ied f ramework of both supply and demand in labour and product markets 
than has h i the r to been the case. Part icular assumptions about the nature of 
agents' act ion in the markets are made which enable res t r ic t ions to be placed 
on the econometr ic specif icat ions of the various schedules. 
For example, one can s tar t f rom a general labour demand speci f icat ion 
such as 
d d, ­ ,d, ... 
n = n (w,Z ) (ι) 
which gives employment as a funct ion of nominal wages (w) and a group of 
exogenous and endogenous variables (Z ). Assumptions such as p ro f i t 
max imiza t ion or cost min imizat ion subject to an output constraint which 
permi t marginal product iv i ty conditions can then be made to res t r i c t the very 
general spec i f icat ion contained in ( i ) . 
Andrews (1987) gives a clear exposition of this general class of model 
showing how fur ther assumptions can be made in order to arr ive at estimable 
systems of equations given current data constraints. For example, the 
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N icke l l /Layard model takes the product market to be imper fec t ly 
compet i t i ve . Because of i ts current popularity as a vehic le for explaining the 
recent rise in UK unemployment, we shall concentrate on this model. For 
fur ther i n fo rmat ion on i ts precise speci f icat ion see Nickel l and Layard 
(1985). However, the concern here is w i th two par t icu la r issues relevant to 
NWLCs. F i rs t l y , because theory suggests that NWLCs w i l l a f fec t demands for 
the stock of labour and for i ts ut i l isat ion d i f fe ren t l y , i t is f i rs t l y wor th 
considering the way in which the labour services input is measured in the 
Layard /N icke l l model . 
The f low of labour services depends funct ional ly on both the stock of 
employees and the ra le at which they are ut i l ised. Yet the Layard/Nickel l 
model concentrates solely on the stock of employment and ignores the 
ut i l i sa t ion dimension of labour services. This is the result of a specif ic 
assumption about the funct ional form of the labour services input. The 
reasons for not considering hours of work are laid out in Layard and Nickel l 
(1985, p.16). There i t is assumed that the stocks of labour and of capital are 
ut i l ised for the same t ime each week. Then output per week depends on the 
number of machine hour t imes output per machine. Thus 
Y = hKf (Y /K) (ii) 
where Y is output , h is hours and K is the capi ta l s tock. Now, if output is 
produced under constant returns to scale w i t h a product ion funct ion of the 
form 
Y = g(K.N) (i i i) 
where N is the level of employment then we can wr i te 
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Y/K = g(N/K)vN = gD(Y/K)K. (iv) 
Then rearranging (ii) 
Y = hKp(N/K). (ν) 
Assuming perfect competition, employment is determined by equating 
weekly marginal product to the weekly wage. That is 
dY/dN = hKf(N/K) = wh. (vi) 
Since h cancels out on both sides of (vi), Layard and Nickell argue that 
employment depends only on the hourly wage and not on hours themselves. 
This seems to imply that a cut in hours of work wi l l have no impact on 
employment. A different way of looking at the Layard/Nickell result is as 
follows: suppose that the production function is given by 
Y = hf(N,K) (vii) 
where h is a scaling factor measuring the util isation of both labour and 
capital. Then dividing both sides by Κ and recalling the assumption of 
constant returns to scale, (v) immediately follows. Thus (vii) should be seen 
as the production function underlying the result in (vi) rather than (iii). 
Totally differentiating (vii), i t is clear that dN/dh = f(N,K)/fN(N,K) which does 
not involve h and so a change in hours does not affect the demand for 
employment. However, the decision to "proceed as though hours do not 
matter" (p.17) follows from the specific production function (vii) which, 
because i t is essentially fixed coefficients technology in hours, inevitably 
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precludes substitution between factor stocks and uti l isation. Layard and 
Nickell seem happy to make this decision without any specific test on the 
suitability of (vii) against alternatives, many of which have been discussed in 
the l i terature on nonwage costs (see e.g. Santamãki, 1987). 
The second issue in the Layard/Nickell work relevant to the discussion 
of NWLCs is the way in which labour costs are represented. Nickell (1983) 
discusses the response of employment and hours in the framework of fixed and 
variable labour costs and derives the standard result that increased fixed costs 
wil l tend to favour utilisation at the expense of employment. He argues that 
desired hours wil l be independent of the level of output if the production 
relation is homothetic. (This is another way of stating Ehrenburg's result that 
" i f the labour services function is additively separable, equilibrium hours are 
invariant to scale"; Ehrenburg, 1971.) Further, if the elasticity of output with 
respect to employment is constant then equilibrium hours are independent of 
the factor price ratio (the ratio of the hourly wage to the rental price of 
capital). He also considers the factors affecting the workers' decision to 
supply hours and concludes that i t is very diff icult to identify separate supply 
and demand factors empirically. In particular, there are considerable 
problems in developing an accurate measure of the rat io of fixed to variable 
labour costs. We have already seen, in respect of National Insurance 
contributions in the UK, that there are diff icult ies in this regard. 
Econometric equations which include a variable measuring the ratio of fixed to 
variable labour costs perform poorly and Nickell puts this failure down to the 
poor quality of this variable. 
Perhaps this experience explains why, in his more recent work, Nickell 
does not attempt to model substitution between workers and hours. The 
difference between wages paid to workers and labour costs paid to firms forms 
part of the "tax wedge" which separates the product and the consumption 
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wage. Union bargainers wi l l be aware of each type of tax (employers' taxes, 
d i rect taxes and indirect taxes) which reduce the consumption wage. In 
determining their real wage target , unions should be ind i f fe rent between 
these. "Under fu l l ra t iona l i ty the e f fec t of all these taxes would be the 
same. Only thei r units would mat te r , for a given level of real unemployment 
benef i t " (op.c i t . , p.31). Employers' labour taxes w i l l reduce the demand fo r 
labour as wel l as a f fec t ing the target real wage. 
The variable used to proxy employers' labour taxes, which are t reated 
as exogenous, is the ra t io of " to ta l labour costs per un i t of output for the 
whole economy" and "wages and salaries per unit of output for the whole 
economy" as published by the Department of Employment. This variable 
emerges as s igni f icant in the wage equation and is reckoned to have "added a 
l i t t l e less than two percentage points to unemployment at constant demand 
and around three percentage points to the natural ra te taking account of 
induced demand reduct ions" (op.ci t . , p.71). 
Nevertheless, i t is not clear that this variable should accurately proxy 
the employers' tax rate on the product wage since i t must include non-tax 
components of wage costs such as voluntary social we l fa re payments which 
have become increasingly important since 1964 (see Table 2.9). Once this 
omission is acknowledged, then the supposed exogeneity of this variable 
becomes much more questionable. For example, social wel fare payments 
must be the outcome of bargaining between employers and employees and i t is 
d i f f i cu l t to see how they could reasonably be t reated as exogenous. 
To conclude the discussion in this Appendix the fo l lowing points appear 
to have emerged f rom recent UK aggregate labour market research. F i rs t ly , 
labour u t i l i sa t ion has at t racted l i t t l e a t tent ion and has not been included 
exp l i c i t l y i n aggregative models which seek to explain the rise in UK 
unemployment over the last twenty years. Research has ra ther concentrated 
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on the factors which have affected the demand for workers at given levels of 
the capital slock. NWLCs have consequently attracted l i t t le attention as 
potentially altering the balance of the labour input as between its slock and its 
util isation. The cost of labour is acknowledged as an imporlant influence in 
determining the level of employment and the "tax wedge" is an imporlant 
consideration as wage bargainers delermine the "target" real wage. 
Non-wage benefits form no pari of this calculation. 

160 
Chapter 5 Pr ivate and Statutory Wage Supplements 
The quant i ta t ive importance of wage supplements in the form of 
voluntary and s ta tu tory social wel fare payments is c lear ly established in Table 
2.15. Somewhat surprisingly, labour market resarch on those categories of 
NWLCs has been re la t ive ly slow to develop. In recen t t imes, however, 
research ac t i v i t y has gathered pace. Much of the impor tan t work has been 
undertaken in the USA and this present chapter a t tempts to survey the most 
impor tant work. While at tent ion is focussed on US work , there are clear 
paral lels fo r EC countries w i th respect to non-wage (and taxat ion) experience 
and pol icy and, hopeful ly, this present review may help to s t imulate s imi lar 
European studies. 
Since the resolut ion of the so-cal led Social Secur i ty funding crisis in 
1983, the issues of NWLCs tha i have held the at tent ion of pol icy makers in the 
USA have been related pr imar i ly to voluntary social we l fa re costs, of which 
pensions and health insurance are by far the largest components. In 
par t icu lar , r is ing health care costs and the regulat ion of pr iva te pensions under 
the Employee Ret i rement Income Security Ac t of 1974 (ERISA) have been the 
subjects of much work. Accordingly, Sections 5.1 and 5.2 below review work 
on the favourable tax t reatment of employee benefits (which has been blamed 
by many fo r r is ing health care costs), and on the ef fec ts of pension regulat ion. 
Cer ta in s tatutory wel fare costs have also been researched in the USA 
because the programmes to which they are re lated have experienced funding 
crises s imi la r to the Social Security crisis of the early 1980s. In part icular, 
the Unemployment Insurance and Workers' Compensation systems have 
experienced an array of problems during the 1980s tha t have brought the 
programmes to the at tent ion of pol icy makers. Sect ion 5.3 br ie f ly reviews 
some the issues that have arisen in re la t ion to these programmes. 
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5.1 Tax Treatment of Employee Benefits 
The fo l lowing is a review of the recent US work on pr ivate pensions 
and heal th- insurance plans w i t h a focus on a few questions that are of 
immediate impor tance of pol icy. Four types of question are discussed. What 
accounts fo r the pat tern of growth of pensions and heal th insurance? Who is 
covered and what are the impl icat ions of the existing pa t te rn of coverage fo r 
income d is t r ibu l ion? What changes in the tax t rea tment of nonwage benef i ts 
would y ie ld s igni f icant revenue gains? What are the impl icat ions of these 
changes fo r the equity of the tax system? 
5.1.1 Explaining the US pat tern of Growth of Pensions and Heal th Insurance 
Panel d of Table 2.12 documents the overal l pa t te rn of growth of 
voluntary social wel fare costs, which are predominant ly the costs of pr ivate 
pensions and heal th insurance. A main conclusion of sect ion 2.4 was that 
voluntary social wel fare costs grew at an annual r a t e of 4 to 5 per cent 
between 1965 and 1975, at an annual rate of roughly 2 per cent during the la te 
1970s, and experienced no growth during the f i r s t hal f of the 1980s. This 
slowing g rowth of pensions and heal th insurance requires explanat ion. 
Unfor tunate ly , there is less cer ta in ty about the causes of the pat tern 
of growth of voluntary social wel fare cosls than there is about the pat tern 
i tse l f . The l i tany of reasons fo r the provision of vo luntary employee benefi ts 
includes: pre ferent ia l t reatment under the federal personal and corporate 
income tax codes; economies of scale in the provision of pensions and health 
insurance; e f f o r t s to improve workers' product iv i ty and reduce turnover by 
deferr ing payment of benef i ts; unionizat ion; changing demographic 
composi t ion of the labour force; and rising real incomes. (Good general 
discussions of these factors include Rice (1966), Lester (1967), and Long and 
Scott (1982). The issue of improving product iv i ty and reducing turnover - the 
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so-cal led agency incent ive for providing deferred benef i ts has been t reated by 
Logue (1979) and Lazear (1981).) 
To what degree can each of these factors explain the pat te rn of 
growth of f r inge benefits? Al though there is substant ial evidence t ha i unions 
and co l lec t ive bargaining exert a posit ive independent e f f ec t on the provision 
of nonwage benef i ts (Freeman 1981, A lper t 1982, Rossi ler and Taylor 1982, 
Fosu 1984; and Mincer 1983), the stagnation of p r i va te -sec to r union growth 
since the 1950s makes unionism a rather unpromising source of s ign i f icant 
changes in employee benefi t provision. Simi lar ly , i t is unclear that the 
" technology" of benef i t provision has changed so tha t scale economies of 
benef i t provision now exist where they did not before (Mi tche l l and Andrews 
1981). 
Defer ra l of income has been shown quite convincingly to reduce labour 
turnover and, by inference, to improve product iv i ty (Schi l ler and Weiss 1979; 
Wolf and Levy 1984). But again, i t is unclear tha t the desire to reduce 
turnover has been a driving force behind changes in the pa t te rn of provision of 
employee benef i ts . The only exist ing study of this quest ion, by Mumy and 
Manson (1985), concludes that considerations of p roduc t i v i t y and turnover are 
fa r less po lent explanalors of pension growth than is the tax t reatment of 
pension contr ibu l ions. 
The most l ike ly causes of changes in the g rowth of f r inge benef i ts, 
then, are the aging of the labour force, changes in the tax t reatment of 
benef i ts , and changes in real incomes. Several ear ly studies of employee 
benef i t provision concentrated on the growth of pensions and health insurance, 
since up unt i l 1980 growth (not slowing growth and stagnat ion) was the pat tern 
that required explanation (Alper t 1983; At rost ic 1983; Holmer 1984; Le ibowi tz 
1983; Long and Scott 1982, 1984; Sloan and Adamache 1986; Taylor and 
Wilensky 1983; Turner 1981; Vroman and Anderson 1984; and Woodbury 1983). 
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In particular, most of these studies pointed to increases in the marginal tax 
rale on earned income as the main explanation of employee benefit growth, 
and gave correspondingly short shrift to changing real incomes and the aging 
of the labour force. 
It seems, however, that these early studies of the demand for 
employee benefits had difficulty in separating the effect of increasing 
marginal tax rates from the effects of changes in real income. The reason for 
the difficulty, of course, is that incomes and marginal tax rates tend to change 
together over time; indeed, even in cross-section there is a close relation 
between the income and marginal tax rates faced by a household. This close 
relation poses problems for economelric estimation. 
Recently completed work (Woodbury 1987) suggests that changes in 
real income may be at least as important as changes in marginal tax rates in 
explaining the pattern of voluntary social welfare benefits. Like previous 
research, Woodbury (1983) finds that both pensions and health insurance are 
good substitutes for wages. But unlike previous research, this work finds that 
the income elasticities of demand for pensions and health insurance both 
significantly exceed one. It turns out that we can explain the slowing growth 
of voluntary social welfare costs if we accept (1) thai voluntary social welfare 
costs are driven primarily by workers' demands for pensions and health 
insurance, and (2) that higher incomes and higher marginal tax rates on 
earnings tend to increase the demand for compensation in non-wage forms. 
During the 1965-75 period, incomes and marginal tax rates were both rising 
rapidly in the USA, and these increases led to higher proportions of total 
compensation being received as pensions and health insurance. During the 
1975-80 period, marginal tax rates continued to rise significantly, but income 
growth was much more moderate. Hence, only one of the two factors 
favouring non-wage benefit growth existed, and as a result the growth of 
164 
non-wage benef i ts slowed. Final ly , during the 1980-85 per iod, marginal tax 
ra les were checked by the Reagan tax cuts, and income growth continued to 
be modest. The result has been minimal growth to no growth of voluntary 
social we l fa re cost. 
How can voluntary social wel fare costs in the USA be expected to 
change in the future? Recenl changes in the US tax laws promise to reduce 
marginal tax rates even fur ther , reducing s t i l l f u r the r the incent ive fo r 
workers to receive compensation in non-wage forms. Also, most exist ing 
forecasts suggest lhat income growth wi l l continue lo be modest in the USA. 
I t seems unl ike ly that voluntary social welfare costs w i l l increase great ly in 
the near f u tu re . 
Since i t seems unlikely that voluntary social we l fa re costs w i l l r ise 
fu r ther , i t may be fa i r to predict that any fur ther g rowth of NWLCs overal l 
w i l l have to occur as a result of increased s tatutory social wel fare costs. 
Whether s ta tu to ry social wel fare costs w i l l in fac t increase is extremely 
d i f f i cu l t to p red ic t . Nevertheless, in the absence of legis lat ive changes that 
mandate greater employer contr ibut ions to s ta tu to ry social wel fare 
programmes, i t seems unlikely that NWLCs in the USA w i l l continue to grow 
as a percentage of to ta l labour costs, as they have in the past. 
5.1.2 Fringe Benefi t Coverage and Income Dis t r ibut ion. 
As discussed in section 6.1.3 below, NWLCs vary great ly by industry, 
occupat ion, sex and race. Transportat ion, communicat ions, u t i l i t i es , 
manufactur ing, and mining have been histor ical ly h igh-benef i l industries, 
whereas services and trade have of fered re lat ive ly low benef i ts (see lable 6.6). 
The dist r ibut ion of employee benefits in several other dimensions has 
been considered by Smeeding (1983, especially tables 6.6 and 6.7). Regarding 
occupations, Smeeding finds that the high-benef i t occupations are as one 
112) 
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might expect: managers and administrators, professional and technical , c ra f t 
workers, and cer ta in operatives. Service, sales, and c le r i ca l occupations are, 
as one would also expect, the low-benef i t occupations. Regarding dif ferences 
by sex, Smeeding finds that , even among f u l l - t i m e and fu l l - year workers, 
women receive lower benefits and are less l ikely to be covered by benefi ts 
than are men. As for b lack-whi te d i f ferent ia ls, blacks are somewhat less 
l ike ly to be covered by health insurance and pension benef i ts (34.8 per cent for 
blacks, 38.2 per ceni for whites), and fr inge benef i ts make up a smal ler 
proport ion of black than of whi te workers' to ta l compensat ion. 
Smeeding (1983) also finds that , as a whole, voluntary employer 
contr ibut ions to pensions and to health and l i fe insurance tend to make the 
d is t r ibu l ion of income more unequal: high-wage workers receive a larger 
share of the i r to ta l compensation as deferred income and insurance than do 
low-wage workers . Smeeding's findings are supported by the findings of 
Taylor and Wilensky (1983) and Chollet (1984) on hea l th benef i ts, and of 
Ko t l i ko f f and Smith (1983) on pensions. But Smeeding also shows tha i i t is 
impor tant to decompose nonwage compensation into hea l th and l i fe insurance, 
on the one hand, and pensions and other deferred compensat ion, on the other. 
The reason is that health and l i fe insurance benef i ts are roughly 
propor t ionate ly distr ibuted, whereas deferred compensation is highly 
regressively d is t r ibuted. Specif ical ly, Smeeding's f indings indicate that 
insurance benef i ts increase f rom 3.7 per cent of compensation for low-wage 
workers to 6.2 per cent of compensation for a midd le-wage group, but then 
decl ine to 2.9 per cent for the highest-wage group. In contrast , deferred 
compensation is only 0.4 per ceni of the earnings of the lowest-wage group, 
but 7.2 per cent of the compensation of the highest-wage group. 
Legal ly required contr ibut ions, such as social secur i ty , unemployment 
insurance, and workers' compensation, d i f fe r markedly f rom voluntary 
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contr ibut ions in their e f fec t on income d is t r ibut ion. Legally required 
contr ibut ions lend to be distr ibuted progressively, and hence bring about 
greater equal i ty . 
In sum, voluntar i ly provided fr inge benefits, un l ike legal ly mandated 
contr ibut ions to social insurance, seem to have a disequalizing inf luence of 
income d is t r ibu t ion . This natural ly raises questions about the desirabi l i ty of 
exempting these benefits f rom federal payrol l and personal income taxes. 
(See Har t 1985 fo r a fur ther discussion of lax exempt ion that includes some 
European reference.) 
5.1.3 Egui ty of the Tax System and Revenue Losses Result ing f rom Fringe 
Benef i t Exemptions 
I f a larger proport ion of the tota l compensation of high-earnings 
workers is received as nonwage benef i ts, as appears lo be the case in the USA, 
then the exempt ion of those benefi ts f rom payroll and personal income taxes is 
c lear ly a regressive aspect of the US tax system. That is, exemption of 
nonwage benef i ts violates the ver t i ca l equity precept t ha t those w i th greater 
ab i l i ty to pay fo r government services should do so. This concern has been 
the subject of an extensive study by the Congressional Budget Off ice (1987), 
which advocates reducing the tax advantages now associated w i th pensions. 
I n addi t ion, exemption of nonwage benefits creates situations where 
hor izonta l inequit ies can - and undoubtedly do - arise. Consider two workers, 
each w i t h l o t a l compensation (wages plus contr ibut ions to health insurance, 
l i fe insurance, and pensions) of $20,000. Suppose also that they are both 
single and declare one exemption and the zero-bracke t amount. I f Mut t 
receives $17,000 in wages, whereas Jeff receives $18,500 in wages, then Jeff 
pays more taxes and faces a higher marginal tax ra te than Mut t . But this 
c lear ly v io lates the notion of hor izontal equity - tha t households equally 
s i tuated should be taxed equally. 
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The "pure solut ion" to this problem, as Munnell (1984) has cal led i t , is 
to include al l employer contr ibut ions for employee benef i ts in taxable gross 
income. (Increases in accrued pension contributions would also be included in 
gross income, since such increases const i tute an increase in an individual 's 
l i f e t ime income.) The pure solut ion is a t t ract ive in pr inc ip le because i t would 
mi t iga te inequi t ies in the tax system. I t is also a t t rac t i ve in the sense that i t 
would e i ther raise federal revenues or permit federal marginal income and 
payrol l tax ra les to be lowered. For example, Munnel l (1984, Table 2) 
estimates the revenue gain f rom such a comprehensive tax to be $64.3 
b i l l ion. The pract ica l d i f f i cu l t ies of implementing this pure solut ion are 
min ima l . Indeed, those problems that exist pale beside the po l i t i ca l 
opposit ion such a proposal would almost certainly meet . In view of the strong 
potent ia l opposit ion to taxing fr inge benefit contr ibut ions, some workable 
a l ternat ive must be sought. 
One a l ternat ive that has gained some in teres t , and that has been 
introduced in a var ie ty of guises in legislative proposals, is lo l i m i t the amount 
of the employer 's contr ibut ion to bolh pensions and heal th insurance tha i is 
excluded f rom the worker 's taxable gross income. There have been numerous 
discussions of such proposals (Adamache and Sloan 1985; Chol let 1984; 
Halper in 1984; Katz and Mankiw 1985; Korczyk 1984; Steuerle and Hof fman 
1979; Sul l ivan and Gibson 1983), and the 1986 Tax Re fo rm did t ighten l im i t s 
on cer ta in forms of re t i rement saving (Congressional Budget Of f ice 1987). 
But l im i t s on the tax advantages given to health insurance have not been 
imposed, al though such l imi ts have at t racted much a t ten t i on . I t is alleged 
that l im i t s would serve to stem what many observers believe to be an 
ine f f i c ien t and excessive use of the health care system. Hence, in addit ion to 
raising considerable revenues, some believe that a " t a x - c a p " on health benef i t 
contr ibut ions would help correct a distort ion of the pr ice system that has led 
to an in f la ted health care sector. 
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Mark Pauly (1986) has recent ly challenged those who advocate taxing 
health benef i t contr ibut ions, arguing that the e f f ic iency ef fects of removing 
the tax- favoured status of health insurance are ambiguous. The ambigui ty 
arises because the health care market is so imper fect . Even in the absence of 
tax-subsidies, the health care sector would never be per fec t l y compet i t i ve . 
Moreover, there are external i t ies associated w i th hea l th care provision, and 
the market fo r health insurance is plagued by adverse select ion. In such a 
case, the theory of second best te l ls us that removing a d is tor t ion may or may 
not be wel fare improving. 
There are two other potent ia l drawbacks to tax ing health insurance 
contr ibut ions. F i rs t , as already noted, insurance contr ibut ions alone among 
vo luntar i ly provided fringes are distr ibuted roughly proport ionate ly . Hence, 
taxing them would not serve to improve the ver t i ca l equity of the tax 
s t ructure - in fac t , calculations by Taylor and Wilensky (1983) and Chollet 
(1984) show tha t the ef fects of a tax ceil ing on heal th contr ibut ions would be 
fe l t disproport ionately by lower- income groups. Second, many employers 
have expressed concerns that taxing health insurance contr ibut ions would lead 
to increased to ta l labour costs (Chol let 1984). They bel ieve that (a) workers 
would demand higher wages to compensate for the taxes they would pay on 
health insurance; (b) workers w i t h low expected medical expenses would 
demand less insurance, leaving the employer to insure high risk workers at 
correspondingly high cost. The mer i ts of these arguments have not been 
examined c r i t i ca l l y or analyt ical ly. 
5.2 Pension Regulation 
The aging of the labour force in the USA has tr iggered a large 
l i te ra tu re on the economics of pensions. In addit ion to t reat ing the favoured 
tax t rea tment of pensions, much of this l i terature has concerned regulat ion of 
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pr ivate pensions by the Employee Ret i rement Income Security Ac t of 1974 
(ERISA). 
Ippo l i to (1986) has divided the l i te ra ture on pensions into two parts, an 
"o ld" and a "new' . The "o ld" l i te ra tu re views pensions as savings devices and 
turns on the important issue of whether (and how much) pensions a f f ec t 
savings and asset accumulat ion. Examples of this l i t e ra tu re include Munnell 
(1976) and, more recent ly , Pozo and Woodbury (1986). The most recent 
evidence, based on the 1986 Survey of Consumer Finances, suggests that 
increases in pr ivate pensions tend to induce both an ear l ier planned re t i rement 
and greater p re - re t i rement asset holdings (Pozo and Woodbury 1986). 
The "new" l i te ra tu re , as Ippol i to calls i t , v iews the pension as an 
ins t i tu t iona l innovat ion that is intended to a f fec t workers ' behaviour and 
u l t ima te ly the product iv i ty of the f i r m . The beginning of this l i te ra ture is 
Burkhauser's work (1979), which develops the not ion of "pension wea l th" , or 
the present value of the pension promise, and shows how pension weal th is the 
central var iable in an analysis of the ef fects of pensions on behaviour. 
Speci f ical ly , Burkhauser shows that pension weal th increases up to the age of 
"normal " re t i remen t , then declines. Subsequent work has shown that this 
var ia t ion of pension weal th around the age of re t i rement does induce workers 
to change the i r behaviour. Specif ical ly, the research suggests that workers 
who are covered by pensions (a) tend to re t i re around the normal re t i rement 
age - that is, before the level of pension weal th declines great ly (Burkhauser 
and Quinn 1983; Fields and Mi tchel l 1984) and (b) have much lower quit rates 
than workers who are not covered (Mi tchel l 1982; A l len , Clark, and McDermid 
1986). Together, these findings suggest that workers respond to the pension 
weal th p ro f i le and re t i re so as to maximize weal th - they re t i re neither too 
early nor too la te . 
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In e f f ec t , the new pension l i te ra ture offers evidence against the need 
for regulat ion of pr ivate pensions. I f pensions are essential ly contracts that 
result in gains in e f f ic iency, as Lazear (1981) among others has argued, then to 
regulate pensions is to constrain workers and employers in the contracts they 
can negot ia te , and u l t imate ly to reduce the ef f ic iency of the labour market . 
The new pension l i te ra ture tends to downplay three aspects of pensions that 
would argue in favour of regulat ion: 
(a) that pensions are long- te rm contracts, and hence a problem of 
imper fec t in format ion exists in the market for pensions; 
(b) that employers can terminate a pension plan un i la tera l ly and impose a 
large capi ta l loss on the worker; and 
(c) that the pension contract is usually imp l i c i t , and hence unenforceable 
in cour t . 
Any of these l a t t e r points would suggest that pension regula t ion might be an 
appropriate and important funct ion of government. 
In the USA, legislation regulat ing pensions was adopted in 1974 w i t h 
the passage of ERISA, and the legislat ion has been f requent ly amended. 
Despite concerns that ERISA would increase the cost of pension provision and 
thwar t and leg i t imate economic functions of pensions, l i t t l e work has been 
done to determine the actual e f fects of pension regu la t ion . The only clear 
e f fec t of ERISA has been that new pension plans tend to be def ined-
cont r ibut ion plans rather than def ined-benef i t plans (Wendung, Crabb-Velez, 
and Carlsen 1986). The value of a def ined-contr ibut ion plan is determined by 
the pecuniary contr ibut ions of the worker and the employer to an account that 
is earmarked fo r the worker. The value of a de f ined-benef i t plan typical ly is 
determined as a funct ion of a worker 's length of service, earnings at 
re t i rement , and age at re t i rement . Def ined-cont r ibut ion plans are essentially 
unregulated, whereas def ined-benef i t plans are subject to regulated standards 
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of vesting, reporting, participation, and funding. 
There has been no empirical demonstration that the efficiency gains 
from the provision of pensions are great. Only one study to date has 
examined the importance of the tax and income incentives to provide pensions 
versus the efficiency (sometimes called "agency") incentives (Mumy and 
Manson 1985). The conclusion of the study is that considerations of turnover 
and productivity - the "agency" incentives - are relatively minor explanatory 
of the provision of pensions. 
5.3 Statutory Programmes and Their Costs 
The funding crises that the Unemployment Insurance and Workers' 
Compensation programmes have experienced in the USA have made them the 
most prominent of the statutory welfare costs that have been researched. 
Recent research on these two programmes is briefly reviewed here. 
5.3.1 Unemployment Insurance 
During the 1980-1982 recession, the Unemployment Insurance Trust 
Funds of several states were exhausted as the incidence and duration of 
insured unemployment rose, and as increasingly generous benefits were paid 
(Vroman 1985). The state-by-state reforms that have followed on the heels 
of these s ta tes ' funding crises have driven up Unemployment Insurance payroll 
taxes and (it appears) have improved the so-called experience rating of the 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) system. Although the implications of these 
reforms for employment and the labour market are as yet little understood, at 
least empirically, employers have reacted strongly to increased UI costs, and 
some states that feel threatened with plant closings have reacted by 
sponsoring studies of interstate differentials in UI costs (Hunt 1986). 
Increased UI costs and the various possible distortions introduced by 
the UI system have become such a concern that considerable attention has 
been devoted to finding schemes of improving the system and reducing the 
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system's costs. These schemes are of several kinds. First, the wel l -
documented belief that UI increases the duration of insured unemployment has 
led to several experiments that attempt to induce workers to return to work 
more rapidly than they otherwise would. The experiments that have been 
completed to date suggest that paying cash bonuses to workers who return to 
work before one-third of their benefit eligibility period has elapsed may 
indeed reduce unemployment duration (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987). But 
paying cash bonuses to employers who hire UI beneficiaries appears to be a 
less promising route (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987). 
Second, there has been interest in testing and improving the 
effectiveness of the Job Service in its rôle of matching workers with jobs. 
Recent work by Johnson, Dickenson and West (1985) suggsts that the Job 
Service is more effective than informal job search only for women. A 
controlled experiment currently being conducted in the State of Washington 
should improve our understanding of which (if any) activities of the Job 
Service are effective in reducing the duration of Unemployment and improving 
subsequent earnings (Spiegelman and Woodbury 1987). 
Third, Kingston and Burgess (1987) have documented large 
overpayments of UI benefits to recipients. These overpayments stem largely 
from benefits that are paid to claimants who fail to meet the work search 
requirements of the UI system. Kingston and Burgess have considered two 
possible remedies to this problem. One is to make el igibi l i ty for UI benefits 
contingent on a more substantial work history than is currently required. This 
would eliminate many workers who are currently eligible for benefits but who 
are unlikely to search for work, and thereby eliminate the need for a 
work-search requirement. The other is to implement "statistical screening" 
of UI recipients, which would entail auditing UI recipients who, based on their 
characteristics, are most likely to abuse the system. Since under statistical 
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screening, claimants who are less likely to search for work would be more 
likely to be audited, administrative resources would be more effectively 
directed. 
To the alarm of some, not all the contemplated changes in the UI 
system would reduce the uses of, and the burden on, the UI Trust Fund. For 
example, Short-Time Compensation (or Worksharing UI) would allow the 
payment of benefits to workers whose hours are reduced, rather than require 
that a worker be separated from employment in order to receive UI. In 
Europe, the FRG has a well established UI system of this type. Of course, the 
intent of short-Time Compensation is to encourage employers to implement 
work-sharing arrangements when demand is slack, rather than to lay off 
workers, so the question whether Short-Time Compensation would in fact 
place an added strain on the UI system is open (Morand 1987; Spiegelman and 
Woodbury 1987). 
5.3.2 Workers' compensation 
The US Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 established the 
National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, which issued its 
final report in July 1972. Of the 19 "essential recommendations" included in 
the Commission's report, nine pertained to Workers' Compensation benefit 
levels. The Commission's recommendations triggered a wave of post-1972 
reforms, and the US Department of Labor (1981) has found that the states 
have made much progress in complying with the recommendation, in particular 
with the benefit recommendations. It is clear that compliance with the 
benefit recommendations has led to enhanced generosity of benefits: 
Berkowitz and Burton (1987) have recently noted that in 1972, only six of the 
51 states (including the District of Columbia) had maximum weekly benefits 
that were at least two-thirds of the state's average weekly wage, whereas in 
1986, 31 of the 51 had maximums that were 100 per cent of state average 
weekly wage, and only nine had maximums below two-thirds. 
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Improvements in the benefits (and also the coverage) of Workers' 
Compensation have led to a surve in the programme's costs. Between 1972 
and 1984, the cost of insurance premiums and administrative expenses of the 
programme incrased from 1.14 to 1.66 per cent of payroll (Berkowitz and 
Burton 1987). 
A major concern is that increased benefit levels may reduce the 
incentive for workes to act in a way that is consistent wi th safety on the job. 
That is, enhanced benefits could lead to higher costs both directly (because 
higher benefits are paid), and indirectly because they induce more job related 
accidents. Chelius (1977) and Butler and Worrall (1983) have marshalled 
empirical evidence to show that increased Workers' compensation benefits are 
related to higher industrial accident rates, supporting the notion that workers 
do change their behaviour depending on incentives - if i t is less costly to 
suffer an accident, workers wil l do less to prevent an accident. 
The response to the rising costs of the Workers' Compensation 
programme in the wake of the post-1972 reforms has been a second wage of 
reforms that have been taking place in the 1980s. The approach to reform has 
differed greatly from state to state, and the mechanisms adopted to reduce 
Workers' Compensation costs have been wide-ranging, as a reading of the 
papers in the Chelius volume (1986) or the discussion in Berkowitz and Burton 
(1987) suggest. Direct approaches include changing the benefit schedule, the 
maximum benefit or the minimum benefit. More indirect approaches include 
coordinating benefits with other sources of disability benefits, tightening the 
definitions of the injuries and disabilities that qualify a worker for benefits, 
imposing medical cost regulations, and allowing greater competition in the 
setting of Workers' Compensation insurance rates. 
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Chapter 6 Industrial Characteristics 
In this chapter, we discuss the broad range of NWLC statistics at a 
more disaggregated industrial level. General industrial characteristics are 
discussed in section 6.1 while special attention is given, in section 6.2, to firm 
size, a topic of increasing interest in the wage compensation literature. 
6.1 General Industrial Characteristics 
6.1.1 Federal Republic of Germany and Japan 
In this section, we highlight industrial cross-sectional differences in 
labour fixity as well as comparable data on overtime working and employee 
skill. These latter two variables would be expected a priori to be positively 
related to the degree of fixity. The work is based on FRG and Japanese data 
with a comparable UK analysis provided in Hart (1984a). 
Table 6.1 presents two estimates of ratios of fixed-to-variable labour 
costs, Ratios I and Π, for 34 FRG manufacturing industries in 1984. The 
Ratios are based on the calculations in Hart (1984a). Recall that Ratio I is 
the narrow definition of fixity while Ratio Π includes the cost category, 
'payments for days not worked', as a fixed cost. With some exceptional cases, 
industries with high Ratio values - like mineral oil refining, iron and steel, 
chemicals and aerospace are industries that would be expected to have 
relatively skilled workforces. Unfortunately, our proxy for skill in Table 6.1 
(last column) - the ratio of non-manual to total employees - is both rather 
crude and available for only a limited number of the industries. 
Also we would expect, following the discussion through chapter 3, that 
relatively high fixed-cost industries would employ relatively high average 
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Table 6.1 
Fixed/variable cost ratios, overtime and skil l ratios, German Manufacturing industries 1984. 
NACE Industry 
D D 
Fix/var Fix/var 
Ratio I R a t i o n 
Weekly 
overtime 
hours per 
worker 2) 
Ratio of 
non-manu; 
to total 
workers 
14 Mineral Oil Refining 0.23 0.31 0.7 
22 Production and preliminary processing of metals 0.18 0.27 (2.2) 
221 Iron and steel 0.23 0.33 2.1 
224 Prod, a prel iminary proc. of non-ferrous metals 0.11 0.20 2.3 
24 Manufacture of non-metall ic mineral products 0.09 0.17 3.7 
247 Manufacture of glass and glassware 0.10 0.19 2.0 
248 Manufacture of ceramic goods 0.10 0.18 1.6 
25 Chemicals 0.16 0.24 1.1 
31 Manufacture of metal articles 0.08 0.16 (2.1) 
311 Foundries 0.08 0.17 (2.2) 
314 Manufacture of structural metal products 0.14 0.22 (2.3) 
316 Manufacture of tools and finished metal goods 0.04 0.12 (1.2) 
32 Mechanical engineering 0.13 0.21 1.4 
35 Manufacture of motor vehicles 0.11 0.21 1.9 
36 Manufacture of other means of transport 0.13 0.22 (1.9) 
361 Shipbuilding 0.13 0.23 3.8 
364 Aerospace equipment manufacturing and repairing 0.15 0.24 1.0 
37 Instrument engineering 0.09 0.16 1.2 
41/42 Food, drink and tobacco industry 0.09 0.17 4.1 
429 Manufacture of tobacco products 0.24 0.33 0.7 
43 Textiles 0.06 0.13 2.6 
44 Leather and leather goods 0.05 0.12 (3.6) 
45 Footwear and clothing 0.05 0.13 1.3 
46 Timber and wooden furniture 0.07 0.14 (1.8) 
47 Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.07 0.14 (2.5) 
471 Manufacture of pulp, paper and board 0.10 0.18 3.0 
472 Processing of paper and board 0.07 0.14 2.3 
473 Printing and all ied industries 0.06 0.13 2.2 
48 Processing of rubber and plastics 0.07 0.15 1.7 
481 Manufacture of rubber products 0.07 0.16 1.7 
483 Processing of plastics 0.06 0.14 2.1 
49 Other manufacturing industries 0.05 0.13 
Total manufacturing 0.10 0.19 (2.0) 
0.25 
0.25 
0.49 
0.26 
0.40 
0.24 
0.34 
0.33 
0.24 
0.20 
0.21 
0.53 
Sources: Labour-cosl-calculations: Statisches Bundesamt FS 16 "Arbeitskoslenerhebung 1984' 
overt ime-f igures: Statisches Bundesamt, FS 16, Reihe 2.1 
1) Ratios I and Π are calculated, respectively, w i th and without the cost i tem "payments f 
days not worked: 
2) The survey, which provides the overtime-figures, uses the German "Wirtschaftszwei. 
Systemalik". This is totally different from the "Nace-classif ication" used in case of tl 
Labour-cost Surveys. For this reason the overt ime-f igures - broken down by industry 
are only approximate values. Figures given in brackets are very problematic. 
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overtime working per period. As with the skill ratios, FRG overlime data are 
particularly diff icult to obtain on a consistent basis to the EC NACE 
classification, and, in particular, the bracketed overtime figures in Table 6.1 
are rather tentative. We have stopped short of testing the associations of the 
two Ratios and the skill/overtime variables because of the poor quality of the 
latter variables but casual observation suggests that these are not strong. 
In the case of Japan, we are able to overcome the data deficiencies 
wi th respect to overtime and the skill proxy thereby enabling us to go 
somewhat further with the analysis along the lines of Hart (1984a) for similar 
UK industries. 
Table 6.2 contains estimates of the fixed/variable cost ratios for 20 
manufacturing industries in 1984. The constructions of the three different 
Japanese ratios are discussed in section 2.2. In line wi th FRG and UK, capital 
intensive industries like chemicals and petroleum display the highest ratios 
with the more labour intensive industries like clothing and timber at the other 
end of the rankings. 
One feature of the fixed/variable ratios is unique to Japan, however. 
While, as in FRG and UK, the rank­orders of Ratios I and Π are very similar, a 
number of industries change their rank­orders quite significantly under the 
cost allocation included in Ratio m . This is especially the case with textiles, 
paper, ceramics, transport machinery and precision machinery, and i t is due to 
the influence of bonuses. (Recall, bonuses are included as fixed costs in Ratio 
ΙΠ.) These outcomes once again underline the necessity of understanding the 
rôle played by bonus payments within total labour compensation in Japan. 
With somewhat more precision than the FRG statistics shown in Figure 
6.1, information on per­period overtime hours and the ratio of non­manual to 
total workers by industry is given in Table 6.2 as well as their respective rank 
orderings. From the Spearman's rank coefficients, i t is evident that the rank 
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Table 6.2 
Industry 
Food 
Text i les 
Apparel 
Timber 
Furni ture 
Paper 
Pr int ing 
Chemicals 
Petroleum 
Rubber 
Leathe 
Ceramics 
Steel 
Non­ferrous 
metals 
Metal produc 
Machinery 
Elect r ica l 
machinery 
Transport 
machinery 
Precision 
machinery 
Others 
■ 
Fixed/Variable Cost R¡ 
Rat io 
I 
0.13 
0.14 
0.10 
0.10 
0.09 
0.14 
0.17 
0.21 
0.25 
0.16 
0.12 
0.13 
0.18 
0.15 
ts 0.12 
0.13 
0.15 
0.13 
0.14 
0.13 
Jc 
Rank 
(1) 
11 
10 
18 
19 
20 
8 
4 
2 
1 
5 
17 
12 
3 
6 
16 
13 
7 
14 
9 
15 
ipanese 
Ratio 
Π 
0.16 
0.16 
0.12 
0.12 
0.11 
0.17 
0.19 
0.25 
0.29 
0.18 
0.14 
0.16 
0.21 
0.18 
0.14 
0.15 
0.17 
0.16 
0.17 
0.15 
Spearman's rank R. . = 0.36 R. 
Manul 
Rank 
(2) 
12 
10 
18 
19 
20 
7 
4 
2 
1 
5 
17 
11 
3 
6 
16 
14 
8 
13 
9 
15 
atios, O' i/ertime and Skill Ratios 
'acturing Industr ies, 1984 
Ratio 1 
m 
0.44 
0.39 
0.30 
0.28 
0.30 
0.45 
0.52 
0.68 
0.73 
0.47 
0.33 
0.39 
0.51 
0.46 
0.37 
0.43 
0.49 
0.45 
0.49 
0.41 
5 = 0 . 6 2 R ^ 
Rank 
(3) 
12 
15 
18 
20 
19 
10 
3 
2 
1 
7 
17 
14 
4 
8 
16 
11 
6 
9 
5 
13 
Month ly 
Over t ime 
Hours per 
Worker 
13 
12 
6 
11 
12 
16 
20 
12 
15 
18 
7 
15 
17 
24 
21 
23 
22 
27 
16 
17 
= 0.35 R52j5 = 
Rank 
(4) 
14 
15 
20 
18 
15 
10 
6 
15 
12 
7 
19 
12 
8 
2 
5 
3 
4 
1 
10 
8 
0.61 
'· 
Rat io 
of N o n ­
Manual 
to Tota l 
Workers 
0.28 
0.21 
0.20 
0.22 
0.25 
0.31 
0.47 
0.54 
0.48 
0.28 
0.21 
0.28 
0.27 
0.34 
0.30 
0.45 
0.40 
0.32 
0.37 
0.32 
Rank 
(5) 
14 
18 
20 
17 
16 
10 
3 
1 
2 
13 
19 
12 
15 
'7 
11 
4 
5 
8 
6 
9 
coefficients (R ) 
R 3 , 4 = 0 · 4 8 R S 3 . 5 = 0 · 7 8 
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correlations between the fixity ratios and overtime are weaker than earlier 
obtained for the UK (Hart, 1976). Noticeably, the correlation is strongest 
with respect to Ratio ΓΠ (0.48) than Ratios I and Π (0.36 and 0.35, 
respectively). The correlations are stronger between each of the three 
ratios and the skill proxy, although again below the comparable results for 
the UK. Again, with respect to these latter results, Ratio HI (0.78) 
outperforms the other two Ratios (0.62 and 0.61). Figures 6.1 and 6.2 depict 
the Ratio m relationships with respect to overtime and skill, respectively. 
6.1.2 United Kingdom 
The main information for the UK industrial breakdowns can be found 
in Table 2.10 which presents data for 1984 and Table 2.11 which gives the 
same data for 1981 using the 1968 SIC. These tables cover manufacturing 
sectors while Table 6.3 gives 1984 figures for other sectors. Annual hours of 
work by industry for 1981 and 1984 are listed in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 
respectively. 
It is immediately apparent from Table 6.3 that there are quite 
marked differences between industries in payments for days not worked, 
voluntary' social welfare, subsidised services, etc. Some of these differences 
are readily explained by the nature of working conditions in the industry: the 
mining industry (extraction of ores) pays higher liability insurance than any 
other sector because of the dangerous nature of the work involved. 
113) 
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Table 6.3 
Labour Costs by Sector in 1984 
Energy 
exc l . coal 
Water Supply 
Manufactur ing 
Construct ion 
Dis t r ibut ion 
Banking 
Finance 
Insurance 
Tota l Finance 
(1) 
14167.15 
11435.22 
9294.86 
9198.62 
6747.67 
11928.88 
10000.08 
12175.11 
11706.93 
(2) 
77.3 
80.4 
84.0 
86.0 
87.5 
72.2 
75.5 
74.0 
73.1 
(3) 
5.4 
6.0 
7.4 
7.7 
7.5 
5.1 
5.9 
5.5 
5.3 
(4) 
1.6 
3.8 
1.3 
5.7 
0.4 
0.4 
0.8 
0.5 
0.5 
(5) 
0.2 
0.1 
0.3 
0.4 
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
(6) 
12.8 
7.9 
5.3 
4.1 
7.2 
15.1 
10.3 
12.6 
13.8 
(?) 
0.1 
0.0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
0.3 
0.3 
0.7 
0.4 
(8) 
1.9 
1.1 
1.2 
0.6 
1.2 
6.3 
6.4 
6.1 
6.3 
(9) 
0.9 
0.6 
0.3 
0.4 
0.2 
0.6 
0.7 
0.6 
0.6 
(10) 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Column headings: column 1 gives Annual Labour Cost in Pounds; Columns 2-10 
give percentage breakdown of this figure by category of labour cost 
Source: Department of Employment 
(1) Annual Labour Cost per Employee (Pounds) 
(2) Wages and Salaries (%) 
(3) National Insurance (%) 
(4) Redundancy Provision (%) 
(5) Liability Insurance (%) 
(6) Voluntary Social Welfare Payments (%) 
(7) Benefits in Kind (%) 
(8) Subsidised Services (%) 
(9) Training (excluding wages) (%) 
(10) Government Contributions (%) 
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Table 6.4 
Annual Hours of Work 1984 
Energy and Water Supply 
A l l Manufactur ing 
Other Mineral Ore Ext rac t ion 
Meta l Manufacture 
Non Meta l l i c Mineral Products 
Chemicals 
Man-made Fibres 
Metal Goods, Engineering 
Metal Goods nes 
Mechanical Engineering 
Of f i ce Machinery 
E lec t r ica l & Electronics 
Motor Vehicles & Parts 
Other Transport 
Inst rument Engineering 
Other Manufacturing 
Food, Drink & Tobacco 
Text i les 
Leather 
Footwear & Clothing 
Timber & Wooden Furni ture 
Paper, Pr int ing & Publishing 
Rubber & Plastics 
Other Manufacturing 
Construct ion 
Wholesale Distr ibut ion 
Reta i l Distr ibut ion 
Total Distr ibut ion 
Banking 
Finance 
Insurance 
(1) 
1692 
1823 
1867 
1814 
1938 
1817 
1917 
1819 
1850 
1851 
1794 
1800 
1769 
1811 
1779 
1812 
1813 
1805 
1773 
1716 
1915 
1812 
1836 
1880 
1934 
1811 
1489 
1595 
1587 
1631 
1627 
(2) 
1721 
1875 
1897 
1832 
1970 
1854 
1926 
1858 
1894 
1871 
1806 
1841 
1786 
1822 
1849 
1953 
1952 
1878 
1845 
1783 
1963 
1884 
1894 
1946 
1958 
1923 
1821 
1858 
1641 
1746 
1679 
Column Headings: figures are average number of hours worked per year for 
both manual and non-manual employees 
Source: Department of Employment 
(1) A l l Employees 
(2) Pa r t -T ime Employees converted to Fu l l -T ime Eguivalents 
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Table 6.5 
Annual Hours of Work 1973-1981 
A l l Manufactur ing 
Food, Drink & Tobacco 
Coal 8c Petroleum 
Chemicals & Al l ied 
Meta l Manufacture 
Mechanical Engineering 
Inst rument Engineering 
E lec t r ica l Engineering 
Shipbuilding & Marine 
Vehicles 
Meta l Goods nes 
Text i les 
Leather & Fur 
Cloth ing & Footwear 
Br icks, Pot tery , Glass 
T imber & Furni ture 
Paper, Pr int ing & Publishing 
Other Manufactur ing 
Mining & Quarrying 
Construct ion 
Gas, E lec t r i c i t y 8c Water 
A l l Index of Product ion Industries 
1973 
1872 
1857 
1891 
1889 
1854 
1915 
1772 
1885 
1915 
1889 
1878 
1844 
1844 
1700 
1970 
1954 
1914 
1861 
1467 
2176 
1888 
1878 
1975 
1814 
1829 
1848 
1831 
1836 
1882 
1823 
1766 
1815 
1818 
1810 
1730 
1826 
1606 
1952 
1901 
1814 
1812 
1632 
2074 
1832 
1840 
1978 
1844 
1852 
1876 
1870 
1884 
1894 
1833 
1800 
1931 
1814 
1828 
1794 
1794 
1698 
1932 
1943 
1857 
1813 
1665 
2053 
1847 
1863 
1981 
1811 
1823 
1878 
1853 
1837 
1829 
1807 
1801 
1913 
1772 
1803 
1782 
1782 
1695 
1888 
1846 
1794 
1817 
1667 
1972 
1769 
1825 
Notes: 
Source: 
Figures are average number of hours worked per year for 
both manual and non-manual employees: no conversion of 
pa r t - t ime employees: 1968 SIC used. 
Department of Employment. 
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Other differences are not so readily explained. In manufacturing as a 
whole other costs added an average of 36.5 per cent to wages and salaries for 
hours worked in 1984. Within the manufacturing sector, chemicals and other 
transport paid out considerably larger proportions at 44.7 per cent and 40 per 
cent respectively. Some paid considerably less: textiles at 29.2 per cent, 
leather at 27.5 per cent, footwear and clothing at 28.9 per cent and timber and 
furniture at 28.4 per cent all paid out considerably less. Outside of 
manufacturing (see Table 6.3) there is considerable variation in the share of 
NWLCs as a proportion of total labour costs. Distribution and construction 
have a low share of NWLCs: interestingly these are both low wage 
industries. In contrast, the financial sector has a very high share of NWLCs 
with much larger expenditure on voluntary social welfare and subsidised 
services than other sectors. Yet wages are not particularly high in banking, 
finance or insurance: their average wage is less than that paid in 
manufacturing while NWLCs account for 26.9 per cent of total labour costs 
against 16 per cent in manufacturing. Nevertheless Figure 6.3 which plots 
NWLC Ratios against hourly earnings in pence for various index of production 
industries in 1981 shows that there is a fairly strong positive association 
between the NWLC ratio and hourly earnings. 
The question of whether the 1984 statistics reflect similar 
inter-industry disparities as were observed in previous surveys is complicated 
by the change in the industrial classification. Nevertheless a comparison of 
Tables 2.10 and 2.11 indicates that the 1984 results would have been 
predictable from the 1981 data. Chemicals and vehicles are well above the 
average share of NWLCs (38.5 per cent) for manufacturing as a whole while 
leather, textiles, clothing and timber &c furniture are well below. The 
construction industry has a low ratio of NWLCs while the utilities and mining 
have high ratios, just as in 1984. 
Fißure 6 .3 : 
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Taking this backward comparison fur ther , Figures 6.4 and 6.5 plot 
NWLC rat ios and hourly earnings, respect ively, in 1975 and 1981 for manual 
workers in a var ie ty of index of production industr ies. The positive 
association fo r both variables indicates a degree of s tab i l i ty in their 
industr ial rankings. Thus, just as some industries seem consistently to pay 
wages above average so do some industries consistent ly incur above average 
nonwage costs. Fur ther , the evidence of the posit ive association between 
high earnings and high NWLC rat ios in Figure 6.3 seems to suggest that those 
industries paying high wages are also the industries incur r ing high nonwage 
costs. 
I f the labour market were compet i t ive and workers had s imi lar 
preferences and capabi l i t ies, then inter industry mob i l i t y would el iminate 
wage d i f fe ren t ia ls . I f one allows for the possibi l i ty that individuals are 
heterogenous, then wage di f ferent ia ls might be explained by differences in 
the slock of 'human cap i ta l ' w i th which each indiv idual is endowed. Any 
remaining d i f ferent ia ls might be at t r ibutable to f r inge benefits and/or 
work ing condit ions. I t is extremely d i f f i cu l t to cont ro l for nonpecuniary 
benef i ts such as working conditions: nevertheless, the labour costs data 
presented here do give some indicat ion of the ex tent of fr inge benefit 
payments. And the evidence reviewed above tends to suggest that workers 
in high wage industries receive a higher level of f r inge benefits than do 
workers in low wage industries. Further, these workers have been able to 
mainta in the i r advantageous posit ion both w i t h respect to earnings and fr inge 
benef i ts through t ime. Thus fr inge benefi ts are addi t ive to earnings 
d i f fe rent ia ls ra ther than compensating for them. This conf i rms the findings 
of Freeman (1981) and Krueger and Summers (1986). 
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Since the evidence does not appear to be consonant with the 
competitive labour market paradigm, a number of noncompetitive 
alternatives have been suggested. If some industries are consistently more 
profitable than others, then workers are likely to develop some structure 
which will give them some access to the rent which their firm is earning. 
This is consonant with the view of Freeman and Medoff (1979) that the 
process of forming a union is endogenous and is determined by firm or 
industry characteristics. Thus wage differentials are essentially the 
end-result of differences in industry characteristics, whatever form of 
collective voice workers use to express their preferences. Another 
explanation of interindustry differentials is contained in the 'shirking' model 
where firms pay a wage above that reguired for market clearing thus creating 
involuntary unemployment in order to prevent workers from 'shirking'. 
Different industries will pay different wages because the incentive reguired 
to induce nonshirking behaviour will differ amongst workers as will the cost 
of monitoring shirking. Yet another view is that because some workers in an 
industry reguire to be paid a high wage (e.g. because they are in short supply), 
other workers in the industry will also require to be relatively well paid in 
order to maintain their morale and thus their productivity. 
To summarise this section it is certainly the case that industries 
differ substantially in the proportion of their total labour costs which are 
spent on nonwage items. It appears the ranking of industries by the ratio of 
NWLCs to total labour costs is not random: rather this ranking has remained 
fairly stable through time, further those industries which pay high wages are 
also likely to pay out a higher than expected amount in nonwage benefits, 
implying that these add to the differences resulting from the inequality of 
earnings rather than compensating for them. Various theories have been put 
forward to explain interindustry earnings differences. Some are consistent 
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w i t h the behaviour observed in the Labour Costs Survey but d iscr iminat ion 
between them is beyond the scope of the present study. 
6.1.3 Uni ted States 
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 show NWLCs as a proport ion of to ta l labour costs 
in f ive years disaggregated by industry. Table 6.6's industry disaggregations 
are based on the National Income and Product Accounts. Each proport ion 
shown is s imply the sum of employer contr ibut ions to social insurance and 
other labour income, divided by Compensation. Table 6.7's proportions are 
based on the Chamber of commerce data, and are computed by transforming 
"a l l employee benefi ts as a percent of payro l l " i n to all benefits as a 
proport ion of to ta l labour costs, (p = 1/(1 + [ l / ( x /100 ) ] ] , where ρ is NWLCs as 
a proport ion of to ta l labour costs, and χ is al l employee benefits as a 
percentage of payrol l .) 
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 both indicate strong in ter indust ry var iat ion in the 
incidence of NWLCs. Moreover, the pat tern of in ter indust ry var ia t ion 
changed over the 20 year period in question. Table 6.6 shows that in 1966, 
communicat ions and u t i l i t ies had the largest propor t ion NWLCs (13 to 15.5 
per cent) , whereas agr icul ture, services, the trade sector , and construct ion 
had the lowest (6 to 8 per cent). By 1985, this pa t te rn had changed 
somewhat; construct ion experienced an explosion of NWLCs and had a 
proport ion of NWLCs simi lar to manufactur ing. Also, NWLCs in f inance, 
insurance, and real estate had lost ground in re la t i ve terms, so that the 
f inancial sector had NWLCs at roughly the economy-wide average. 
A comparison of Table 6.6 w i th Table 2.13 (and s imi lar ly a 
comparison of Table 6.7 w i t h Table 2.14) suggests that the growth of f ixed 
NWLCs, both in aggregate and by industry, has been s im i la r to that of NWLCs 
general ly. For example, Tables 6.6 and 2.13 reveal that NWLCs as a 
proport ion of to ta l labour cost and the f ixed/var iable labour cost rat io both 
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grew by 66 per cent between 1966 and 1985. Also, the growth of NWLCs in 
an industry is mirrored in the growth of the fixed/variable labour cost ratio in 
the same industry with only two notable exceptions. The exceptions are 
construction, where NWLCs grew by 118 per cent while the fixed/variable 
labour cost ratio grew by 179 per cent, and wholesale trade, where NWLCs 
grew by 78 per cent while the fixed/variable labour cost ratio grew by 105 
per cent. 
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 attempt to show the relationships between fixed 
labour costs on the one hand, and skill levels and overtime hours on the 
other. Table 6.8 repeats the 1985 data on fixed/variable cost ratios from 
Table 2.13, and adds data on skill levels by industry. The variable used to 
proxy skill level is real capital consumption allowance per full-time 
equivalent worker. This variable has been used frequently to approximate 
firm-specific human capital, for the reason that it measures real capital use 
per worker, which in turn is believed to be related to the amount of 
firm-specific skills possessed by workers (Long and Scott, 1982). The 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the fixed/variable cost ratio 
and the skill proxy is 0.88, suggesting that industries that use highly skilled 
labour also face (or voluntarily take on) relatively high fixed labour costs. 
Table 6.9 repeats the 1985 data on fixed/variable cost ratios in 
manufacturing industries from Table 2.14, and adds data on overtime hours by 
industry. The overtime data derive from US Department of Labor statistics, 
as described in the notes to Table 6.9. The Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient between the fixed/variable cost ratio and average overtime hours 
is lower in this instance, 0.59. Nevertheless, there is still the suggestion 
that industries facing high fixed labour costs tend to make greater use of 
overtime, rather than add workers to their payrolls. In that the relationship 
betwen fixed labour costs and skill appears stronger than that between fixed 
labour costs and overtime hours, the figures accord with Hart's findings for 
UK manufacturing (Hart. 1984, Table 2.9). 
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Table 6.6 
Non-Wage Labour Costs as a Proportion of Total Labour Costs 
by Industry, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, and 1985: 
U.S. Nat ional Income and Product Accounts Data 
Industry 1966 1971 1976 1981 1985 
All private domestic 0.0961 0.1113 0.1444 0.1563 0.1600 
Agriculture 0.0602 0.0744 0.1027 0.1338 0.1321 
Mining 0.1229 0.1345 0.1618 0.1674 0.1713 
Construct ion 0.0817 0.0907 0.1364 0.1590 0.1787 
Manufacturing: 
Durable 
Nondurable 
Transportation 
Communications 
Utilities 
Trade: 
Wholesale 
Retail 
Finance and insurance 
Services 
0.1150 
0.1092 
0.1016 
0.1566 
0.1320 
0.0763 
0.0755 
0.1100 
0.0639 
0.1391 
0.1222 
0.1170 
0.2064 
0.1500 
0.0924 
0.0872 
0.1240 
0.0775 
0.1768 
0.1577 
0.1644 
0.2176 
0.2100 
0.1176 
0.1107 
0.1647 
0.1051 
0.1890 
0.1822 
0.1654 
0.2214 
0.1998 
0.1280 
0.1231 
0.1593 
0.1205 
0.1887 
0.1830 
0.1862 
0.2227 
0.2034 
0.13359 
0.1337 
0.1587 
0.1275 
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Table 6.7 
Non-Wage Labour Costs as a Proport ion of Tota l Labour Costs 
by Industry, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, and 1985: 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Data 
Industry 1966 1971 1976 19B1 1985 
Al l 
Manufactur ing 
Food, tobacco 
Text i les, apparel 
Wood products 
Pr int ing and publishing 
Chemicals 
Petro leum 
Rubber and plastics 
Stone, glass 
Metals: 
Pr imary 
Fabr icated 
Machinery: 
E lec t r i ca l 
Other 
Transportat ion Equip. 
Inst ruments, other 
N on-manufactur ing 
U t i l i t i es 
Trade: 
Depar tment stores 
Other 
Finance 
Insurance 
Hospitals 
Other 
0.198 
0.191 
0.214 
0.159 
0.169 
0.174 
0.215 
0.219 
0.201 
0.188 
0.200 
0.186 
0.192 
0.194 
0.188 
0.192 
0.212 
0.212 
0.188 
0.194 
0.243 
0.213 
-
_ 
0.235 
0.234 
0.249 
0.191 
0.221 
0.215 
0.255 
0.263 
0.233 
0.238 
0.258 
0.223 
0.228 
0.231 
0.259 
0.237 
0.237 
0.245 
0.195 
0.197 
0.263 
0.241 
-
-
0.268 
0.272 
0.268 
0.225 
0.254 
0.259 
0.302 
0.290 
0.275 
0.267 
0.302 
0.274 
0.268 
0.273 
0.281 
Q.254 
0.264 
0.284 
0.242 
0.235 
0.285 
0.211 
0.204 
0.252 
0.272 
0.276 
0.273 
0.237 
0.266 
0.269 
0.303 
0.308 
0.271 
0.275 
0.302 
0.275 
0.273 
0.278 
0.280 
0.280 
0.266 
0.295 
0.234 
0.234 
0.278 
0.278 
0.237 
0.248 
0.274 
0.284 
0.284 
0.244 
0.261 
0.255 
0.301 
0.281 
0.286 
0.254 
0.332 
0.296 
0.281 
0.286 
0.293 
0.293 
0.266 
0.292 
0.235 
0.240 
0.257 
0.273 
0.256 
0.253 
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Table 6.8 
Fixed/Variable Labour Cost Ratios and Skill Levels in the US 
by Industry 1985 
US National Income and Product Accounts Data 
Fixed/ 
Variable 
Industry Cost Ratio Rank 
All private domestic 0.1061 
Agriculture 0.0590 12 
Mining 0.1231 5 
Construction 0.1146 7 
Manufacturing: 
Durable " 0.1397 3 
Nondurable 0.1317 4 
Transportation 0.1097 8 
Communications 0.2009 1 
Utilities ' 0.1712 2 
Trade: 
Wholesale 0.0830 9 
Retail 0.0719 11 
Finance and insurance 0.1211 6 
Services 0.0749 10 
Notes: The skill proxy is constructed from National Income Product 
Accounts data by dividing real capital consumption allowance by 
full-time equivalent employment. The Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient between the fixed/variable cost ratio and the skill proxy 
is 0.88. 
Ski l l 
Proxy 
3.82 
2.57 
12.09 
1.63 
5.84 
8.58 
5.82 
21.05 
23.01 
2.63 
1.43 
3.74 
1.19 
Rank 
-
9 
3 
10 
5 
4 
6 
2 
1 
8 
11 
7 
12 
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Table 6.9 
Fixed/Var iable Labour Cost Ratios and Over t ime Hours in US 
Manufactur ing Industries, by Industry 1985 
US Chamber of Commerce Data 
Industry 
F ixed/ 
Variable 
Cost Ratio Rank 
Average 
Over t ime 
Hours Rank 
A l l manufactur ing 
Food, tobacco 
Textiles, apparel 
Wood products 
Pr int ing and publishing 
Chemicals 
Petroleum 
Rubber and plastics 
Stone, glass 
Metals: 
Primary 
Fabricated 
Machinery: 
Electrical 
Other 
Transportat ion Equip. 
Instruments, other 
0.310 
0.304 
0.244 
0.253 
0.270 
0.352 
0.305 
0.298 
0.257 
0.387 
0.329 
0.312 
0.315 
0.333 
0.265 
8 
14 
13 
10 
2 
7 
9 
12 
6 
5 
3 
11 
3.3 
3.7 
2.0 
3.5 
2.7 
3.4 
4.2 
3.1 
4.8 
3.8 
3.5 
2.7 
3.4 
4.8 
2.4 
5 
14 
6.5 
11.5 
8.5 
3 
10 
1.5 
4 
6.5 
11.5 
8.5 
1.5 
13 
Notes: Over t ime hours are f rom US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Stat is t ics , Employment and Earnings 33 (March 1986). Overt ime 
hours for several of the industry groupings repor ted in the Chamber of 
Commerce data needed to be constructed as a weighted average of 
two or more industries reported in Employment and Earnings. (Food, 
tobacco is an average of Food and kindred products and tobacco 
manufactures; Text i les, apparel is an average of Text i le products and 
Apparel and other tex t i le products; Wood products is an average of 
Lumber and wood products, Furniture and f i x tu res , and Paper and 
al l ied products; Rubber and plastics is an average of rubber and 
miscellaneous plastics products and Leather and leather products; and 
Instruments, other is an average of Instruments and related products 
and Miscellaneous manufacturing.) The Spearman rank correlat ion 
coef f i c ien t between the f ixed/var iable cost ra t io and average 
over t ime hours is 0.59. 
( 1 4 ) 
196 
6.2 NWLCs and F i rm Size 
There is a considerable amount of internat ional evidence that wage 
costs rise w i t h f i r m size. Evidence in the cases of FRG and UK is given in 
Figures 6.6 and 6.7, respectively, which show annual wage and non-wage costs 
in 1984 broken down by six categories of f i rm size. 
A number of explanations have been put fo rward fo r the (direct) wage 
phenomenon. These include: 
(1) Workers in large f i rms have to be compensated for their more 
specialised skil ls so as to induce low rates of turnover (see e.g. Oi 
(1983)). Nevertheless, i f only large f i rms employ such specialised 
workers, market conditions may be such as to ensure low turnover 
w i thou t the requirement for large wage d i f fe rent ia ls . 
(2) Large f i rms are arranged on a hierarchical basis due to the need for 
supervision of workers. To induce workers to move up the hierarchy, 
higher wages must be paid (see e.g. Calvo and Well isz (1978)). 
(30 Large f i rms are l ikely to enjoy more market power. Workers, 
real is ing this, w i l l seek to apportion a share of the monopoly pro f i ts 
for themselves. 
(4) More product ive f i rms wi l l tend to have larger workforces. They 
must a t t rac t more workers per period than smal ler f i rms in order to 
main ta in equi l ibr ium. In order to do so they w i l l tend to have to o f fe r 
higher wages (see e.g. Strand (1987)). 
These explanations are concerned exclusively w i th the relat ionship between 
wage costs and f i rm size. They do not consider how nonwage costs and f i r m 
size might be re la ted. The positive relationship between to ta l labour costs 
and f i r m size in the FRG and the UK is shown in Figures 6.6 and 6.7, 
respect ive ly . In the UK, for example, workers in manufactur ing f i rms 
employing more than 1000 workers cost their employers on average 36 per 
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cent more than those in firms employing between 10 and 49 workers. Similar 
differences between size categories are also apparent within industries. 
Not only do wage costs increase with firm size, so do NWLCs. This 
is evident from Figure 6.8 for FRG and Figure 6.9 for UK (see also Hart, 
1984, for further FRG, Japanese and UK evidence) which gives the absolute 
amount spent by firms of different sizes on different categories of NWLC. 
Obviously National Insurance charges will be closely related to earnings and 
one would expect these therefore to increase with firm size, given the above 
wage information, but the relationship of other NWLCs to wage costs is not 
so predictable a priori. Nevertheless, the association does appear to be 
positive with larger firms spending more on voluntary social welfare, 
subsidised services, etc. Simple regression analysis of the 1984 results by 
size of firm confirms the existence of a positive association between annual 
wage costs and the endogenous component of non-wage costs (comprising the 
sum of all components of NWLCs which are not determined by government). 
Further analysis of the residuals indicates significant firm size and industry 
effects on endogenous NWLCs above those which can be explained by 
earnings alone. 
What special features of NWLCs in their own right provide a positive 
association with firm size? The following would appear to be among the 
most likely explanations: 
(A) Insurance and other fringe benefits bought through the firm may be 
cheaper than eguivalent purchases on the open market due to the 
availability of group discounts. This sort of advantage would appear 
to be positively related to firm size since, as pointed out by Freeman 
(1981), large firms not only can spread the fixed costs of 
implementing and running deferred compensation schemes but also 
can expect to pay lower per worker fees for management of the 
various funds. 
Figure 6.8: FRG: Non-Wage Labour Costs 1984 by Size of Firm 
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(Β) Workers in large f i rms have re la t ive ly long average tenure due, for 
example, to greater opportunit ies for internal mob i l i t y . For thei r 
parts, such f i rms should be par t icu lar ly aware of the benefits of 
providing deferred compensation packages in order to encourage f i r m 
a t tachment . 
(C) Longer tenure and greater opportunit ies for acguir ing specif ic human 
capi ta l in larger f i rms may encourage the f i r m to compensate labour 
in l ine w i t h the 'agency' pr inciple (Lazear, 1981). Firms may o f fe r 
the possibi l i t ies of wage supplements at la ter stages of working l i f e -
through pension, health and other fr inge benefi ts - as an incent ive for 
younger workers to avoid shirking and to a t t emp t to c l imb the 
promot ion ladder as guickly as possible. By paying workers more 
than thei r marginal products in la ter years and less than their 
marginal products in the early years, f i rms inbui ld a mechanism that 
encourages ef f ic ient working pract ices and avoids monitor ing costs. 
The scale and complexity of large f i rms may render the la t te r type of 
cost to be par t icu lar ly high. 
(D) Large f i rms are more l ike ly to employ groups of highly 
interdependent workers whose guit costs to the f i rm may be 
par t i cu la r l y severe. There may be great incent ives, therefore, to 
minimise turnover costs by providing wage and f r inge compensation 
considerably above the going market ra te . 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions 
Non-wage labour costs comprise between 30 and 40 per cent of to ta l 
labour costs in the average f i r m w i th in the OECD bloc of countr ies. Fixed 
NWLCs account for up to 20 per cent of tota l labour costs in most countr ies 
and a considerably higher percentage in Japan. Moreover, both to ta l and 
f ixed NWLCs have grown systemat ical ly in re la t ive impor tance over several 
decades and, in many countr ies, are l ikely to continue to expand their to ta l 
labour cost shares. Yet , despite these impressive magnitudes and trends, 
research work and policy analysis has focussed a t ten t ion , un t i l very recent ly , 
almost exclusively on the rô le of direct wages. This def ic iency is 
compounded when i t is considered that there now exists a strong body of 
theoret ica l l i t e ra tu re that has established a set of d is t inc t ive labour market 
e f fec ts of various types of non-wages. 
A f t e r somewhat gradual progress f rom the mid 1960s to the early 
1980s, labour market economists have started to pay considerably more 
empi r ica l and pol icy at tent ion both to NWLCs as an aggregate phenomenon as 
wel l as to the main component parts of non-wages. The roots of the modern 
work were established during the 1960s in the analyses of Oi , Becker, Rosen 
and others. These studies concentrated on human capi ta l aspects of NWLCs 
- l ike t ra in ing and hir ing costs - and established the fundamental importance 
of dist inguishing between f ixed and variable elements of non-wages. Early 
a t ten t ion was concentrated, in part icular, on the impl icat ions of the 
existence of f ixed and variable costs for cyc l i ca l movements in 
employment . I t was also established in some of these early studies that the 
existence of f ixed labour costs necessitated the exp l ic i t division of the labour 
input in to stock and ut i l isat ion dimensions. In essence, the later work has 
bui l t on these foundations and cast fresh l ight on impor tan t labour market 
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problems which feature other types of non-wages, together w i t h their f ixed 
and variable dimensions. One object ive of the present repor t has been to 
provide a comprehensive coverage of the key issues of cur ren t concern. 
Perhaps the single most impor tant topic of cur ren t interest is that 
featured in sect ion 4.2, namely the re la t ive f lex ib i l i t y of working hours and 
nominal wages in Japan compared to most other OECD countr ies. Some 
economists hold the view that explaining such f l ex ib i l i t y is an essential step 
towards understanding Japan's persistently low rates of unemployment; in 
essence, hours and wages are seen as providing a bu f fe r to f luctuat ions in 
aggregate demand leaving the employment stock re la t i ve ly immune f rom the 
e f fec ts of 'surprise' economic events. By contrast, the USA and European 
countr ies appear to re ly far more heavily on employment guant i ty 
adjustments to changing economic condit ions. 
H i the r to , i t has proved to be par t icu lar ly d i f f i c u l t to obtain 
convincing explanations of these d is t inc t ly d i f ferent react ions to economic 
f luc tuat ions. Very recent work, however, has provided some v i ta l clues. 
The work has been concerned pr imar i l y w i th comparat ive internat ional levels 
of f ixed NWLCs. On f i rs t re f lec t ion , the argument tha t Japan's dist inct 
posi t ion is due to i t having far higher per capita f i xed non-wages than 
elsewhere is not convincing. I t might wel l be expected that f ixed costs 
associated w i t h h i r ing, t ra in ing, machine set-up, f r inge benef i ts and so on are 
l i ke ly to occur, more or less, w i t h egual incidence in Japan and any other 
large industr ia l capi ta l is t country. Estimates of these categories of f i x i t y 
for Japan, FRG, UK and USA in chapters 2 and 6 of this repor t certainly do 
not ind icate any t ru ly exceptional Japanese t ra i ts . What makes the f i x i t y 
explanat ion fa r more convincing is the possibil i ty tha t bonus payments in 
Japan largely re f lec t returns to workers' human capi ta l investments. In 
terms of magnitude, there is nothing in Europe or the USA that matches the 
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Japanese bonus system. If it is the case that - at least in large part - the 
bonus represents the workers' share of the guasi-rents arising from human 
capital investments then an explanation for stronger worker-employer 
attachments in Japan compared to workers elsewhere is more firmly 
established. Further, given greater job specificity, there are sound reasons 
why Japanese workers would be relatively willing to accept work sharing - in 
the sense of reduced average hours - and wage reductions in the face of 
downturns in economic activity. 
It should be stressed, however, that there is no general agreement 
over the main economic rationale for bonus payments in Japan. Certainly, 
both theoretical and empirical support for the proposition that Japanese 
labour specificity is significantly higher than its main competitors is by no 
means conclusive. The above comments merely point to the fact that this is 
a potentially very rewarding avenue to explore in considerably more depth. 
For example, if wage compensation structures could be introduced on the 
European scene that helped to induce more flexibility with respect to both 
intensive market activity and nominal wages then a set of significant 
strategies for dealing with the problems of unemployment might be 
established. One approach already advocated along these lines - primarily 
linked to the work of the economist Martin Weitzman - has been to suggest 
the introduction of more profit sharing schemes in Europe. In this work, 
Japanese bonuses are viewed essentially as profit shares. It might be 
mentioned in this respect - following the discussion in section 3.4 - that the 
analysis of these issues incorporating the separation of workers and hours and 
accommodating NWLCs does not produce unambiguous policy conclusions. It 
points, for example, to a positive relationship between profit sharing and 
labour utilisation (e.g. longer hours) in the profit-sharing firm and may give 
some pointer to the fact that the Japanese working hours are more flexible 
than in many other countries. 
206 
In sharp contrast to Japan, the internal labour market in Europe has 
been marked by s t r i c t r ig id i t ies rather than inbuil t f l e x i b i l i t y . This has been 
no more apparent than in the European debate - par t i cu la r ly in FRG - on the 
length of work ing hours. European unions have envisaged work sharing in the 
face of high unemployment levels in the form of systemat ic once- fo r -a l l 
reduct ions in weekly or annual hours of work. Again, NWLCs have featured 
prominent ly in the analysis of related labour marke t issues. Fixed 
non-wages const i tu te a 'premium' for hir ing new workers eguivalent to the 
over t ime and sh i f t premiums incurred by employers who wish to extend 
working hours. Reductions in standard, or normal, hours can have the e f fec t 
of increasing marginal employment cost on the extensive re la t ive to the 
intensive margin thereby inducing less, not more, employment . Rather, 
f i rms may seek to extend overt ime working or introduce more shi f twork ing or 
employ more p a r t - t i m e workers as a means of o f fse t t ing these re lat ive cost 
e f fec ts . Chapter 3 presents a wide range of theore t i ca l and empir ical 
evidence that tends in large part to underline the high risks of adopting 
strategies of systematic working t ime reductions in order to al leviate high 
and persistent levels of unemployment. Interest ingly, as discussed in sect ion 
3.3, para l le l economic arguments exist over policies designed to reduce the 
mandatory age of re t i rement in order to create new jobs in the younger age 
cohorts. Younger workers may a t tempt to adjust to shorter expected 
work ing l i f e t imes - or more str ingent social secur i ty penalt ies for remaining 
at work beyond a given age - by increasing average hours in order to provide 
themselves w i t h o f fset t ing earnings improvements. 
Another distinguishing feature of the European approach to recent 
labour market problems has been the extension of leg is la t ion covering job 
secur i ty . Again, this introduces a form of market r i g i d i t y and involves f ixed 
NWLCs. In sect ion 4.3, we at tempt to summarise the main benefits and 
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costs of job security and, while not coming down firmly on one side or the 
other, it is clear that the introduction of each new item of legislation 
involves the risk, in a longer term context, of potentially threatening some of 
the jobs it seeks to protect. It is guite clear that given security proposals 
should be examined in their own right and that generalised policy prescription 
should be avoided. 
In all European countries, statutory social welfare contributions 
constitute the largest individual component of NWLCs in the typical firm. 
The contributions take the form of taxes on that section of the firm's payroll 
that lies between legislatively proscribed lower- and upper-wage ceilings. 
Tax rates have tended to grow systematically through time and, especially in 
recent times, upper-ceiling limits have grown faster than average wages in 
several countries. In part, such growth rates have occurred in order to meet 
the growing demand for resources for state pensions, health provision and 
unemployment benefits. At the same time, European industrial and regional 
policies have tended to provide increasing capital subsidies for such purposes 
as assisting ailing industries and encouraging industrial mobility to poorer 
geographical areas. An influential view has been that statutory social 
welfare contributions are a 'tax on jobs' and thus detrimental to employment 
prospects and, moreover, that the position is aggravated by capital-labour 
substitution induced by the relatively favourable capital subsidies. These 
issues are examined closely in section 3.2 through a discussion of recent 
reductions in UK statutory contributions, partly as a result of the above types 
of argument, as well as through recent empirical work into the employment 
effects of changed in FRG payroll taxes and ceiling limits. More 
macro-based empirical work is also reported on in section 4.4. As with the 
discussion on job security, the view is taken that while certain obvious 
employment scale advantages may result from payroll tax reductions there 
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are offsetting problems that, at least, point to the need for great caution in 
this policy domain. For example, since payroll taxes comprise 
overwhelmingly variable NWLCs to the average firm, given the existence of 
relatively high upper-wage ceilings, tax reductions would serve to induce 
firms to substitute more labour utilisation - perhaps through longer average 
hours - for fewer workers. This results from the fact that fixed non-wages 
rise relative to variable labour costs. Indeed, the FRG evidence reported on 
in section 3.2.2 suggests that this negative substitution effect may be large 
enough to overwhelm the positive scale effect. On the other hand, while 
other types of complication arise in a more macro context, the reported 
findings in section 4.4 suggest that job creation by this sort of approach may, 
at least in the context of the UK economy, be more cost effective than the 
policy alternatives of reductions in income or value added taxes. 
In many countries, average non-statutory wage supplements in the 
form of fringe benefits are roughly comparable to statutory social welfare 
payments as percentages of total labour costs. Chapter 5 contains a 
thorough review of the most recent USA research into the causes of the 
pattern of growth of the two most important voluntary supplements, private 
pension and health insurance. Perhaps the most important economic issues 
related to these types of NWLC concern the economic implications of the 
growth rates for tax revenues and for the eguity of the tax system. 
Potential problems arise because fringe benefits are often exempted from 
certain types of corporate and individual taxes or incur relatively low 
marginal tax rates. The pros and cons of attempting to tax non-wages on a 
similar basis to direct wages are discussed in Chapter 5. The chapter also 
deals with pension regulation as well as aspects of statutory programmes and 
their costs. 
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In large par t , pr ivate fr inges and statutory social wel fare payments 
cover broadly s imi la r domains. Both forms of non-wage are dominated by 
health and pension provision. While the discussion in chapter 5 embraces the 
two categories of wage supplement, i t stops short of an in depth evaluation of 
how the systems may be rat ional ised so as to al locate t o ta l resources - f rom 
pr ivate and s ta te sectors - more e f f i c ien t ly (see Har t , 1985, for a general 
pol icy discussion). I t is in this context that , u l t imate ly , the current research 
ac t i v i t y in to the economic causes and impl icat ions of each main type of 
pr ivate and s ta tu to ry wage supplement may prove to be par t icu lar ly 
rewarding. 
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